Warfield v. Wis. Cranberry Co.

• Decision Date: 23 April 1884
• Citation: 63 Iowa 312,19 N.W. 224
• Parties: WARFIELD AND ANOTHER v. WISCONSIN CRANBERRY CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

63 Iowa 312

19 N.W. 224

WARFIELD AND ANOTHER

v.WISCONSIN CRANBERRY CO.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed April 23, 1884.

Appeal from Polk circuit court.

Action to recover damages because of the failure of defendant to deliver 100 barrels of cranberries as the plaintiff claims it contracted to do. Trial by jury, verdict and judgment for the defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

ADAMS and REED, JJ., dissent.

Nourse & Kauffman, for appellant.

Geo. A. Underwood, for appellee.

SEEVERS, J.

The defense was the statute of frauds. The burden was on the plaintiff to establish a contract in writing, or a written admission of an oral contract. One Barnes procured the plaintiff to order cranberries of the defendant. Such order was in writing, and is as follows:

“DES MOINES, IOWA, October 3, 1881.

DEAR SIR: Please ship one hundred barrels of cranberries, $6.75 per barrel, delivered; berries to be as sample shown us by Mr. Barnes. Thirty days, or one per cent. cash, ten days.”

This order was delivered to Barnes and by him forwarded to the defendant in Wisconsin. The defendant wrote Barnes as follows:

“NORWAY RIDGE, WISCONSIN, October 5, 1881.

FRIEND BARNES: By delivery I mean in the car in Des Moines, not at their stores; simply to count them out. Drayage is three to four cents in Chicago, and more there. Sent to your address, for Watt & Co., two hundred barrels yesterday, and wrote you very fully. Perhaps they will take whole car. If so, can send Smith, Warfield & Howell 75 and 100; and the ten-barrel man 185 and Morrison 25,--210, all in one car; or leave Mr. Morrison entirely out, if he chooses. Can send by the 15th.”

The court instructed the jury as follows: “You will first inquire and determine from the evidence whether or not the letter of October 5th, marked Exhibit A, was written in response to the order in writing of the plaintiffs. If you fail to find that it was so written you need not inquire further, but returnyour verdict for the defendant. But if you find that it was in response to the order of plaintiffs, then I instruct you that it is a sufficient acceptance of the order of the plaintiffs, if you further find that it was addressed to Mr. Barnes with the intention that it should be exhibited to the plaintiffs, and that it was exhibited to them by him.”

It will be observed the court submitted two propositions of fact to the jury: First, whether the letter of October 5th was in response to, and therefore an acceptance of, the order; and, second, whether the defendant intended Barnes to show the letter to the plaintiff. That Barnes did show it must, under the evidence, be conceded. No complaint is made of the first proposition, but appellant insists the second is erroneous, and that the law is that “letters addressed to a third party, stating or affirming a contract, may be used as a memorandum of it;” citing Browne, St. Frauds, (4th Ed.) § 3540, and authorities there cited. In the case at bar there was a written offer, and on plaintiffs' theory a written acceptance of such offer, thus making a contract in writing. But whether there was an acceptance is, in the instruction, made to turn, not on the question of acceptance in writing, but on the question whether it was intended the writing should be exhibited to the plaintiff. In so ruling we think the court erred. Kleeman v. Collins, 9 Bush, 467;Cook v. Barr, 44 N. Y. 160;Peabody v. Speyers, 56 N. Y. 230;Moore v. Mountcastle, 61 Mo. 424. The principle upon which these decisions are based we understand to be that the statute was not intended to apply to written contracts, but to the enforcement of oral contracts, when properly evidenced, as by the admission in writing of the party to be charged. If the party sought to be charged has in writing admitted the contract, this is sufficient, as we understand, to take the case out of the statute, no matter to whom the writing may have been addressed.

It is, however, insisted, the question under consideration has been ruled differently in Steel v. Fife, 48 Iowa, 99. This case was decided correctly, but it must be confessed there are some expressions in the opinion which should have...