Ward v. Pennington
Decision Date | 31 May 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 82,82 |
Citation | 434 So.2d 1131 |
Parties | Walter Leroy WARD, III, et al. v. C.B. PENNINGTON, et al. CA 0669. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Roger M. Fritchie and Chapman L. Sanford, Baton Rouge, for plaintiffs-appellants Walter Leroy Ward, III, Joy Gilbert Ward and Swan S. Ward.
Thomas H. Benton, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant Naomi Terry Ward.
Herschel L. Abbott, Jr., New Orleans, and J. Huntington Odom, Baton Rouge, for defendants-appellees C.B. Pennington, et al.
Before LOTTINGER, COLE and CARTER, JJ.
This is an appeal from a trial court judgment sustaining exceptions of no cause of action and prescription and dismissing plaintiffs' suit.
Plaintiffs 1 filed suit on September 29, 1981, seeking recognition of an ownership interest in Mount Pleasant Plantation and for an accounting from the defendants with respect to sums realized from that property. Appellants base their claims on a letter, dated over 24 years prior to the filing of this suit, by C.B. Pennington, Sr. to W.L. Ward, Jr. and contend that the letter is a counter-letter translative, as between the parties, of an undivided one-half interest in and to immovable property. The letter is as follows:
"April 2, 1957
Mr. W.L. Ward, Jr.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Dear Mr. Ward:
This will confirm our verbal agreement that you own an undivided one-half interest in that certain agreement to purchase Mt. Pleasant Plantation between Edward E. Brown, the seller, and myself and C.B. Pennington, Jr., a copy of which agreement is attached hereto.
Upon your request, I will execute a formal agreement setting forth your individual one-half interest.
The purchase agreement referred to in the aforementioned letter was executed between Brown and the Penningtons in February, 1957. A formal act of sale was executed in May, 1957, whereby Mount Pleasant Plantation was transferred from Edward Brown to C.B. Pennington and C.B. Pennington, Jr.
Defendants filed peremptory exceptions of no cause of action, no right of action, and prescription of 10 years under LSA-C.C. art. 3544.
After a hearing on the exceptions, the trial court sustained the exceptions of no cause of action and prescription of 10 years and dismissed plaintiffs' suit. 2 Appellants contend that the trial court erred (1) in sustaining the exception of no cause of action and (2) in sustaining the exception of prescription.
In support of the contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the exception of no cause of action, appellants essentially assert that the document of April 2, 1957, is a counter-letter by which Walter Ward, Jr. obtained a one-half ownership interest in the binding agreement to purchase Mount Pleasant Plantation. Appellants further contend that the April 2 letter when coupled with the act of sale, alleged to have been executed by Pennington in a fiduciary capacity, gave Ward a one-half ownership interest in the property itself.
The first question presented is whether plaintiffs' petition states a cause of action for which relief may be granted. In order to sustain an exception of no cause of action, all allegations contained in plaintiffs' petition must be considered as true, and accepting them as true, the petition must fail to state a cause of action. Boyer v. St. Amant, 364 So.2d 1338 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978), writ refused, 365 So.2d 1108 (La.1978); Lewis v. Kehoe Academy, 346 So.2d 289 (La.App. 4th Cir.1977); LSA-C.C.P. art. 931. 3 The exception of no cause of action raises the issue of whether the law affords a remedy to anyone for the complaint advanced by the plaintiff. Willis v. State, 212 So.2d 555 (La.App. 1st Cir.1968). Stated another way, the purpose of such an exception is to determine whether under the allegations of the petition, the law affords any remedy for the grievance complained of. Willis v. State, supra; Adserv Corp. v. Lincecum, 385 So.2d 432 (La.App. 1st Cir.1980); Bamber Contractors, Inc. v. Henderson Bros., Inc., 345 So.2d 1212 (La.App. 1st Cir.1977).
In considering a petition against which an exception of no cause of action has been raised, every reasonable interpretation must be accorded its language in favor of maintaining the sufficiency of the petition and affording the litigant an opportunity to present his evidence. Hero Lands Company v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So.2d 93 (La.1975); Adserv Corp. v. Lincecum, supra.
Plaintiffs' claim of an ownership interest in Mount Pleasant Plantation is based on the April 2, 1957, letter 4 and the purchase agreement attached thereto which plaintiffs contend is a counter-letter as envisioned by LSA-C.C. art. 2239 5. Although a counter-letter is not defined in the Civil Code, a relatively clear definition has developed in the jurisprudence. In Louis v. Garrison, 64 So.2d 254 (La.App. Orleans 1953) the court stated at page 257:
Black's Law Dictionary 6 defines counter-letter as:
The only logical interpretation of the April 2, 1957, letter is that it reflects a confirmation of a verbal agreement that Ward was the owner of an undivided interest in the agreement to purchase Mount Pleasant Plantation. Further, that when Ward so requested, Pennington would execute a formal agreement (which we interpret to mean "written") with Ward setting forth their verbal agreement and, we assume, the terms, conditions, etc. This constitutes, at the most, a promise to sell resulting in either party having the right to enforce the agreement if an appropriate action is timely filed. Cf. Lambert v. Succession of DeHass, infra. Thus, the letter under these circumstances simply is not a legal counter-letter wherein title to immovable property, as between the parties (Ward and Pennington), passed.
Appellants contend that Peterson v. Moresi, 191 La. 932, 186 So. 737 (1939) contains a "strikingly similar agreement." We disagree. In Peterson, supra, Moresi purchased seven acres of land on August, 19, 1907, for $2,000 cash. On the same day, Moresi signed an instrument which he called "Recognition of Interest" as follows at 186 So. pp. 737, 738:
Moresi died in 1936, and suit was thereafter filed by certain parties named in the "Recognition of Interest" instrument, seeking to be recognized as joint owners of the seven acres of land. The Supreme Court stated at 186 So. page 739:
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