Hanley v. Westminster Motors, 2117

• Decision Date: 04 August 1952
• Docket Number: No. 2117,2117
• Citation: 90 A.2d 762,80 R.I. 22
• Parties: HANLEY v. WESTMINSTER MOTORS, Inc. Equity
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 762

90 A.2d 762

80 R.I. 22

HANLEY v. WESTMINSTER MOTORS, Inc.

Equity No. 2117.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Aug. 4, 1952.

Charles F. Cottam, Providence, for petitioner.

Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons, Matthew W. Goring, Thomas J. Hogan, Joseph H. Gainer, Jr., all of Providence, for respondent.

BAKER, Justice.

This is a petition brought by an employee against his employer to review a preliminary agreement entered into by the parties under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, General Laws 1938, chapter 300. After a hearing in the superior court the trial justice entered a decree awarding compensation and medical expenses to the petitioner and the respondent has duly prosecuted its appeal to this court.

Referred to chronologically and briefly, the evidence discloses among other things the following facts. In 1942 while working, petitioner fell an appreciable distance and suffered a fracture of his first lumbar vertebra. From that injury he apparently recovered completely within a year and went to work at the Quonset Point Naval Air Station as a mechanic doing lifting and heavy work on trucks without experiencing any pain. Later he became an inspector of motor vehicles there.

After the war he was discharged from that position and in 1947 was employed by respondent as a stock clerk and a parts manager. In February 1948 while working, a casting slipped out of his hands slightly injuring his right knee and back. On that occasion he was out of work only four days and signed a settlement receipt showing a compensation payment of $13.33. On January 18, 1949 while still employed by respondent in the same capacity petitioner was carrying a package from a higher level to the main floor, which was polished, and he suffered an injury by slipping, although not falling, while stepping down one step. At that time he experienced a severe pain in his right lower back area which radiated down into his right leg. This is the injury which is involved in the instant proceeding.

Although suffering considerable pain and receiving medical treatment, petitioner continued to work until February 21, 1949 when he became totally disabled. However, he returned to work March 2 because he did not wish to lose his job. On March 7 he signed the preliminary agreement under consideration and also a settlement receipt for the payment of $16.66 to cover the period he was out of work because of his disability, both instruments being duly approved by the director of labor. The petitioner continued in respondent's employment until May 25, 1949 when he was discharged.

Thereafter in July 1949 he worked for about ten days for another employer but was then discharged. He has done no work since July 16, 1949. His present petition for review was filed in the department of labor March 13, 1950. Since his injury on January 18, 1949 he has continuously suffered pain, varying in intensity, which originates in his lower back on the right side and radiates down that leg. Between the date of the accident and April 1950 he has called on at least fourteen doctors, ten of whom testified in the superior court. At that time petitioner was fifty-eight years of age.

The respondent's reasons of appeal number twenty-eight but only the first nine, which involve the same issue, are now being pressed. The remaining reasons of appeal are expressly waived. It is respondent's contention that the trial justice erred in awarding compensation and medical expenses for disability resulting from an injury which is not contained in the preliminary agreement being reviewed. In support of such contention the respondent has cited the following cases: Airedale Worsted Mills, Inc., v. Cote, 75 R.I. 361, 66 A.2d 802; Manville-Jenckes Corp. v. Lubinski, 76 R.I. 36, 68 A.2d 107; Peters v. Monowatt Electric Corp., R.I., 79 A.2d 922; Wanskuck Co. v. Puleo, R.I., 82 A.2d 872, 873.

Unquestionably those cases stand for the general principles that in the absence of challege an agreement approved by the director of labor is final to the extent of the facts therein agreed upon, and that on a petition to review such an agreement the trial justice in awarding compensation is not authorized to go beyond the specific injury stated therein. The petitioner, however, does not dispute the soundness of the above principles but argues that those cases are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar and do not govern it. He urges that he is incapacitated by the injury which is set out in such agreement after the printed words 'Nature and location of injury' as: 'Rt. sacro-iliac area.'

Upon consideration it is our opinion that the petitioner's contention has merit. An examination of the above cases shows that in each one the preliminary agreement entered into by the parties and then being reviewed contained a statement of a specific injury which was agreed to as being the cause of the employee's incapacity. For example, in the Wanskuck Co. case the injury was described in the agreement as 'strain calf muscles', whereas on review the employee in seeking compensation attempted unsuccessfully to show that bursitis in the back of the heel or ankle was within the scope of the injury set out in the agreement. The other cases cited by respondent dealt with other types of specific injuries, and in each of them the court in substance followed the general principles of law hereinbefore referred to in regard to the limitation placed upon the scope of its examination when a specific injury was clearly set out in the preliminary agreement.

However, a consideration of the preliminary agreement in the instant cause shows that the parties failed to set out clearly in that instrument and to agree upon any specific injury as the cause of petitioner's alleged incapacity to work. As already indicated the words 'Rt. sacro-iliac area' in the agreement follow the phrase 'Nature and location of injury.' Such language in our judgment should be given its ordinary and reasonable meaning and not a strained construction. So considered it appears that the location of the injury is set out,...