Ward v. State, 16557
Decision Date | 08 August 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 16557,16557 |
Parties | Larry WARD, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
William J. Stewart, Bolivar, for movant-appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Robert P. Sass, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Movant Larry Ward appeals from an order denying, after an evidentiary hearing, his amended Rule 27.26 1 motion to set aside a judgment and sentence to life imprisonment for first degree murder. Initially, movant was charged with capital murder, but on September 23, 1983, pursuant to a plea bargain, the amended information charging first degree murder was filed and movant entered a guilty plea to the amended information. 2 A pre-sentence mental examination was ordered. The examining physician concluded movant did not suffer from a mental disease or defect. He was sentenced December 15, 1983.
Movant says he did not intend to harm anyone; and, in fact, had no idea that a homicide was contemplated until after it happened. Movant then relies on § 562.041 3 for the proposition that his trial counsel incorrectly advised him as to his responsibility for the conduct of another. In movant's brief, it is argued that movant "did not even know that a kidnapping was contemplated by the co-defendant until after the event." That claim is contradicted by substantial evidence.
Movant testified J.R. Cooley and Pam Foster came to movant's house and stayed about 30 minutes. Movant, Cooley and Foster then left to go to North Town Mall in Springfield to pick up Rex Smith (the victim) because Cooley wanted to try to persuade the victim to "plead the Fifth" at a "court hearing the next day." The court hearing involved charges pending against J.R. Cooley. Pam Foster and movant got the victim into the car by false pretenses. Pam called the victim and told him she wanted to go out with him, to celebrate her twenty-first birthday. Pam met the victim. The movant was supposed to find Pam and the victim and bring them to the car. In this manner, the victim was lured to the car by movant and Pam. The three of them got into the car; Cooley then entered the car, pulled a "toy starter pistol" and "showed" it to the victim. The victim was in the back seat of the car when Cooley got in and exhibited the starting pistol.
Movant then drove the car away from the mall. Movant drove to the Hilton Inn in Springfield where they changed drivers and Cooley began to drive. After 5 to 10 minutes, Pam was let out at her home. Movant remained in the automobile with the victim and Cooley until they ultimately drove to Taney County where the victim was killed. After Pam was let out of the car, Cooley, movant and the victim drove around some more in Springfield. Soon after Pam left the car, they stopped "in front of [the] Skate Corral" and the victim was "tied up" using extension cord to tie his hands in front. After the victim was tied up, Cooley drove out Kearney Street (Springfield) toward by-pass 65. As Cooley drove south on Highway 65 near the Battlefield exit, the victim asked to go back. Cooley told him to shut up. Between Springfield and Ozark, Cooley and the victim were yelling at each other, with the victim telling him over and over that he wasn't going to testify. Cooley kept telling the victim he was lying.
The automobile was driven to Taney County and stopped at Swan Creek. Movant, J.R. Cooley and the victim got out of the car. Movant stayed by the car. By this time, movant described the victim as "scared." Rex told Cooley to leave him tied to a tree but Cooley said they were going down to talk. Movant did not see the stabbing. Movant did testify as follows:
The switch blade knife used to stab the victim belonged to movant. Movant claimed Cooley had gotten the knife (without movant's knowledge) from the bottom drawer of movant's dresser at his house in Springfield.
The evidence, as summarized above, was elicited from movant at the time of hearing or was contained in his deposition taken June 15, 1988. Other evidence found in the transcript of movant's guilty plea is as follows:
At that point movant was sworn; he was asked if he entered the plea freely and voluntarily and movant answered, "Yes."
It appeared ... [from autopsy doctor testimony at preliminary] that he died just approximately ten minutes after he received the stab wound. He was found on the banks of Swan Creek....
[T]he kidnapping took place that evening. The death occurred that same night. Although it started up there, it ended down here....
The court carefully inquired about the written plea of guilty signed by movant. Movant, by his sworn testimony, said he had no questions or confusion about the meaning of the questions in the written plea of guilty; he had no lack of understanding about the written plea of guilty. In the sworn written plea of guilty movant stated:
I assisted Jim Cooley in taking Rex ... from Springfield, Missouri against his will and by physical force and bringing him to Taney County where he was stabbed and killed.
The charge of first degree felony murder in the amended information did not require premeditated intent on the part of the movant to cause the death of the victim if the killing was committed in the perpetration of a kidnapping. 4
To be convicted of first degree felony murder under § 565.003, a person need only have the requisite intent to commit or participate in the underlying felony and "no other mental state on his part need be demonstrated because of the strict liability imposed by the felony rule." (Citation omitted.)
State v. Rumble, 680 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Mo.banc 1984). "[I]t is the intent to commit the underlying felony, not the intent to commit the killing, which is the gravamen of the offense [first degree felony murder]." State v. Lassen, 679 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Mo.App.1984).
There was a plethora of evidence before the motion court of movant's active participation in the kidnapping. Much of the evidence was supplied by movant's testimony or sworn statements at the time of the guilty plea. The law did not require proof of movant's intent to kill to sustain a conviction for felony murder. State v. Rumble, supra. Accordingly, there was substantial evidence before the motion court that the advice given to movant by his counsel concerning felony murder was correct advice. [A]ppellate review of the trial court's decision in ruling a Rule 27.26 proceeding is expressly "limited to a determination of whether the findings, conclusions, and judgment of the trial court are clearly erroneous." ... Such findings and conclusions are deemed clearly erroneous only if, after a review of the entire record, the appellate court is left with the "definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." (Citation omitted.)
Sanders v. State, 738 S.W.2d 856, 857 (Mo.banc 1987) (emphasis in original). Movant's testimony that he did not know Cooley was going to kidnap the victim was refuted by the transcript of the guilty plea hearing, the written plea of guilty at that time, and by other testimony of movant. The motion court was free to...
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