Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Ward
| Citation | 286 Ky. 73 |
| Parties | Warfield Natural Gas Co. et al. v. Ward et al. |
| Decision Date | 28 March 1941 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky) |
1. Quieting Title. — In action to quiet title, wherein defendants claimed under a Virginia patent issued in 1786, evidence established location of Virginia patent as claimed by defendants.
2. Constitutional Law. — The safest rule in interpretation of a constitutional provision is to look with all the lights and aids of contemporary history at the nature and object to be accomplished and to give to each word such force consistent with its legitimate meaning as may fairly secure and attain the ends proposed, and such rule is especially applicable to a remedial provision.
3. Limitation of Actions. — The constitutional provision prohibiting action to recover land held under Virginia or Kentucky patent issued before 1820 from one claiming under "title of record," unless brought within five years after adoption of constitutional provision or commencement of possession, means that where a claimant relies upon a paper title, traceable to a patent issued by Virginia or by Kentucky before 1820, his adversary may plead the five-year limitation period in bar of a right to recover under the title if he shows that the land was in his possession, or in his predecessor's possession, under a recorded title founded on a later grant from Kentucky when the Constitution became effective, or that he has been an occupant for five years before the commencement of the action against him (Ky. Stats., sec. 4704; Constitution, sec. 251).
4. Limitation of Actions. — Under constitutional provision prohibiting action to recover land held under Virginia or Kentucky patent issued before 1820 from one claiming under "title of record," unless brought within five years after adoption of constitutional provision or commencement of possession, "title of record" means a title emanating from the commonwealth of Kentucky, but does not necessarily mean a valid title (Ky. Stats., sec. 4704; Constitution, sec. 251).
5. Limitation of Actions. — The constitutional provision prohibiting action to recover land held under Virginia or Kentucky patent issued before 1820 from one claiming under "title of record," unless brought within five years after adoption of constitutional provision or commencement of possession, can be invoked only where superiority of title is based upon a patent issued by Virginia or by Kentucky before 1820 (Constitution, sec. 251).
6. Limitation of Actions. — The "title of record" referred to in constitutional provision prohibiting action to recover land held under Virginia or Kentucky patent issued before 1820 from one claiming under "title of record," unless brought within five years after adoption of constitutional provision or commencement of possession, cannot be relied on as a sword for attack nor as a shield in defense, except to support possession and to describe its extent (Constitution, sec. 251).
7. States. — The constitutional provision prohibiting action to recover land held under Virginia or Kentucky patent issued before 1820 from one claiming under "title of record," unless brought within five years after adoption of constitutional provision or commencement of possession, does not violate provision of Virginia compact that all private rights and interests in land over which Virginia surrendered sovereignty, derived from the laws of Virginia, shall remain valid and secure under the laws of the proposed state of Kentucky (Compact with Virginia, secs. 7, 9; Act Cong. Feb. 4, 1791, 1 Stat. 189; Constitution, sec. 251).
8. Limitation of Actions. — The constitutional provision prohibiting action to recover land held under Virginia or Kentucky patent issued before 1820 from one claiming under "title of record," unless brought within five years after adoption of constitutional provision or commencement of possession, deals with the matter of remedy and not of right, and does not impair or extinguish vested rights when operating prospectively (Constitution, sec. 251).
9. Limitation of Actions. — In action to quiet title, wherein defendants claimed under a Virginia patent issued in 1786, evidence established that plaintiffs had been in possession of land claimed for five years under a "title of record" so as to be entitled to invoke constitutional plea of limitations (Ky. Stats., sec. 4704; Constitution, sec. 251).
10. Quieting Title. — In action to quiet title, where defendants' title of record, based upon a Virginia patent, was superior to plaintiffs' title of record, but was unenforceable because of plea of limitations, plaintiffs could not rely on their record title, but were required to base their claim on adverse possession, and hence it was immaterial whether plaintiffs' title was defective (Ky. Stats., sec. 4704; Constitution, sec. 251).
