Warner Cable of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Community Antenna Television Commission

• Citation: 372 Mass. 495,362 N.E.2d 897
• Parties: WARNER CABLE OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC., et al. 1 v. COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION COMMISSION, Mayor of Somerville, Intervener.
• Decision Date: 04 May 1977
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 897

362 N.E.2d 897

372 Mass. 495

WARNER CABLE OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC., et al. ¹ v. COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION COMMISSION, Mayor of Somerville, Intervener.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 9, 1977.

Decided May 4, 1977.

Walter H. Mayo, III, Boston (Hilary S. Schultz, Boston, with him), for plaintiffs.

Terence P. O'Malley, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Thomas H. Miller, Asst. Atty. Gen., with him), for defendants.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and KAPLAN, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

KAPLAN, Justice.

The plaintiff 'Warner' corporations, licensees of community antenna television (CATV) systems, brought an action in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk (county court) against the Communnity Antenna Television Commission (Commission) to invalidate certain regulations promulgated by the Commission, and to secure an adjudication that they were entitled to rate increases proposed by them. A single justice referred the action to a special master and, upon confirmation of the master's report, a partial summary judgment was entered in effect approving those rate increases. Thereafter a single justice reserved and reported the whole case to the full court for disposition. ² We hold that the regulations in question were valid, and that the issue of the proposed increases in rates was for the Commission in the first instance and not for the court.

The Commonwealth entered upon the regulation of CATV systems (actually cable systems) ³ by the enactment of St.1971, c. 1103, effective on November 16, 1971, embodying a new c. 166A of the General Laws. The authority to license the operators of such systems was confirmed in the cities and towns as 'issuing authorities,' ⁴ with oversight and ultimate control of the licensing function in the newly created Commission. G.L. c. 166A, §§ 3--9, 11--14. ⁵ For a minimum period of three years, the issuing authorities were to determine the rates and charges of their respective licensees, provided that the monthly charges to subscribers should not in any event exceed $7. ⁶ During the three-year period the Commission was to study the necessity and desirability of itself undertaking rate regulation under the statute; if it reached an affirmative conclusion, it would proceed with such a program under rules for the purpose to be formulated by it pursuant to the statute. G.L. c. 166A, § 15.

On December 18, 1974, the Commission in a 'First Report and Order' announced that it had completed its study and, for reasons which it elaborated, had determined to go ahead with rate regulation. At the same time it published tentative 'Procedural Regulations for Determination of Changes in Cable Television Rates and Charges' which, with amendments, took effect on march 1, 1975. ⁷

The plaintiffs had been licensed to operate CATV systems in Malden, Chelsea, Somerville, Winthrop, Medford, and Everett. ⁸ Their charges to subscribers--which, as far as appears, they had themselves voluntarily adopted--were a basic $5 monthly for service to subscriber's first set, and $1 monthly (at three of the cities) or $1.50 monthly (at the others) for each additional set.

Under the March, 1975, regulations of the Commission, a licensee desiring to raise its charges to subscribers must, as a first step, petition the issuing authority, which was to accord a full hearing and render a report within ninety days. If the report was negative, the licensee could, as a second, step, apply to the Commission for relief. In that case the Commission was obliged to afford a de novo hearing and to render a decision as soon as practicable. The statute provided (§ 15) for judicial review by the Superior Court of all questions of fact and law at the suit of any party claiming to be aggrieved by the Commission's decision.

On February 26, 1975 (anticipating by two days the effective date of the regulations), the plaintiffs petitioned their respective issuing authorities for a 50% increase of the basic monthly charge to $7.50 and for a charge of $2.50 monthly for each additional set. Their petitions were denied. They applied respectively to the Commission on dates between May 16 and August 27, 1975.

Through October, 1975, the Commission had not set a date for the de novo hearing, although the record does indicate that on August 7 there had been a 'conference with all parties,' and it appears, further, that by the end of October there was internal Commission understanding that the economic situation might well justify interim rate increases for some licensees. On October 31 the plaintiffs applied to the Commission to determine interim rates. But on November 4 they filed their action in the county court praying (among other things) for an injunction, preliminary and final, against interference by the Commission with their charging subscribers at the rates of $7.50 and $2.50 as originally proposed to the issuing authorities.

