Ware v. State

Decision Date04 March 1969
Docket NumberNo. 68--303,68--303
Citation219 So.2d 442
PartiesDonald Frank WARE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Robert L. Koeppel, Public Defender, and Maurice Jay Kutner, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Melvin Grossman and Harold Mendelow, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In 1965, the appellant pleaded guilty to several informations in the Criminal Court of Record in and for Dade County, Florida, and was placed on five years' probation. In 1967, he was informed against for breaking and entering and possession of burglary tools. When this subsequent information came on for trial, it was stipulated by private counsel for the appellant that the violation of probation could be heard at the same time as the trial. At the conclusion of the matter, which was tried nonjury, the trial judge acquitted the appellant of the 1967 charges but revoked his probation, which had been entered as a result of the guilty pleas on the 1965 charges. The appellant appeals and urges, as grounds for reversal, that (1) the parole violation could not have been heard without a warrant having been issued by a magistrate; (2) the trial judge abused his discretion in revoking the parole.

As to the first ground, there is no mandatory requirement that a warrant be issued by a magistrate. It is sufficient if the alleged parole violation comes to the attention of the court and that the defendant was given due notice of the alleged violation and an opportunity to be heard. Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So.2d 607; State ex rel. Roberts v. Cochran, Fla.1962, 140 So.2d 597; McNeely v. State, Fla.App.1966, 186 So.2d 520. See: Gardner v. State, Fla.App.1969, 219 So.2d 100 (1969).

The appellant also contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in revoking his probation because he found him not guilty of the 1967 crime as charged. It is not incumbent upon a trial judge, upon a hearing for parole violation which had originally been entered as a result of a guilty plea, to find that the appellant had violated the terms of his parole with the same exactness as required for original conviction. Brill v. State, supra; State ex rel. Ard v. Shelby, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 631; State v. Cochran, supra; Roberts v. State, Fla.App.1963, 154 So.2d 695; McNeely v. State, supra.

Examining this record in light of the principles enunciated in the...

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2 cases
  • People ex rel. Dowdy v. Smith
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 15 d5 Dezembro d5 1978
    ...So.2d 758 (Fla.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924, 96 S.Ct. 267, 46 L.Ed.2d 250; Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash.2d 405, 518 P.2d 721; Ware v. State, 219 So.2d 442 (Fla.App.); Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 208 A.2d 575; contrast People v. Grayson, 58 Ill.2d 260, 319 N.E.2d 43, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 9......
  • Dees v. State, 44315
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 22 d3 Maio d3 1974
    ...notice and 'disclosure of evidence,' we find implicit in the remainder of the statute that 'due notice' be given Ware v. State, 219 So.2d 442 (Fla.App.3d 1969). More specifically, in light of Morrissey, supra, we hold that, since June 29, 1972, the date on which Morrissey, supra, was render......

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