Walton v. Ramp

Decision Date29 July 1980
Docket NumberNo. 1-480A77,1-480A77
Citation407 N.E.2d 1189
PartiesDouglas A. WALTON, and Regina M. Walton, Appellants (Plaintiffs Below), v. James RAMP, Renetta Ramp, Decatur County Board of Commissioners, Appellees(Defendants Below).
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Dennis E. Harrold, Soshnick, Bate & Harrold, Shelbyville, Phillips B. Johnson, Johnson & Eaton, Versailles, for appellants.

James K. Wheeler, Locke, Reynolds, Boyd & Weisell, Indianapolis, for appellees.

ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiffs-Appellants, Douglas A. Walton and Regina M. Walton (Walton), appeal a summary judgment granted to the Defendant-Appellee, Decatur County Board of Commissioners (County). 1 The lawsuit arose out of an automobile accident in which Douglas A. Walton's automobile went off the road allegedly because of an icy slick spot in the road maintained by the County. The Waltons allege in their complaint that the spot was caused artificially by the co-defendant adjacent landowners, James and Fernetta Ramp, allowing water to spill off their property. The Waltons also allege in their complaint that the County was guilty of negligence in: (1) failure to remove the ice; (2) failure to restrain the Ramps from pouring water on the highway (3) failure to warn travelers of the icy spot; (4) failure to barricade the spot; and (5) permitting the icy slick spot to remain on the highway so as to constitute a hazard.

We reverse.

The standard of review in a summary judgment case is that it is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 56(C).

In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is upon the moving party to establish that no material facts are in genuine issue and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Hale v. Peabody Coal Co., (1976) Ind.App., 343 N.E.2d 316. Thus, for purposes of determining whether to grant the motion, the facts set forth in the non-moving party's affidavits are taken as true, and the products of discovery are liberally construed in his favor. Hale, id. Also, even if the facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is not appropriate when the information before the court reveals a good faith dispute as to the inferences to be drawn from those facts. Hale, id.

In this case, the trial court essentially found under the facts alleged in the complaint that the County was immune from liability under the Tort Claims Act. The trial court found in particular that the icy highway was a temporary condition resulting from weather, which is one of the specific immunities found in Ind. Code 34-4-16.5-3.

The law in Indiana is well established that a governmental entity is bound to exercise reasonable care and diligence to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel. Koonce v. City of Evansville, (1975) 163 Ind.App. 539, 325 N.E.2d 220. This is a common law duty. Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, (1970) 253 Ind. 472, 255 N.E.2d 225. Under the common law, a governmental entity is not liable for injuries caused by defects in its streets and sidewalks due to natural accumulation of snow and ice. City of Southbend v. Fink, (1966) 139 Ind.App. 282, 219 N.E.2d 441. In examining the immunity statute, we think the Tort Claims Act is...

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16 cases
  • Carroll v. Jobe
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • August 10, 1994
    ...of the common law in this area, and it does not abrogate this duty. Ind.Code § 34-4-16.5; Van Bree, 584 N.E.2d at 1117; Walton v. Ramp (1980), Ind.App., 407 N.E.2d 1189. However, there is no similar corresponding duty for owners of property abutting a public sidewalk. Hirschauer v. C & E Sh......
  • Tucher v. Brothers Auto Salvage Yard, Inc.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • January 10, 1991
    ...question is whether the presence of gravel in a roadway is a defect which a governmental entity is obliged to remove. In Walton v. Ramp (1980), Ind.App., 407 N.E.2d 1189, we held that ice on a road, created when an adjacent landowner allowed water to spill onto the road, was not a condition......
  • Ladra v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • December 9, 2021
    ...from weather," the Court of Appeals described the ITCA as "little more than a codification of the common law." Walton v. Ramp , 407 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). And based on this observation, the court concluded that the ITCA did "not abrogate the common law duty" of a government......
  • Ladra v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • December 9, 2021
    ...resulting from weather," the Court of Appeals described the ITCA as "little more than a codification of the common law." Walton v. Ramp, 407 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980). And based on this observation, the court concluded that the ITCA did "not abrogate the common law duty" of a gov......
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