Ward v. Westerfield, 2020-SC-0520-I, 2020-SC-0544-I
| Docket Number | 2020-SC-0520-I, 2020-SC-0544-I |
| Decision Date | 28 April 2022 |
| Citation | 653 S.W.3d 48 |
| Parties | David M. WARD; and Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc., Appellants/Cross-Appellees v. Senator Whitney WESTERFIELD, in His Personal and Official Capacities; Marsy's Law for Kentucky, LLC; and Commonwealth of Kentucky, ex rel. Attorney General Daniel Cameron, Appellees/Cross-Appellants and Secretary of State, ex rel. Michael G. Adams, in His Official Capacity; the Kentucky State Board of Elections, ex rel. Michael G. Adams, in His Official Capacity as Chief Election Official for the Commonwealth; and A.B. Chandler III, in His Official Capacity as Chairman, Appellees/Cross-Appellees |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE DAVID M. WARD : J. David Niehaus, Virginia H. Snell, Louisville, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE KENTUCKY ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, INC.: Michael R. Mazzoli, Cox & Mazzoli, PLLC, Louisville.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT MARSY'S LAW FOR KENTUCKY, LLC: John C. Roach, W. Keith Ransdell, Lexington, Ransdell, Roach & Royse, PLLC.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT SENATOR WHITNEY WESTERFIELD: David Fleenor, General Counsel, Office of the Senate President.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY EX REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL DANIEL CAMERON : Matthew F. Kuhn, Brett R. Nolan, Office of the Solicitor General.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLEE MICHAEL G. ADAMS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE: R. Kent Westberry, Bridget M. Bush, Landrum & Shouse LLP, Louisville.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLEE A.B. CHANDLER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE KENTUCKY STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS: Taylor A. Brown, General Counsel, State Board of Elections.
The parties appeal a ruling of the Franklin Circuit Court concerning the second attempt to include Marsy's Law, an amendment related to crime victims’ rights, in the Kentucky Constitution. We accepted transfer from the Court of Appeals because this case raises important questions regarding a challenge to a constitutional ballot initiative. After careful review of the record, we conclude that Appellants’ claims must be dismissed for lack of standing.
In 2018, the General Assembly proposed, and Kentucky voters ratified, the constitutional amendment known as Marsy's Law. After a legal challenge, this Court invalidated the 2018 amendment because the entire text of the proposed amendment was not placed on the ballot.1
In 2020, the General Assembly again proposed the Marsy's Law constitutional amendment. Appellants2 sued the Secretary of State, the State Board of Elections, and the Chairperson of the State Board of Elections before the general election. The Complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief either prohibiting Marsy's Law from appearing on the ballot or, in the alternative, preventing tabulation of votes on ratification of the amendment. Appellants also brought facial challenges to the legality of substantive provisions of Marsy's Law.
The Kentucky Attorney General, Marsy's Law for Kentucky, LLC, and Senator Whitney Westerfield intervened as co-defendants. The Plaintiffs and Intervening Defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In October 2020, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Intervening Defendants. The trial court ruled in favor of the Intervening Defendants on Plaintiffs’ procedural claims. Still, the trial court concluded that Appellants’ facial challenges to Marsy's Law were not ripe because the amendment had not yet been ratified by Kentucky voters. The trial court withheld ruling on Appellants’ facial challenges and held those claims in abeyance.
The parties filed cross-appeals. The Court of Appeals recommended transfer of those appeals to this Court. This Court accepted transfer and denied Appellants’ motion for emergency relief. In their response briefs to this Court, Appellees challenged the justiciability of Appellants’ claims. While this appeal was pending, Kentucky voters ratified the Marsy's Law constitutional amendment. We now address the parties’ arguments on appeal.
