Wanskuck Co. v. Puleo, 2086
| Decision Date | 31 July 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 2086,2086 |
| Parties | WANSKUCK CO. v. PULEO. Eq. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Worrell & Hodge and Lee A. Worrell, Providence, for petitioner.
Joseph V. Ortoleva, Providence, for respondent.
This petition to review a preliminary agreement under the Workmen's Compensation Act, General Laws 1938, chapter 300, was brought by the employer and was granted by the director of labor. It was heard de novo in the superior court on the respondent employee's appeal from that decision, and thereupon a decree was entered granting the petition on the ground that the respondent's incapacity had ceased. The cause is before this court on the employee's appeal from that decree.
It appears that on May 6, 1949 respondent sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with the petitioner. A preliminary agreement was entered into and provided for payments of compensation to the employee for an injury to his leg. In that agreement, which was approved by the director of labor, the injury is described as 'strain calf muscles' and the cause thereof is stated as 'knee against bale when tightening.' Payments thereunder of compensation at the rate of $28 weekly for total incapacity according to the act were made by the employer.
In April 1950 the employer filed the instant petition for a review of the agreement as above indicated. At the hearing thereon in the superior court petitioner called respondent as a witness, and also presented evidence from the foreman of the plant, the nurse in charge of first aid and records, three investigators, and Dr. Frank B. Littlefield. In general this evidence tended to show that respondent's leg still showed some slight residual evidence or effect of the injury which no longer prevented him from doing his regular work of wool sorting, especially if he used a supporting bandage; that petitioner had offered respondent lighter work of patching bags, but on three different occasions, after a comparatively few hours' trial, he went home claiming he was unable to do any work; that during the period when he thus claimed he was unable to do even light work as offered by petitioner he had been observed on different occasions by investigators while he was working as a bartender in a cafe; and that he was able to walk, bend, and serve customers for substantial periods of time without sitting down, and showed no signs of a limp or disability due to his injured leg.
In addition to other witnesses whose evidence tended to corroborate the respondent's ability to work, Dr. Littlefield testified personally to the effect that he had examined him on different occasions and had treated him regularly once a week from the middle of August 1950 to the time of the hearing; that the employee was now suffering from a venous insufficiency but was able, especially with the aid of a supporting bandage on his leg, to stand indefinitely and perform his usual work of wool sorting or the lighter work offered by the petitioner; that he did not consider it reasonably possible for the injury received by the employee to result directly in 'bursitis' in the heel or ankle as claimed by medical testimony for respondent; and that medically he could not agree with the claim made by respondent's doctor that a bursitis of the Achilles' muscle in back of the heel or in the ankle would be considered as coming within the injury as described in the agreement, namely, 'strain calf muscles.'
On the other hand there was testimony by the employee and by Dr. Frank D. Fratantuono, who had examined him on two occasions during hearings. While that doctor never treated the employee for the injury, he testified in effect that the respondent was still suffering from 'Moderal Achilles' tendon bursitis' in back of the heel or substantially in the ankle, which was said to be causally and directly connected with the injury to the Achilles' muscle; that the injury described in the preliminary agreement covered an area from the back of the knee down to the ankle; and that the employee's present difficulty and cause of his incapacity was a bursitis in the back of his ankle which was properly included, according to medical understanding, in the injury described in the preliminary agreement as 'strain calf muscles.' His testimony in general tended to corroborate the...
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