Ward v. Zelinski, 19587
| Decision Date | 15 March 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 19587,19587 |
| Citation | 195 S.E.2d 385,260 S.C. 229 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Oley Milton WARD, Respondent, v. Joseph Anthony ZELINSKI, Appellant. |
Burroughs, Green & Sasser, Conway, for appellant.
Rankin & Johnson, Conway, for respondent.
This action was brought by Oley Milton Ward, the respondent herein, against Joseph Anthony Zelinski, the appellant herein, to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly suffered by him as a result of a collision between the truck which he was driving in a northerly direction on U.S. Highway 301, near the town of Manning, and an automobile driven by the appellant, also traveling in a northerly direction on said highway.
The respondent, in his complaint alleged that as he was operating a truck in a northerly direction on U.S. Highway 301, the appellant drove his Chevrolet automobile from a private driveway or road onto the highway into the path of his truck, in violation of Section 46--424 of the Code; that he failed and refused to keep a proper lookout for the respondent and others using said highway; and that he failed to yield the right-of-way to the respondent who was approaching on a through highway. It is further alleged that the respondent suffered personal injuries and such were proximately caused by the negligent and reckless acts of the appellant.
The appellant, by answer, interposed (1) a general denial; (2) that the respondent's injuries were proximately caused by his own negligence and recklessness; and (3) the respondent's contributory negligence and recklessness. The appellant filed a counterclaim alleging damages to his automobile and that such were proximately caused by the negligence and recklessness of the respondent.
This came on for trial before the Honorable Claude M. Epps, Presiding Judge of the Civil and Criminal Court of Horry County, and a jury, at the 1972 February term of said Court, and resulted in a verdict in favor of the respondent.
At appropriate stages of the trial, the appellant made a motion for a directed verdict in his favor and, after the verdict, for judgment Non obstante veredicto or in the alternative for a new trial. These motions were refused and this appeal followed.
The questions raised by the exceptions of the appellant are: (1) was there any evidence from which the jury could draw the inference that the appellant was guilty of negligence and that such was a proximate cause of the injuries to the respondent and, (2) was the respondent guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The question of whether or not there was error in refusing the motions of the appellant for a directed verdict, judgment Non obstante veredicto, and alternatively for a new trial, requires us to consider the testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the respondent. If more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence, the case must be submitted to the jury. However, if the evidence is susceptible of only one reasonable inference, the question is no longer one for the jury but one of law for the Court. Ordinarily, contributory negligence is an issue for the jury and it rarely becomes a question of law for the Court. Bruno v. Pendleton Realty Co., Inc. 240 S.C. 46, 124 S.E.2d 580.
The respondent testified that he was driving a truck pulling a forty-foot double decker livestock trailer loaded with hogs, and was traveling in a northerly direction on U.S. Highway 301, at a speed of about 45 miles per hour as he was approaching the Ramada Inn on his right. He also testified that when he was about 100 feet south of the Ramada Inn driveway, the appellant drove out of said driveway and into the highway immediately in front of him and proceeded in a northerly direction. The respondent said that in an attempt to avoid colliding with the appellant, he locked is truck and trailer brakes down, turned to the right, and ran off of the highway, striking the right rear of the appellant's automobile. He says this bent the bumper of his truck causing him to lose control thereof and to overturn in the highway. He further testified that the collision took place 'about halfway from the driveway to the end of the motel', but he didn't 'know how many feet it is'. Later on cross-examination, he acknowledged that in a prior deposition that he had stated that the distance from the Ramada Inn driveway to the point of impact with the car of the appellant was about 20 feet. Under further cross- examination, the respondent was positive in his statement that the appellant had traveled about 20 feet from the driveway when the collision took place. The respondent testified that he was too close to the appellant's vehicle when it entered the highway, to avoid colliding with it.
Two witnesses in behalf of the appellant, testified that they were changing a tire on an automobile some 600 feet north of the Ramada Inn driveway and that the collision between the truck and the automobile occurred some 350 to 400 feet...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Griffin v. Griffin
...275 (1940). Rarely does the question of a plaintiff's contributory negligence become a question of law for the court. Ward v. Zelinski, 260 S.C. 229, 195 S.E.2d 385 (1973); Gillespie v. Ford, 225 S.C. 104, 81 S.E.2d 44 (1954). It becomes so only when the evidence is susceptible of but a sin......
-
Winters v. Fiddie
...whether the house was a “dwelling unit” within the meaning of the Act was properly submitted to the jury. See Ward v. Zelinski, 260 S.C. 229, 234, 195 S.E.2d 385, 388 (1973) (finding when evidence is contradictory and more than one reasonable inference is possible, it is the trial court's d......
-
Hancock v. Mid-South Management, Co., Inc.
...of only one reasonable inference, the question is no longer one for the jury but one of law for the Court." Ward v. Zelinski, 260 S.C. 229, 232, 195 S.E.2d 385, 387 (1973). LAW/ANALYSIS Hancock contends the trial court erred in granting Mid-South's summary judgment motion because the eviden......
-
Niver v. S.C. Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 1518
...ordinarily a question of fact for the jury and only in rare instances is the issue a question of law for the court. Ward v. Zelinski, 260 S.C. 229, 195 S.E.2d 385 (1973). This is not one of those rare instances. The record, when viewed, as it must be, in the light most favorable to Niver, s......