"We review the trial court's issuance of summary judgment de novo and any factual findings will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous."3 Whether Appellants have standing is a jurisdictional question of law that is reviewed de novo.4
Section 112 of the Kentucky Constitution gives circuit courts original jurisdiction in all justiciable causes not vested in another court.5 This Court has held, and reaffirmed, that "the existence of a plaintiff's standing is a constitutional requirement to prosecute any action in the courts of this Commonwealth."6 We have adopted the federal standard for standing espoused in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife .7
To have constitutional standing, a "plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."8 The party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the elements of standing.9
Appellants have not met their burden of establishing that the alleged injuries harmed them in a concrete and particularized manner. Instead, Appellants’ claims constitute nonjusticiable generalized grievances because the harms they assert are shared in equal measure by all citizens of the Commonwealth.
One of the major principles underlying the standing doctrine is the prohibition against "generalized grievances."10 "[W]hen the asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction."11
Kentucky courts recognize the prohibition against generalized grievances. In Sexton , we explained that the prohibition against generalized grievances was one of "two major federal prudential standing principles."12 Even before Sexton both this Court and the Kentucky Court of Appeals recognized the prohibition against generalized grievances as part of our standing jurisprudence.13 And after Sexton , our Court has reiterated that to have standing a plaintiff must have personally suffered some actual or threatened injury.14
Moreover, persuasive federal authority is helpful in defining the parameters of the prohibition against generalized grievances. "To have standing, a litigant must seek relief for an injury that affects him [or her] in a ‘personal and individual way.’ "15 The litigant "must possess a ‘direct stake in the outcome’ of the case."16 A litigant raising a generally available grievance about government, no matter how sincere, and claiming only harm to his and every other citizen's interest in the proper application of the laws, does not state a justiciable case or controversy.17
Appellants contend that they have standing as citizens and voters. But Appellants’ Complaint does not assert standing based on status as a voter. The Complaint says that "Plaintiff David M. Ward is a resident of this Commonwealth who pays taxes to the Commonwealth." Furthermore, the Complaint does not allege that members of KACDL are voters. The Complaint is devoid of any mention of Appellants being harmed as voters.
Even accepting that Appellants are voters and citizens, Appellants do not allege a concrete and particularized injury. Appellants do not contend that they misunderstood the contents of the Marsy's Law ballot question. Nor have Appellants argued that they are personally impacted by the substantive provisions in Marsy's Law. Instead, Appellants advance hypothetical harms on behalf of unspecified injured voters and citizens. As such, Appellants have not established that they are impacted by Marsy's Law in a "personal and individualized way."18
Appellants contend that "[a]ny adult citizen of Kentucky has standing to challenge the sufficiency of a proposed Constitutional amendment because every citizen will be affected by it after ratification." But Appellants’ statement—that every adult citizen in Kentucky has standing to challenge the sufficiency of the Marsy's Law constitutional amendment—essentially concedes that their alleged injuries constitute nonjusticiable generalized grievances. Appellants admit that any Kentuckian could assert injuries identical to those contained in their Complaint. As such, Appellants are not directly affected by Marsy's Law.
Appellants invite this Court to create a special standing doctrine for voters alleging injury in the context of a constitutional ballot initiative. It is true that Kentucky voters play a unique role in ratifying constitutional ballot initiatives. Yet, Appellants have cited no authority supporting their contention that voters challenging the procedural and substantive legality of constitutional ballot initiatives should be exempted from the requirement of alleging an injury in fact. The Kentucky Constitution limits the jurisdiction of Kentucky courts to justiciable causes. So we must decline Appellants’ invitation because the allegation of a concrete and particularized injury is a constitutional prerequisite to prosecution of any action in the courts of this Commonwealth.
Additionally, our holding in Ward I has no impact on our analysis of constitutional standing here. In Ward I , we considered whether this Court had authority to address the parties’ claims on the merits based on separation of powers.19 This Court did not, however, directly analyze whether Ward or KACDL had constitutional standing under Sexton and its progeny. While constitutional standing was raised before the circuit court in Ward I , the issue of constitutional standing was abandoned on appeal.20 As such, we...
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Graham v. Adams
...interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Ward v. Westerfield, 653 S.W.3d 48, 51 (Ky. 2022). In 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States, applying the Lujan standards, held voters had not established standing to brin......