11. Adverse Possession. — In action to quiet title, wherein defendants claimed under a Virginia patent and plaintiffs claimed that defendant's superior title of record, based upon Virginia patent, was unenforceable because of plea of limitations, case resolved into a question of adverse possession, with burden resting upon plaintiffs to establish title by prescription (Ky. Stats., sec. 4704; Constitution, sec. 251).
12. Adverse Possession. — Plaintiffs' patents to land, though invalid because land embraced therein had been previously patented, constituted "color of title" and defined extent of plaintiffs' possession, even though plaintiffs exercised ownership only over portions thereof (Ky. Stats., sec. 4704).
13. Adverse Possession. — The payment of taxes is but an element of adverse possession and does not alone constitute actual possession.
14. Adverse Possession. — There must be both intention and action existing and appearing on the land itself to constitute "adverse possession."
15. Adverse Possession. — Evidence that five patents, which, though invalid, constituted color of title on which plaintiffs' adverse possession was based, joined each other, that plaintiffs' predecessor acquired land as a unit in 1891, and since held and used land as such, showed that there was sufficient actual occupancy on portions of each patent to constitute "adverse possession" to described boundary of each of them.
16. Mines and Minerals. — The mere taking of a second oil and gas lease after having leased premises from another lessor in order to protect itself would not in and of itself "estop" lessee from denying title of second lessor.
17. Mines and Minerals. — Where defendants accepted oil and gas lease from plaintiffs' predecessor after having obtained a lease on same property from another person, and thereafter for a long period of years paid delay rentals to plaintiffs' predecessor, refused to develop property, then abandoned all interest under second lease but eventually claimed title under it and drilled a well on property under such claim, acceptance of lease from plaintiffs' predecessor was an "abandonment" of all rights acquired by defendants under prior lease, and defendants were "estopped" from claiming adverse possession against plaintiffs under prior lease.
18. Adverse Possession. — Evidence established that plaintiffs, in action to quiet title, had acquired title by prescription to lands claimed.
19. Judgment. — In a collateral attack on a judgment, the absence of jurisdiction must affirmatively appear of record and it cannot be established by extrinsic evidence.
20. Judgment. — The misplacement of papers in a case cannot affect integrity of the judgment and other entries in trial court's records, since pleadings and exhibits become only evidential after judgment is entered and are presumed to support the record.
21. Judgment. — Where one of defendants, in action to quiet title. claimed title to one of tracts from same source as plaintiffs claimed title and pleaded in bar a prior judgment, in action in which plaintiffs were made parties, which quieted title in him, invalidity of prior judgment could not be established by extrinsic evidence, and the judgment, being valid, supported defendant's plea of "res judicata."
22. Adverse Possession; Quieting Title. — The period of limitations through which plaintiffs' title by adverse possession might have been ripened was suspended during the 17 years the action to quiet title was pending, and by judgment in such action adverse to plaintiffs, plaintiffs' claim was denied.
23. Adverse Possession. — Where judgment, in action to quiet title, was rendered against plaintiffs, but plaintiffs were not dispossessed under judgment, plaintiffs' possession thereafter was in subordination to title therein adjudged.
24. Tenancy in Common. — Where one of defendants owned a two-eighths undivided interest in oil and gas on land and plaintiffs owned other six-eighths interest, plaintiffs could not acquire defendant's interest by adverse possession, in absence of notice or notorious action amounting to notice (Ky. Stats., sec. 2366a-1).
25. Estoppel. — One having or claiming title to land by purchasing or procuring an outstanding or adverse claim or title does not admit that it is paramount to that under which he holds and is not thereby "estopped" to deny its validity.
26. Estoppel. — A defendant, in action to quiet title, was not "estopped" to claim title to one of tracts involved from same source as plaintiffs because of his insistence upon title through another source, where there was no showing that plaintiffs were lulled into a sense of security or changed their position by reason of defendant's act.
Appeal from Martin Circuit Court.
Kirk & Wells, W.R. McCoy, A.R. Kingdon and Harold A. Ritz for appellants.
Howes & Walker for appellees Ward's Heirs.
W.J. Ward, pro se.
Before James F. Bailey, Judge.
Affirming.
The case involves the title to oil and gas under about 660 acres located on the Left Fork of Big Elk Creek, a...
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