Ward v. Brown

• Decision Date: 29 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2:10–cv–0019 KJN.,2:10–cv–0019 KJN.
• Citation: 891 F.Supp.2d 1149
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: Shimaine WARD, Plaintiff, v. BROWN, et al., Defendants.

891 F.Supp.2d 1149

Shimaine WARD, Plaintiff,

v.BROWN, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:10–cv–0019 KJN.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Aug. 29, 2012.

Ananda Joy Norris, Law Office of Ananda Norris, Ian Booth Kelley, Law Office of Ian Kelley, San Francisco, CA, for Shimaine Ward.

ORDER

KENDALL J. NEWMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff, proceeding through counsel, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All parties consented to proceed before the undersigned for all purposes. See28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Plaintiff claims that defendants' refusal to correct his release date from state prison caused him to be over-incarcerated in federal prison, in violation of his constitutional rights, and California law. Pending before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an opposition, and defendants filed a reply. After supplemental briefing, oral argument was heard on August 2, 2012, before the undersigned. As set forth below, this court finds that defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

II. Plaintiff's Allegations and Background

On April 23, 1998, plaintiff pled guilty to robbery in Contra Costa County. [ (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) ] That same day, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of nine years in state prison: a five year term on count one, four consecutive one year sentences on counts two through five, and concurrent three year terms on the remaining nine counts. [Plaintiff] received pre-sentence credits of 203 actual days and 100 days conduct credits for a total of 303 days pre-sentence credit. At the time, robbery was considered a serious felony under California Penal Code § 1192.7, but not a violent felony under California Penal Code § 667.5; therefore, he was not subject to the 15% limitation on credits. [Plaintiff] was sent to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to serve his sentence. [ (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) ]

On February 1, 1999, [plaintiff] pled guilty to a federal grand jury indictment, charging one count of bank robbery and one count of use of a firearm. ( Id.) [Plaintiff] was sentenced to an aggregate term of 97 months; the sentence imposed on count one, 37 months, was to run concurrent to the California state sentence [plaintiff] was already serving, and the sentence imposed on count two, 60 months, was to run consecutive to the state term. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(4), the federal district court directed [plaintiff] to be imprisoned in a California penal institution. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.)

[Plaintiff] was returned to the physical custody of the CDCR to serve his sentence. ( Id.) The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) recognized that the CDCR had primary custodial authority over [plaintiff]. ( Id.) The projected release date as of this custodial transfer was June 18, 2002. ( Id.) At the conclusion of the CDCR commitment, [plaintiff] was to be transferred to the custody of the BOP to begin serving his remaining sentence: a 60 month consecutive term imposed for use of a firearm. ( Id.)

On June 28, 2000, [plaintiff] pled guilty to two counts of robbery in Santa Clara County pursuant to a negotiated disposition that [plaintiff] would not serve any additional custody time than that previously imposed on the prior state and federal convictions. [ (Dkt. No. 1 at 6–7.) ] However, after the imposition of this sentence, the CDCR erroneously reset [plaintiff's] release date from June of 2002 to July 27, 2006. [ ( Id., at 7.) ] [Plaintiff] alleges that absent this error, [plaintiff] would have concluded his state term and begun serving his federal sentence in June of 2002. ( Id.)

On July 11, 2002, [plaintiff] filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Santa Clara Superior Court. ( Id.) In that petition, [plaintiff] asserted that he had been assured that if he pled guilty he would be sentenced concurrent to the Contra Costa case and would serve no additional time in prison. ( Id.)

On May 15, 2003,¹ the Contra Costa Superior Court issued a final order directing the CDCR deliver [plaintiff] to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative for the purpose of commencing service of the 60 month consecutive sentence imposed in the federal action. ( Id.) On May 16, 2003, a deputy clerk of the Santa Clara Superior Court served Jack Marshall, acting warden of North Kern State Prison with a copy of the May 15, 2003 order. ( Id.) The order was received by the warden's office on June 2, 2003.( Id.) The CDCR apparently attempted to comply with this order, but the federal government refused to take custody of [plaintiff] at that time. ( Id.)

In July 2006, federal marshals took custody of [plaintiff]. [Plaintiff] then initiated federal habeas proceedings to receive credit against his federal sentence for the additional time he spent incarcerated in state prison. ( Id.) On May 23, 2008, the Santa Clara Superior Court issued an order vacating [plaintiff's] seven year sentence imposed on July 14, 2000 and re-sentenced [plaintiff] to a term of two years nunc pro tunc to July 14, 2000, which was to run concurrent to any state or federal sentence. ( Id. at 7–8.) The court further found that [plaintiff] had completed service of all imposed California state prison terms on June 18, 2002, and was no longer serving any prison sentence for any California state offense. ( Id. at 8.) Notice of the same was timely provided to CDCR. ( Id.)

[Plaintiff] alleges that the CDCR failed to conform its records to reflect the May 23, 2008 court order and sentence. ( Id.) As a result, the federal authorities were noticed of the order, but would not adjust [plaintiff's] sentence until the CDCR updated its records. ( Id.) [Plaintiff] subsequently filed a motion in the Santa Clara Superior Court, requesting the court to issue an order directing the CDCR to conform its records. ( Id.) [Plaintiff] alleges that his requests for correction were largely ignored by the CDCR. ( Id.)

[Plaintiff] alleges that if he had been properly transferred to federal custody by the CDCR on June 18, 2002, he would have been released from federal custody no later than June 18, 2007. ( Id.) [Plaintiff] further alleges that had he been transferred to federal custody immediately after the May 23, 2008 order, he would have been immediately released. ( Id.) However, [plaintiff] was not released from federal custody until December 1, 2008. ( Id.)

On October 14, 2009, [plaintiff] filed a complaint, alleging that defendants violated various constitutional rights and committed negligence, false imprisonment, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, in violation of California state law. Defendants Schwarzenegger and James removed the action to this court on January 4, 2010. On January 12, 2010, defendant Cate and CDCR filed a notice of joinder in the removal.

(Dkt. No. 28 at 2–6.)

On September 10, 2010, 2010 WL 3582620, the motion to dismiss plaintiff's federal constitutional claims filed by defendants Schwarzenegger and Cate was granted, and CDCR's motion to dismiss plaintiff's federal claims was granted, but its motion to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims was denied. (Dkt. No. 28.) Thus, this action is proceeding on plaintiff's claims that defendant James violated plaintiff's rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments; defendants CDCR, Cate, and James falsely imprisoned plaintiff; defendant James intentionally caused plaintiff to suffer emotional distress; defendants CDCR, Cate, and James were negligent and negligently caused plaintiff to suffer emotional distress; and defendants CDCR, Brown, and Cate negligently hired, retained, supervised, and disciplined their subordinates.

III. Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants move for summary judgment as to the following claims and parties:

1. Federal constitutional claims against defendant James;

2. False imprisonment claims against defendants CDCR, Cate, Brown, and James;

3. Intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against defendant James;

4. Negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against defendant James;

5. Negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring claims against defendants Cate and Brown; and 6. Whether defendant James is entitled to qualified immunity.

IV. Concessions

Plaintiff conceded dismissal of the Fifth Amendment claim (dkt. no. 65 at 5), and plaintiff's state law claims, with the exception of the false imprisonment claim, as to defendant Brown (dkt. no. 78 at 1).

V. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil procedure 56(c) is met. “The judgment sought should be rendered if ... there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’ ” Id., citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id...