Waltrip v. TS Enters., Inc.
Decision Date | 01 March 2016 |
Docket Number | No. SCWC–11–0000722.,SCWC–11–0000722. |
Citation | 398 P.3d 815 |
Parties | Deborah J. WALTRIP, Petitioner/Claimant–Appellant, v. TS ENTERPRISES, INC., dba Kimo's Restaurant, and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, Respondent/Employer/Insurance Carrier–Appellee, and Special Compensation Fund, Respondent/Appellee. |
Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Deborah J. Waltrip, petitioner pro se.
Robyn M. Kuwabe, Honolulu, for respondent, Special Compensation Fund.
Robert E. McKee, Jr., Honolulu, for respondents, TS Enterprises, Inc., dba Kimo's Restaurant, and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company.
This case arises from an accident suffered by Petitioner/Claimant–Appellant, Deborah J. Waltrip ("Waltrip"), while she worked for TS Enterprises, Inc., dba Kimo's Restaurant ("Restaurant"), on Maui.1 The Special Compensation Fund ("Fund") established under Hawai'i Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 386–151 (1993), is also an interested party.2 We accepted certiorari to address certain procedural issues implicated by Waltrip's pro se appeal.
In brief, Waltrip was not given an award by the Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations ("DLIR") for certain aspects of her claimed injuries, and she appealed to the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board ("LIRAB"). Following a hearing, LIRAB issued its Decision and Order ("July 2011 Decision"). Unsatisfied with LIRAB's decision, Waltrip, pro se, filed two separate motions, each of which was denied. The first motion was titled, "Request to Reconsider" ("August Request"). The second motion was titled, "Request That the July 25th, 2011 Decision and Order Be Vacated and That the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board Issue a New Notice of Initial Conference and Restart the Proceedings All Over Again Including New Discovery Deadlines and a Retrial of the Issues" ("September Request"). Waltrip appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA").
Fund then filed a motion to dismiss Waltrip's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that her notice of appeal was untimely filed. The ICA issued an "Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Appellee Special Compensation Fund's May 3, 2012 Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction" ("Partial Dismissal Order") stating that Waltrip's notice of appeal was untimely as to LIRAB's July 2011 Decision, and was also untimely as to LIRAB's order denying the August Request. See Waltrip v. TS Enters., No. CAAP–11–0000722, at 3, 2012 WL 1959579 (order). As to Waltrip's appeal of LIRAB's order denying her September Request, the ICA concluded that "it appears that we might have appellate jurisdiction over [it]." Id. Accordingly, the ICA permitted the parties to proceed with briefing. Ultimately, the ICA found LIRAB lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Waltrip's September Request when it construed that request as a second motion for reconsideration over which the Board lacked statutory or regulatory authority to rule. See Waltrip v. TS Enters., No. CAAP–11–0000722, at 2, 2014 WL 4283722 (App. Aug. 28, 2014) (SDO).
The following timeline provides a sequence of major events relevant to the procedural posture presented by this case:
Upon accepting certiorari, this court ordered supplemental briefing to address the following issues:
We hold as follows:
(1) because: (a) under Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure ("HRAP") Rule 35(a), an order partially dismissing an appeal is not a "dispositional order"; (b) pursuant to HRS § 602–59(c) (Supp.2011), "[a]n application for a writ of certiorari may be filed with the supreme court no later than thirty days after the filing of the judgment or dismissal order of the intermediate appellate court," and (c) Waltrip timely filed her application for certiorari from the ICA's Judgment on Appeal, this court has jurisdiction to review both the ICA's Partial Dismissal Order and SDO which underpin the Judgment on Appeal;3 (2) the ICA did not err in issuing its Partial Dismissal Order, rather than wholly denying Fund's Motion to Dismiss and later addressing any partial dismissal in its eventual SDO, as it has the power under HRS § 602–57(3) (Supp.2010), "[t]o make or issue any order ... necessary or appropriate in the aid of its jurisdiction ...," and also because it referred to its partial dismissal in its subsequent SDO; (3) in reviewing the Partial Dismissal Order, the ICA did not err in dismissing Waltrip's appeal of LIRAB's (a) July 2011 Decision and (b) Order Denying August Request, for untimeliness; and (4) pursuant to the fundamental tenets that "[p]leadings prepared by pro se litigants should be interpreted liberally," Dupree v. Hiraga, 121 Hawai'i 297, 314, 219 P.3d 1084, 1101 (2009) (citation omitted), and that "pleadings [and letters] in administrative proceedings are to be construed liberally rather than technically," id. (citing Perry v. Planning Comm'n, 62 Haw. 666, 685–86, 619 P.2d 95, 108 (1980) ); Doe v. Attorney General, 135 Hawai'i 390, 399, 351 P.3d 1156, 1165 (2015) (discussing id. ), the ICA erred in holding in its SDO that LIRAB had no authority to rule on the merits of Waltrip's September Request because it was essentially an unauthorized second motion for reconsideration under HRS § 386–87(d) (1993),4 on the same grounds as the August Request, rather than viewing it as a motion to reopen under HRS § 386–89(c) (1993),5 when Waltrip's September Request was filed more than a year after LIRAB's hearing and she had attached post-hearing letters from her treating psychiatrist discussing both her physical and mental condition, which could be construed to constitute "substantial evidence ... of a change in ... a determination of fact related to [her] physical condition" pursuant to HRS § 386–89. Such a motion, however, should have been submitted to the Director of DLIR instead of LIRAB.
Accordingly, we affirm the ICA's Judgment on Appeal. The ICA's Judgment as to the July 2011 Decision and August Request is affirmed. The ICA's Judgment as to the September Request is affirmed on other grounds.
Waltrip sustained a work accident on September 18, 2001 while working for Restaurant. On September 4, 2002, she filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with DLIR. Waltrip described her work injury as pain in the left knee, reflex sympathetic dystrophy
("RSD"), neuropathy, atrophy, and depression. Waltrip was represented by counsel during the proceedings before DLIR until April 2006. Subsequently, she proceeded pro se. The Director of DLIR issued numerous interim decisions on Waltrip's claim including a January 4,...
To continue reading
Request your trial- State v. Loher, SCAP-24489
-
Goodwin v. Iowa Dist. Court, 18-0737
...of this tenet rest on the promotion of equal access to justice[.]' " (alterations in original) (quoting Waltrip v. TS Enters., Inc., 398 P.3d 815, 828 (Haw. 2016))); State v. Redding, 444 P.3d 989, 993 (Kan. 2019) ("Courts are to interpret pro se pleadings based upon their contents and not ......
-
Goodwin v. Iowa Dist. Court for Davis Cnty.
...of this tenet rest on the promotion of equal access to justice[.]’ " (alterations in original) (quoting Waltrip v. TS Enters., Inc. , 398 P.3d 815, 828 (Haw. 2016) )); State v. Redding , 310 Kan. 15, 444 P.3d 989, 993 (2019) ("Courts are to interpret pro se pleadings based upon their conten......
-
Erum v. Llego
...... of our law: "pleadings prepared by pro se litigants should be interpreted liberally." Waltrip v. TS Enters., Inc. , 140 Hawai‘i 226, 239, 398 P.3d 815, 828 (2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting ......
-
Case Notes
...which invoke the judicial system's interest in "promotion of equal access to justice[.]" Waltrip v. TSEnters., Inc., 140 Hawai'i 226, 239, 398 P3d 815, 828 (2016). In this case, claims brought by pro se Petitioner/Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant Richard A. Villaver ("Villaver") were dismisse......