Ward v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America
| Decision Date | 01 March 1938 |
| Citation | 13 N.E.2d 411,299 Mass. 559 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | EDGAR WARD v. THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA & others. |
October 6, 1937.
Present: RUGG, C.
J., FIELD, DONAHUE LUMMUS, & QUA, JJ.
Equitable Restrictions. Land Court, Certificate of title.
Restrictions stated in a deed of a tract of land to be created "for the benefit of subsequent grantees of any part" thereof, the later recording of a plan of the tract divided into lots, and the registration of the tract by decree referring to the restrictions, showed the existence of a general scheme for development of the tract, and the restrictions were enforceable by the purchaser of one of the lots against the purchaser of another.
Under G. L. (Ter Ed.) c. 185, Section 114, the Land Court had no power to amend the certificate of title of the owner of one of the lots in a tract of land by striking out a recital that the lot was subject to restrictions earlier created if they were still valid and enforceable by the owners of other lots who took their certificates of title for value, in good faith and relying upon the restrictions.
PETITION, filed in the Land Court on October 1, 1935, to amend the petitioner's certificate of title.
The certificate was ordered amended by Smith, J. The respondents alleged exceptions.
G. P. Davis, for The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States.
A.L. Partridge, for The Prudential Insurance Company of America.
R. E. McCarthy, (R.
A. Shea with him,) for Alfred Hannie and others.
W. J. Kurth, for Wildey Savings Bank. L. G. Brooks, for First National Bank in Medford, submitted a brief.
No argument nor brief for the petitioner.
This is a petition to amend a certificate of title describing land in Medford, issued to the petitioner by the Land Court and dated May 4, 1934. The prayer is for an order to strike from that certificate the following restrictive clause attaching to the land: "subject to the restrictions, easements, agreements and reservations set forth in a deed given by the City of Medford to Fellsway Realty Company, duly recorded March 10, 1926, with Middlesex South Deeds, Book 4947, Page 89." The original decree of registration was subject to the clause just quoted and comprised about nine and one half acres of land in Medford. The land was bounded on the south by Elm Street, on the west by Fellsway West, and on the north and east, for the most part, by land of the city of Medford. The original deed from the city of Medford to Fellsway Realty Company contained the words: "Said premises are conveyed and the grantees for themselves, their heirs, successors and assigns take the same subject to the following easements, reservations, and restrictions created for the benefit of the grantor's remaining estate and for the benefit of subsequent grantees of any part of the parcel hereby conveyed and in case of breach thereof the grantor or its assigns as well as owners of any part of the parcel hereby conveyed may enforce the same by appropriate proceedings . . . ." Then follow numerous restrictions imposed upon uses to which the land might be put. So far as material to this proceeding, they were that the premises should be used for no commercial purpose except the production of films for motion pictures and, subject to that exception, that the premises should be used for residential purposes only; with further provisions as to the cost of dwelling houses to be erected, the distance at which such houses should be erected from the lines of streets and from the lines of adjacent lots, and other provisions designed for the development of the tract for residential purposes.
The bill of exceptions of the respondents, together with the decision of the judge of the Land Court, a copy of the deed heretofore specified and referred to in the decision, and copies of three plans include all the material facts. Those facts in substance are as follows: The premises described in the certificate of the petitioner sought to be amended by this petition are shown as lot 49 on Land Court plan No. 12930-A and lot 19-A on Land Court plan No.
12930-C. Each of the corporate respondents, other than the city of Medford, is the owner of record of, or the holder of a mortgage on, one or more of the lots shown on the three plans above mentioned. The petitioner was the treasurer of the Fellsway Realty Company, which was the grantee in the deed of the entire tract, then unregistered, from the city of Medford, recorded on March 10, 1926. Shortly thereafter there were several mesne conveyances, one by the petitioner, who finally conveyed the tract to William J. L. Roop, trustee under a declaration of trust of which the petitioner owned five hundred one of the five hundred five preferred shares and five hundred of one thousand common shares. Title to the tract, excepting three lots which had been conveyed away prior to the date of registration, was registered in the name of said Roop, as trustee, by decree entered on August 29 1928. That was the original decree of registration of the tract. It contained the same restrictive clause, already quoted, which referred to the restrictions in the deed given by the city of Medford to the Fellsway Realty Company, duly recorded on March 10, 1926, in Book 4947, Page 89. That is in substance the same clause which the petitioner seeks by the present proceeding to have struck from his certificate of registration. There was filed in the land registration office on June 8, 1928, a plan which apparently shows the tract embracing all the land here in controversy divided into lots numbered 1 to 49, both inclusive, and which already has been referred to as Land Court plan No. 12930-A. Perhaps there are fifty-two lots. Thus, before the original certificate of registration of August 29, 1928, there was on file a plan showing the tract as divided into lots. This plan, together with the restrictive clause in the certificate, shows a general building scheme. Evans v. Foss, 194 Mass. 513 . Maclary v. Morgan, 230 Mass. 80 . Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477 . During the period when lots were being sold by Roop as trustee, there was a sign on his office reading Roop also stated to purchasers that the tract was restricted to residential purposes. The persons to whom such representations were made, and who are respondents, purchased in reliance upon such representations. At the time the petitioner acquired record title to the premises described in his certificate of title, all of the lots shown on said three plans, except two, had been sold and conveyed by Roop, trustee. It is stated in the decision of the judge of the Land Court that there were This is confirmatory of the existence of a general building scheme. Whitney v. Union Railway, 11 Gray, 359. Hano v. Bigelow, 155 Mass. 341. Bacon v. Sandberg, 179 Mass. 396 . Hartt v. Rueter, 223 Mass. 207 . Maclary v. Morgan, 230 Mass. 80 . The case at bar is distinguishable from Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 380 , because the petitioner has taken his title...
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