Walton v. State

• Decision Date: 06 June 1903
• Citation: 75 S.W. 1
• Parties: WALTON v. STATE.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 1

75 S.W. 1

WALTON v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

June 6, 1903.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pulaski County; Robt. J. Lea, Judge.

Jas. Walton was convicted of seduction, and appeals. Reversed.

The indictment is as follows (after omitting formal part): "The said James Walton, in the county and state aforesaid, on the 15th day of May, 1901, being a single and unmarried man, unlawfully and feloniously did obtain carnal knowledge of one Julia Robinson, a single and unmarried female, by virtue of a false expressed promise of marriage, to her previously made by said James Walton, against the peace," etc. Appellant demurred to the indictment. His demurrer being overruled, exceptions were saved. After conviction, appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment; upon the overruling of which, appellant saved exceptions. He was tried upon his plea of not guilty, convicted, and appealed to this court. After conviction the appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment, which was by the court overruled, to which he excepted. Before the case was submitted to the jury, the defendant's counsel moved the court to give to the jury the following instruction, to wit: "Instruction No. 2. While Julia Robinson is presumed to have been virtuous at the time of the alleged intercourse, if the jury believe from the evidence or circumstances that she was not chaste and virtuous and did not possess actual personal chastity, or if the jury have reasonable doubt about this, they should acquit." The only other instruction on reasonable doubt in the case was instruction No. 1, which, as given by the court, is as follows: "Instruction No. 1. The burden is on the state to show beyond reasonable doubt: (1) That the crime was committed in Pulaski county, Ark.; (2) that it occurred within three years before the finding of the indictment; (3) that the defendant had carnal knowledge of Julia Robinson; and (4) that such carnal knowledge was had by virtue of an express promise of marriage made to her by the defendant, and that she would not have yielded to his embraces without such promise of marriage." The court refused to give this as asked, but modified it by striking out the words "and she would not have yielded to his embraces without such promise of marriage," to which the defendant excepted. This was not an instruction that if the jury had a reasonable doubt on the whole case, which would have included the part of instruction No. 2 refused by the court, "that she (the woman) did not possess actual personal chastity, or if the jury have reasonable doubt about this, they should acquit." There were other instructions asked and refused, and various questions raised and discussed, some of which are questions for a jury should the appellant be tried again on this charge, and others of which it is unnecessary for us to discuss.

F. T. Vaughan, for appellant. Geo. W Murphy, Atty. Gen., for the State.

HUGHES, J. (after stating the facts).

It seems to us so plain that the court erred in refusing to give the second instruction for the defendant that we deem it unnecessary to discuss it. This instruction is that "while Julia Robinson is presumed to have been virtuous at the time of the alleged intercourse, if the jury believe from the evidence or circumstances that she was not chaste and virtuous, and did not possess actual personal chastity, or if the jury have reasonable doubt about this, they should acquit." Actual personal chastity on the part of the woman was necessary to make out the crime of the defendant, and if the jury had a reasonable doubt that she possessed this they were bound to acquit the defendant. Actual personal chastity on her part was a material element of the crime. Polk v. State, 40 Ark. 486, 48 Am. Rep. 17.

It seems equally clear to this court that there was no prejudicial error committed by the court below in striking out and refusing to give the last clause of instruction No. 1, asked for by the defendant, which is as follows: "And she would not have yielded to defendant's embraces without such promise of marriage." The court had instructed the jury by instruction No. 3 that before they could convict the defendant they must find that such intercourse was had by reason and on account of defendant's promising to marry the girl, who, at the time she yielded to his embraces, was in possession of actual personal chastity. The last clause of instruction 1 was covered in effect by the first clause of same, and the court properly struck it out. There was no necessity to repeat what had been given.

Was the indictment sufficient, which is as follows (leaving out the formal parts), to wit: "That said James Walton, in the county and state aforesaid, on the...