Walton v. U.S. Steel Corp., 31509

• Decision Date: 21 April 1964
• Docket Number: No. 31509,31509
• Citation: 378 S.W.2d 240
• Parties: Edward WALTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP., a Corporation, and Ross Redd, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 240

378 S.W.2d 240

Edward WALTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP., a Corporation, and Ross Redd Defendants-Respondents.

No. 31509.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

April 21, 1964.

Hullverson, Richardson & Hullverson, James E. Hullverson, Orville Richardson, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.

Robertson, Baker & De Voto, Ernest E. Baker, St. Louis, for defendants-respondent.

DOERNER, Commissioner.

The only issue presented by this appeal is one of law. Briefly, it is this: when a prevailing plaintiff is required to and does remit part of a judgment, and a new judgment for the reduced amount is entered 'as of' the date of the original judgment, is the plaintiff entitled to interest on the amount of the new judgment from the date of the rendition of the original judgment? The trial court held that the plaintiff was not, and this appeal followed.

The facts are a matter of record. In chronological order they are as follows: On July 13, 1960, plaintiff instituted this suit in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis against the defendants whereby he sought to recover damages for personal injuries. On April 25, 1961, at the conclusion of a jury trial, a verdict for $136,000 was returned in favor of plaintiff and against both defendants, and a judgment for that amount was entered. On May 6, 1961, defendants filed separate motions for judgment or in the alternative for a new trial, alleging therein (among other grounds) that the verdict was excessive. On July 7, 1961, the court entered an order stating that if within 10 days plaintiff would remit the sum of $46,000 the motions for a new trial would be overruled, otherwise they would be sustained on the ground that the verdict was excessive. On July 12, 1961, plaintiff remitted the sum of $46,000 from the judgment entered on April 25, 1961. The next day, July 13, the court entered the following order:

"Now on this day comes the plaintiff, by attorney, and here in open court, and in writing this day filed, pursuant to the order of Court made and entered herein on the 7th day of July, 1961, remits the sum of $46,000.00, from the verdict and judgment heretofore rendered in his favor reducing said judgment to the sum of $90,000.00; thereupon, it is ordered by the Court that the verdict and judgment rendered herein on the 25th day of April, 1961, in favor of plaintiff and against both defendants for the sum of $136,000.00, be reduced and a new judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff and against both defendants for the sum of $90,000.00, as and of April 25, 1961, the date of the original judgment.

"Wherefore, it is considered and adjudged by the Court that the plaintiff have and recover of both defendants the sum of $90,000, as and of April 25, 1961, together with the costs of this proceeding, for which let execution issue.

"It is further ordered by the Court that the separate motions of defendants to set aside verdict and enter judgment in accordance with their motions for a new trial, or in the alternative for a new trial, be and the same are hereby overruled."

Thereafter the defendants perfected their appeal to the Supreme Court. By an opinion handed down on November 15, 1962, reported in 362 S.W.2d 617, that court affirmed the judgment.

When the Supreme Court's mandate reached the Circuit Court on January 4, 1963, a dispute arose between plaintiff and the defendants over the computation of the interest due. Plaintiff contended that he was entitled to the amount of the judgment, $90,000, together with interest thereon from April 25, 1961, the date on which the original judgment was rendered. Defendant conceded that plaintiff was entitled to $90,000 but maintained that the interest should be allowed thereon from July 13, 1961, the date of the rendition of the reduced judgment. The disputed interest amounted to $1168.41. By agreement, defendants paid plaintiff the amount of the judgment together with the interest thereon from July 13, 1961, and defendant United States Steel Corporation deposited with the clerk of the court its check for $1168.41 payable to plaintiff and his attorneys, to be distributed to plaintiff or returned to that defendant as the court might decide. Based on their respective contentions, each party filed a motion for an order directing the clerk to deliver the check to him. On January 14, 1963, the court ruled in favor of defendant United States Steel Corporation, and plaintiff duly appealed.

The matter of interest due on a judgment is governed by Section 408.040, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S, which provides in part that 'Interest shall be allowed on all money due upon any judgment * * * from the day of rendering the same until satisfaction be made by payment, * * *.' It will be recalled that when plaintiff remitted the sum of $46,000 from the original judgment the court entered a new judgment for $90,000. Defendant maintains that the original judgment rendered on April 25, 1961, was erroneous because excessive, and that there was no valid judgment on which interest could accrue until the new judgment was entered on July 13, 1961. Plaintiff points out that the court entered the new judgment 'as and of April 25, 1961,' and argues that the judgment for $90,000 should therefore draw interest from that date. The solution to the problem presented would thus appear to depend upon the determination of the proper date of the rendition of the judgment.

Inherent in the problem is our practice of affirming a judgment on the granting of a remittitur. It is a practice which has long been established in our state as a matter of procedure, Smiley v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 359 Mo. 474, 222 S.W.2d 481, and the history of its development may be found in Cook v. Globe Printing Co., 227 Mo. 471, 127 S.W. 332. The principle upon which the practice is based was defined in Counts v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 485, 222 S.W.2d 487, 495, as follows:

'* * * The principle upon which this practice is based, as shown by these authorities, is that, when there is no substantial evidence to support a verdict for more than a certain maximum amount, the result may be due to error or mistake of the jury and not passion or prejudice. When that is the situation, the Court, in determining the maximum amount authorized by the evidence, does not award or fix the damages but only says that if the jury had given such maximum amount then its verdict could have properly been permitted to stand. It is, therefore, proper to permit the plaintiff to elect between accepting a judgment for such amount, by...