Want v. Wash. Co. MD Gov't
| Decision Date | 18 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: DKC-19-2545 |
| Parties | JEROME WANT, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON CO. MD GOVT., WASHINGTON CO. COMMISSIONERS, ROBERT SLOCUM, ANDREW ESHEMAN, KEVIN CERRONE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Without being served, Defendant Washington County Board of County Commissioners ("Washington County") filed a motion to dismiss the civil complaint filed by self-represented Plaintiff Jerome Want. (ECF No. 6). Mr. Want was sent a letter by the Clerk advising that, if he did not file an opposition to the motion to dismiss, his complaint may be dismissed without further warning. (ECF No. 7). Mr. Want did not oppose the motion, but instead filed proposed summonses for service of the complaint. (ECF No. 8). The complaint, which Mr. Want filed in forma pauperis,1 must be dismissed as to all named defendants, without requiring service of the complaint, for the reasons noted herein.
Mr. Want's complaint purports to assert a claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). (ECF No. 1 at p.1, ¶ 1; pp. 10-11). Mr. Want bases his claim on allegations that "Washington County Maryland Government has violated Plaintiff's rights . . . by not providing sufficient equipment and competent drivers to meet his physical needs as a disabledAmerican." (Id. at p. 1, ¶ 1). Mr. Want explains that he has been left "stranded for long periods of time without bus transportation," and that his "frequent complaints to county commissioners, the county transit and . . . to Andrew Eshelman, [and] Kevin Cerrone have been ignored." (Id). The narrative Mr. Want provides as the factual background for his claims recounts the occasions where the bus was late or did not arrive; the bus driver did not inform him he did not need to transfer to another bus; the bus stops did not have a place for him to sit; and the county encouraged smoking at bus stops where an ashtray was provided. (ECF No. 1 at pp. 2-8). He states that he has been forced to walk long distances when the bus does not arrive which is painful for him due to his back problems, which provide the basis for his disability. He adds that the discrimination against him as a disabled person includes:
(ECF No. 1 at p. 11). In addition, Mr. Want states that smoking should be banned at bus stops. (Id).
Washington County's motion to dismiss asserts that funding of public transit is not a justiciable issue (ECF No. 6 at p. 2-3) and that the ADA does not provide for the award of compensatory or punitive damages (id. at p. 4-5). Washington County further states that Mr. Want's attempt to have this court "order Washington Co. MD Government to allocate $2,500,000 as additional monies for the County Transit budget" is, in essence, his attempt to allocate local, state or federal government funds. (Id. at 2). Defendant explains:
(Id. at 3).
In reviewing the complaint in light of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construes the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir. 1997). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) ().
The Supreme Court of the United States explained a "plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, the complaint does not need "detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 555. Instead, "once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. at 563. To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not 'show[n]' -- 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Mr. Want's complaint fails to assert sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for the relief sought against Washington County; therefore, the unopposed motion to dismiss will be granted.
The claims against the remaining defendants are also subject to dismissal. Mr. Want's complaint was filed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in this court without prepaying the filing fee. To guard against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute requires dismissal of any claim that is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). This court is mindful, however, of its obligation to construe liberally self-represented pleadings, such as the instant complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Inevaluating such a complaint, the factual allegations are assumed to be true. Id. at 93 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). Nonetheless, liberal construction does not mean that this court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (). In making this determination, White v. White, 886 F. 2d 721, 722-723 (4th Cir. 1989). With this standard of review in mind, Mr. Want's claims against the remaining defendants are examined below.
The ADA was enacted in 1990 "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities," 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), and "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities." Id. § 12101(b)(2). Title II of the ADA, which is at issue here, prohibits public entities, including "any State or local government" and "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government," id. § 12131(1), from discriminating "by reason of" disability against a "qualified individual with a disability." Id. § 12132. To prevail under an ADA Title II claim, "a plaintiff must show that [he or] she was excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, a program or service offered by a public entity, or subjected to discrimination by that entity." Constantine v. George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 499 (4th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted); see also Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494, 502-03 (4th Cir. 2016). To that end, the Fourth Circuit has recognized "three distinct grounds for relief: (1) intentional discrimination or disparate treatment;(2) disparate impact; and (3) failure...
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