Walton v. State, SC07-704.

• Decision Date: 29 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. SC07-704.,SC07-704.
• Citation: 3 So.3d 1000
• Parties: Jason Dirk WALTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

3 So.3d 1000

Jason Dirk WALTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC07-704.

Supreme Court of Florida.

January 29, 2009.

Rehearing Denied February 25, 2009.

Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, William M. Hennis, III, Litigation Director, CCR Counsel and Roseanne Eckert, Assistant CCR Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Katherine Maria Diamandis, and Katherine V. Blanco, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, FL, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Jason Dirk Walton appeals an order of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit summarily denying his successive motion to vacate three convictions of first-degree murder and corresponding death sentences under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Under our mandatory jurisdiction to review orders arising from capital proceedings, we affirm the circuit court's order. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

In his first claim, Walton has failed to demonstrate that the State violated his constitutional rights by utilizing inconsistent theories to secure convictions against each of the criminal defendants in this triple homicide. Walton also has not established prejudice from the alleged use of a state agent, who did not testify in his second sentencing proceeding. Next, the trial court properly denied Walton's motion for additional public records because each request was either overbroad, collateral, or irrelevant to his postconviction claims. Lastly, this Court has previously considered and repeatedly rejected the evidence presented by Walton in support of his challenge to the constitutionality of Florida's lethal injection protocol. Thus, for the reasons explained below, we affirm the circuit court's order summarily denying postconviction relief.

I. PROCEEDINGS TO DATE

A. Conviction and Sentencing

In 1984, Jason Dirk (J.D.) Walton was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder in Pinellas County. See Walton v. State, 481 So.2d 1197, 1198-99 (Fla.1985) (Walton I).¹ Armed with guns on a rainy Friday night, Walton, Richard Cooper, Jeffrey McCoy, and Terry Van Royal entered Steven Fridella's residence with the plan to rob the victim of money and drugs. See 481 So.2d at 1198; Walton v. State, 547 So.2d 622, 623 (Fla.1989) (Walton II). Once inside the house, they bound and held at gunpoint Fridella and two other men, Gary Peterson and Bobby Martindale. Walton ransacked the house but did not find any money or drugs. With the original plan proving unsuccessful, the three victims were killed by several shotgun blasts. See Walton I, 481 So.2d at 1198.

Walton made two statements to the police in which he admitted being present at the time of the homicide but denied any part in the shootings. See id. He told police that although he initiated the idea to commit the intended crime, he tested his handgun before entering the house and it had misfired. See id. He observed Van Royal and Cooper pointing shotguns at the victims. As Walton exited the house, he heard several gunshots. See id.

The jury found Walton guilty of all three counts of first-degree murder. See id. During the first penalty phase, the State introduced the testimony of an alleged jailhouse informant and former cellmate of codefendant Cooper. See id. at 1198-99. The cellmate testified that Cooper had indicated Walton was the "ringleader" and had informed Cooper that the codefendants were going to "eliminate" the victims. Id. The State also introduced the written confessions of Cooper and McCoy. See id. at 1198. Following the jury recommendation, the trial court imposed a death sentence for each murder. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions but reversed the death sentences and remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the written confessions constituted hearsay and thus were admitted in violation of Walton's confrontation rights. See id. at 1200-01.

During the second sentencing hearing, the State did not introduce the written confessions or the testimony of the jailhouse informant. Instead, it again presented Walton's confession, including the statement that Walton "turned on the television full blast to prevent the neighbors from hearing the victims scream and that he heard shotgun blasts as he left." Walton II, 547 So.2d at 623. A taped statement by McCoy was presented to the jury, which described the four men carefully devising the plan as retaliation because one of the victims had stolen marijuana from Walton's trailer. See id. A majority of the jury recommended death sentences on all counts, which the trial court imposed and this Court affirmed. See Walton II, 547 So.2d at 623.

B. Rule 3.850 and Habeas Proceedings

Governor Martinez signed a death warrant for Walton on September 24, 1990, and denied Walton's request for clemency. Thereafter, this Court granted a stay of execution for Walton to file his first rule 3.850 motion to vacate his convictions and sentences. The trial court denied Walton's ensuing motion.² In the same year, Walton filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court, in which he claimed error in the penalty phase jury instructions and presented other claims that were also concurrently presented in his motion to vacate.³ On appeal of the order denying the rule 3.850 motion, Walton contended that the circuit court erred when it denied his claim that the prosecutor had utilized inconsistent theories in securing the death sentences against him, which violated his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Of note, Walton has also raised this claim in the motion presently under review. This Court relinquished jurisdiction, reversed for an evidentiary hearing regarding Walton's entitlement to various public records, and reserved ruling on the other claims pending disposition of the public records request. See Walton III, 634 So.2d at 1062.

Subsequently, Walton filed his Third Amended Motion to Vacate based on newly discovered evidence found during the public records litigation. In this motion, it appears that Walton retooled his inconsistent theories claim as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The circuit court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Walton raised several additional claims.⁴ This Court affirmed the order and denied the habeas petition. See Walton IV, 847 So.2d at 443-60.

C. Successive Postconviction Proceedings

In 2006, Walton filed a successive motion for postconviction relief based on the discussion of inconsistent prosecutorial theories in Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005), and newly discovered affidavits from two witnesses regarding the jail informant's alleged role as a state agent. Walton also claimed that Florida's lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment based on the newly discovered evidence presented within an article, Inadequate Anaesthesia in Lethal Injection for Execution, published in The Lancet,⁵ and the American Bar Association's report on the death penalty, Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in the State Death Penalty System: The Florida Death Penalty Assessment Report, issued in 2006. In conjunction with his motion, Walton filed demands for public records from the Department of Corrections, the Office of the Attorney General, and the Office of the State Attorney, which were met with objections from each entity. The circuit court denied the public records request and entered a separate order summarily denying the motion to vacate. Walton now seeks relief from this Court, raising four issues related to the motion to vacate and two issues relating to the motion for production of additional public records.

II. ANALYSIS.

A. The State Did Not Use Inconsistent Theories to Secure Death Sentences Against All Codefendants.

In Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005), the United States Supreme Court addressed a prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories. Walton asserts that Bradshaw recognized a new constitutional right, which was that the State violates due process if it advances inconsistent positions to secure the same sentence against codefendants. Drawing from this "newly recognized" right, Walton now alleges that the State's presentation of inconsistent theories in the codefendants' cases violated his due process rights. Walton asserts that the State contended during his criminal proceedings that he was the ringleader and he ordered the codefendants to shoot the victims. Walton then posits, in supposed contrast, that the State argued in the separate trials of his codefendants (Cooper and Van Royal) that they shot the victims of their own will and thus were not entitled to mitigation for acting under extreme duress or substantial domination by Walton at the time of the murders. Walton maintains that these alleged inconsistencies subjected him to irreparable prejudice because the State's prosecutorial theory and the trial court's decision focused on his ringleader role as the basis for imposing the death sentences.

A successive rule 3.851 motion may be denied without an evidentiary hearing if the records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B). This Court reviews the circuit court's decision to summarily deny a successive rule 3.851 motion de novo, accepting the movant's factual allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record, and affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to no relief. See State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 137 (Fla.2003); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B).

The record conclusively demonstrates that Walton is not entitled to relief because this claim is procedurally barred and meritless. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(d)(2)(B) requires any ...