Ward v. Town of Southfield

• Decision Date: 27 April 1886
• Citation: 102 N.Y. 287,6 N.E. 660
• Parties: WARD v. TOWN OF SOUTHFIELD and another.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

102 N.Y. 287

6 N.E. 660

WARD

v.TOWN OF SOUTHFIELD and another.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 27, 1886.

Appeal from judgment of general term supreme court, Second department, affirming judgment for defendant.

RUGER, C. J., dissenting.

Hamilton Wallis, for appellant, William G. Ward.

George J. Greenfield, for respondents, Town of Southfield and another.

EARL, J.

In the years 1871 and 1872 the plaintiff was treasurer of the village of Edgewater, in the county of Richmond, and as such treasurer was collector of taxes of the part of the town of Southfield which was embraced within the limits of the village. In the month of January, 1872, there was issued to him by the board of supervisors of the county of Richmond a warrant whereby he was directed, as such collector, to collect the taxes which appeared in the assessment roll annexed to the warrant. The whole amount of taxes which he was thus directed to collect was upwards of $66,000. He collected all of that sum but about $4,000, which he neglected to collect, and in January, 1873, the defendant Greenfield, who was then supervisor of the town of Southfield, commenced an action against him, and the sureties upon his bond, to recover the amount of taxes thus remaining due and uncollected, and a recovery was had. From that judgment the defendants therein appealed to the general term of the supreme court, and from affirmance there to this court, and here the judgment was affirmed. 58 N. Y. 401. After such affirmance, Ward, the plaintiff herein, paid the amount of that judgment, with costs. Thereafter he claims to have discovered for the first time that the affidavit of the assessors attached to the original assessment roll was so defective as to render the assessment illegal and void, so that no taxes were in fact legally imposed, and the persons assessed were under no legal obligation to pay them; and he claims that, if he had been aware of the defect in the affidavit of the assessors, he could have successfully defended the action. He then commenced this action to vacate and set aside the former judgment, and to recover back from the defendants the money which he was obliged to pay in satisfaction of that judgment, on the ground that the defendant Greenfield was aware of the defect in the affidavit and of the invalidity of the tax at the time he commenced that action, and during the pendency thereof, and fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff his knowledge of such defect and invalidity to the end that the plaintiff might not avail himself of the defense which such knowledge would have afforded him in that action. He bases his right to recover in this action upon the ground that the former judgment was recovered against him by the fraud of Greenfield, and invokes the equitable jurisdiction of the court to give him the relief granted in such cases.

Courts of equity have general jurisdiction to grant relief against fraud, and to set aside all deeds, contracts, and other instruments obtained by fraudulent practices; and the jurisdiction of the court to grant such relief extends, not only to voluntary contracts inter partes, but also to judgments and decrees of courts. But the solemn judgment of a court should not be lightly interfered with. It is for the interest of the public, as well as of individuals, that there should be an end of litigation; and where parties have been lawfully brought into a court having jurisdiction of their persons and the subject of litigation, and have had opportunity to prosecute their claims and to defend their rights, and judgment has been regularly pronounced, while such judgment is not vacated or reversed it concludes the parties thereto; and a matter thus once litigated and adjudicated cannot be again brought in question. Such are the general rules which should not easily be evaded. A party defeated in a litigation may appeal from the judgment, or move for a new trial, and, in a proper case, to vacate and set aside the judgment. These remedies are generally ample to protect all parties. But where there is fraud, not in the subject of the litigation, not in anything which was involved in the issues tried, but fraud practiced upon a party, or upon the court, during the trial, or in prosecuting the action, or in obtaining the judgment, then, in a proper case, the judgment may be attacked collaterally, and on account thereof set aside and vacated. But before a regular judgment can be thus assailed the proof should be clear and very satisfactory.

It is not sufficient merely to raise a suspicion, or to show what is sometimes called constructive fraud; but there must be actual fraud. There must be by one party a false and fraudulent representation, or a fraudulent affirmative act, or a fraudulent concealment of a fact for the purpose of obtaining an undue and an unjust advantage of the other party and procuring an unjust and unconscionable judgment. It is not practicable nor possible to formulate a rule on this subject which will be sufficient to solve all cases; but, where fraudulent concealment of a fact is relied upon for the purpose of impeaching and setting aside a judgment regularly obtained, it must be an intentional concealment of a material and controlling fact, for the purpose of misleading and taking an undue advantage of the opposite party. It would not be wise or politic to carry the rule so far as to make it incumbent upon every plaintiff to...