Walton v. Ketchum
| Decision Date | 20 December 1898 |
| Citation | 48 S.W. 924,147 Mo. 209 |
| Parties | Walton et al., Appellants, v. Ketchum et al |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. James E. Withrow Judge.
Affirmed.
Webster & Webster for appellants.
(1) The deed from O'Flaherty to Meegan, under which all parties claim title, should be given such construction as will effectuate the intent of the parties thereto, and to that end all its parts should be considered in gathering its meaning as well as the circumstances under and the purposes for which it was made; and the construction given to it must be reasonable, so as to fairly give effect to its intent. Jennings v. Brizeadine, 44 Mo. 332; Long v Wagoner, 47 Mo. 178; Jamison v. Fopiano, 48 Mo. 194; Bruensman v. Carroll, 52 Mo. 313; Wolfe v. Dyer, 95 Mo. 545; Cook v. Couch, 100 Mo. 29; Louis v. Pitman, 101 Mo. 291; Davis v. Hess, 103 Mo. 31; Long v. Trimons, 107 Mo. 512; McCullock v. Holmes, 111 Mo. 445; Fosburgh v. Rogers, 114 Mo. 122; Hanna v. Land Co., 126 Mo. 1; Lakenan v. Railroad, 36 Mo.App. 363; Church v. Kellar, 39 Mo.App. 441. (2) A life estate may be created by necessary implication from the terms of a deed. Bean v. Kenmuir, 86 Mo. 666; Cornwell v. Orton, 126 Mo. 355; Elston v. Schilling, 42 N.Y. 79; Lockridge v. McCammon, 90 Tex. 234; Anderson's Law Dict., title "Dispose;" Black's Law Dict., title "Dispose;" Bouvier's Law Dict., title "Dispose;" Century Dict., title "Dispose." (3) Upon the death of Ann Yore the trust created by the deed was executed in the children of Patrick and Ann Yore. 1 Perry on Trusts, secs. 298, 305, 307; 27 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 107-125, 309; Roberts v. Mosely, 51 Mo. 282; Pitts v. Sheriff, 108 Mo. 117; Laurens v. Jenney, 1 Speers, 356. (4) The intent of the deed from O'Flaherty to Meegan as trustee, was clearly to give to Patrick Yore, in case he survived his wife, the use, occupation and control of the property during his lifetime, and the legal effect of such grant of the use was to create a life estate in him. 3 Washb. on Real Prop. [5 Ed.], p. 406. (5) The statute of limitations did, and could not begin to run against plaintiffs until the termination of Patrick Yore's life estate, notwithstanding the trust was executed in her children upon the death of Ann Yore. Brown v. Moore, 74 Mo. 633; Sutton v. Casseleggi, 77 Mo. 397; Colvin v. Hauenstein, 110 Mo. 575; Thomas v. Black, 113 Mo. 66; Fischer v. Siekman, 125 Mo. 165. (6) Patrick Yore having the right to use and occupy said property during his lifetime, lawfully took and remained in possession; but, being only a life tenant, he could not, by any act, claim or words, enlarge his estate therein, or make his possession adverse to his children. Salmon's Adm'r v. Davis, 29 Mo. 176; Keith v. Keith, 80 Mo. 126.
Fred. Wislizenus for respondents.
(1) Patrick Yore had no interest under the deed from O'Flaherty to Meegan. First. Life estates by implication are known in wills, not in deeds. 2 Woerner's Am. Law of Adminis., p. 882, sec. 418; 1 Washb. on Real Prop., * 89; Tudor on Real Prop., p. 640; 1 Preston on Estates, p. 190; 1 Eq. Abr. Cases, 196; 2 Ld. Raymond, 1152. Second. Even in wills the implication will not be raised, unless the intention so clearly appears that a contrary intention can not be supposed to have existed in the testator's mind. Barlow v. Barnett, 28 A. 597; Barnett v. Barnett, 29 Beav. 239. (2) On the death of Ann the trust was not executed but remained active. First. A trust will not be executed if its continuance serves a legal useful purpose, such as protection of a remainder, nor will it be executed if there are active duties reposed in the trustee. Pugh v. Hayes, 113 Mo. 428; 1 Sanders on Uses [Am. Ed.], 253; Hill on Trustees, sec. 361; Perry on Trusts, sec. 306; Barker v. Greenwood, 1 Horn and Hurl, 389; 27 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 309. Second. A trust will always continue where the interests of a married woman are involved. Tiedeman on Real Prop., sec. 569; Schouler on Dom. Rel., sec. 105; Sanders on Uses, p. 387; Bank v. Taylor, 53 Mo. 450; Morrison v. Thistle, 67 Mo. 596; Perry on Trusts, secs. 310, 329; Weekman v. Berry, 55 Pa. St. 70. (3) When the statute of limitations runs against a trustee, it also runs against all beneficiaries of the trust. Yore v. Yore, 63 F. 645; Ewing v. Shannahan, 113 Mo. 188; Boswell on Lim., sec. 340; Decouche v. Savetier, 3 Johns. Ch. 190; Walker v. Walker, 16 S. & R. 379; Winnfield v. Virgin, 51 Ga. 139.