When the single justice heard the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on November 13, the Commission had already held (on November 7) a 'prehearing conference' regarding the application for interim rates. The single justice denied the motion, without prejudice to a renewal when the Commission acted, or failed to act promptly, on the interim rates application. On November 21 the plaintiffs renewed their motion. It appeared at the argument on the renewed motion that the Commission on November 25, after hearing, and upon a reasoned decision, had entered an order for interim rates allowing, under bond, a basic monthly charge to subscribers of $6.80 (to commence as of December 1), but not allowing any increase of existing charges for additional sets. The single justice was not prepared to grant interlocutory relief beyond the interim rates allowed by the Commission, and he accordingly denied the renewed motion.

On December 2 the plaintiffs by leave amended their complaint in the county court to allege that the interim rates allowed by the Commission were confiscatory. ⁹ At the same time they moved for the appointment of a master, presumably to inquire into the issue of confiscation. Although the Commission had started on the road to a determination of final rates by holding a prehearing conference on December 16, and by issuing formal notice to the parties on January 12, 1976, a single justice on January 20 entered an order referring 'the case' to a special master to make findings of fact and report to the county court.

Thereafter two proceedings ran on parallel tracks: the Commission took evidence under the retemaking provision of its statute and the March, 1975, regulations; the special master took evidence typical of a hearing on rates. Hearings before the Commission ended on March 4, 1976, hearings before the special master on April 13,

On April 2, 1976, the Commission rendered a lengthy analytic decision--joined in by three Commissioners, with a fourth concurring in the result--approving the basic monthly rate of $7.50 proposed by the plaintiffs but denying any increase in the rates for additional sets. (Receipts from the charges for additional sets have been less than 10% of the total receipts.) Two Commissioners dissented from the increase allowed, each with opinion. Review by the Superior Court of the Commission's decision was sought by the present plaintiffs (July 1, 1976) and, in a cross petition, by the issuing authorities of Malden, Chelsea, Somerville, Medford, and Everett (July 15); both petitions named the Commission as defendant. The cross petitioners have moved to consolidate the petitions, and the cases are pending in the Superior Court.

It was not until June 30, 1976, that the special master filed his report in the county court action. This did not express a conclusion about rates, but was read by the single justice as justifying not only the $7.50 basic rate but also the raise to $2.50 for additional sets. He allowed the plaintiffs' motion to confirm the special master's report, and on August 6 entered partial summary judgment accordingly. He denied a motion by the Commission to dismiss the complaint and the action based on the grounds (as the Commission put them) that the controversy had become 'moot' and that 'primary jurisidction' lay with the Commission. ¹⁰

1. Retemaking was to be accomplished by the Commission in the first instance under G.L. c. 166A, § 15, and therefore we dispose of one of the matters reserved for us by holding that the reference to the master, with the consequent partial summary judgment, was not appropriate. The statute laid down the procedure for determining applications by licensees for changes of rates: it led from the issuing authority to the Commission and thence to the Superior Court for judicial review--a customary administrative-judicial route. In the present case that path was followed, and in fact judicial review of the administrative decision still awaits the parties in the designated court.

Under Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils.,--- Mass. ---, ---, ^a 329 N.E.2d 712 (1975), a court may step in beforehand in an extraordinary situation where a retemaking agency is depriving a party of procedural due process by delaying inordinately the administrative decision. ¹¹ It can be doubted whether the present case fits that description, as the agency acted with due speed in determining interim rates once the plaintiffs moved for them, and it attained to a decision on final rates well before the special master filed his report; it is of no particular significance that the agency may have been impelled to step hard on the accelerator because of the overhanging county court action. In all events, as the Boston Gas case itself shows, where procedural due process is offended by administrative delay, the expected result is not for the court to displace the agency as ratemaker, but rather for the court to order the agency to expedite its action. ¹² All this can be viewed as a phase of the doctrine of 'exhaustion of...