From a judgment for defendants the plaintiffs appealed.
The facts are undisputed. All parties claim title under a deed from Thomas O'Flaherty to James Meegan, trustee, and the only questions raised on this appeal arise upon the construction to be given that deed. The deed omitting formal matters is as follows:
"This deed, made and entered into this twenty-sixth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two, by and between Thomas O'Flaherty and Eliza, his wife, of the city and county of St. Louis, and State of Missouri, parties of the first part, and James Meegan, of the same place, of the second part, and Ann Yore, wife of Patrick Yore, party of the third part, all of St. Louis, aforesaid, witnesseth: That the parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of three thousand dollars, to them in hand paid by the said Patrick Yore, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, sold, remised, released and forever quitclaim unto said Meegan, a certain lot of ground in said city, in block one hundred and ninety-four in the addition to St. Louis" (the lot in controversy).
"To have and to hold the said lot of ground above described, with all the privileges and appurtenances to the same belonging or in anywise appertaining unto him, the said James Meegan, his heirs, executors, administrators and successors, in trust, and confidence, however, for the following uses and purposes, and for none other, to wit: For the sole use, benefit and behoof of the said Ann Yore during her natural life and no longer, to receive the rents, profits and issues arising from or growing out of the said premises, and to pay over the same to the said Ann Yore, or to dispose of the said premises by sale, hypothecation, mortgage, or otherwise, as the said Ann Yore, with the assent of her said husband in writing, signed by them and attested by two respectable witnesses, shall direct, and in case of the death of said Patrick Yore and Ann, his wife, before the said premises shall be disposed of, then the same to be held by said James Meegan, as trustee as aforesaid, for the sole use and benefit of the children of the said Patrick Yore and Ann, his wife."
The other facts, essential to an understanding of the points involved, are, Ann Yore died intestate in 1876, without having made any disposition of the property. She left six children of her marriage with Patrick Yore, of which plaintiff, Sarah O. Walton, is one. She was married to her co-plaintiff, Frederick Walton, before Barbara Ann's death.
It is admitted that Patrick Yore, on the death of Barbara Ann, entered into possession of the property in controversy, openly and notoriously claiming and holding the same as his own against all the world, and collecting the rents thereof to his own use till the marriage settlement hereinafter mentioned.
Patrick Yore in 1879 married defendant, Sophia Yore. A marriage settlement was made whereby Sophia released all rights including dower in Patrick Yore's property, and was granted a life estate in the property involved in this suit. The essential parts of that marriage settlement are set forth in appellants' abstract. Ever since the marriage Sophia Yore has held the property openly and notoriously claiming and holding the same as her own against all the world, and is still doing so.
Patrick Yore died in 1889, claiming the property, subject to Sophia Yore's life estate.
Defendant Ketchum is Sophia Yore's tenant.
Plaintiffs contend that the property in controversy was not disposed of, within the meaning and intent of the deed prior to the death of Patrick Yore who survived his wife; that it was the intention of all parties to the deed that Patrick Yore, in case he survived his wife, should have the sole right to the use and occupancy of said premises during his lifetime and that therefore the right of entry and of action did not accrue to them until his death in 1889, and hence the statute of limitations is no bar to their recovery. Defendants on the other hand insist that Patrick Yore took no estate whatever under the deed. Obviously not a curtesy, because Mrs. Yore only took an equitable life estate herself, and not a life estate by implication, because such a construction would clearly defeat the plainly expressed intention of the grantor. Secondly, that the statute of limitations is a bar because having run against the trustee Meegan it also ran against the beneficiaries.
I. The substratum of plaintiffs' argument is that the deed by implication created a life estate in Patrick Yore and the right of immediate possession never vested in plaintiffs until his death in 1889. Much discussion was had at the bar and is repeated in the briefs of the proposition advanced by defendants, that a life estate by implication can never be created by deed but must necessarily be by will. If as we take it plaintiffs only contend that in the construction of a deed as well as a will, courts no longer look to the mere formal words of grant to ascertain what is granted, but gather the intention and purpose of the grantor from all the corners of the deed and effectuate that purpose unless prohibited by some positive provision of law, then w...
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