Warner v. Hill
| Decision Date | 20 May 1922 |
| Docket Number | 2825. |
| Citation | 112 S.E. 478,153 Ga. 510 |
| Parties | WARNER ET AL. v. HILL ET AL. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where an administrator purchases, directly or indirectly, at his own sale, property of his intestate, such sale is voidable at the election of the heirs at law; and they can move in a reasonable time to have the same set aside.
(a) If the heirs at law knowingly receive the proceeds of such sale they thereby ratify the same, and will be estopped from thereafter attacking the sale.
(b) If a guardian of minor heirs receive from such administrator their portions of the proceeds of such sale, and such heirs after reaching their majority, with knowledge of the facts treat such funds as their own, and give to their guardian receipts in full therefor, they will be held to have ratified the administrator's sale, and will thereafter be estopped from attacking the same, although they did not actually receive from their guardian such funds for which they so receipted.
If, after an administrator buys land at his own sale, the heirs at law, with knowledge of their rights, stand by and allow the purchaser at such sale, or his assignee, to make valuable and expensive improvements on the land so bought, they will be estopped from asserting title thereto against such purchaser or his assigns.
(a) Where the court instructs the jury to find a special verdict of the facts only in a cause, and for this purpose propounds to them questions to be answered, it is not error for the court to propound to the jury a question on the theory that the plaintiffs are estopped under the above-recited facts, without defining, in connection with the submission of such question, the circumstances which would make it inequitable for the plaintiffs to assert their claims to an interest in the land so sold, the court having given instructions on this theory after propounding to the jury a question upon the theory of estoppel, and in immediate connection with instructions upon the latter theory.
The answer of the jury to question 6, when considered in connection with the charge of the court in reference thereto, and the answer to question 12, are not so contradictory as to be unintelligible.
One tenant in common will not be estopped from asserting title to his interest in lands held by him and another tenant in common, by knowingly permitting such other tenant, without objection on his part, to erect valuable, permanent, and expensive improvements on joint property, during the existence of the joint tenancy, and before the former tenant has been actually ousted by the latter, or until the latter takes exclusive possession of the joint property with notice to his cotenant of his adverse possession.
(a) This rule does not apply where the alleged cotenant making such improvements claims to be the sole owner of the property under an independent title, and holds the same adversely to the person claiming to be his cotenant, and with notice to the latter of such adverse and exclusive possession.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
Generally the question of ratification depends on the intention of the parties, and is a matter of fact to be determined by the jury; but, when the facts are undisputed, it may become a question of law.
The acceptance of the benefit flowing from an unauthorized act amounts to an implied ratification of the act, whether the party intends to ratify it or not.
Ratification involves a full knowledge of all the facts.
An administrator's sale was only voidable, and not void because not had at the courthouse, but upon the premises, in another city in the same county.
A special question submitted to the jury as to whether plaintiffs, with knowledge of their claim to land, allowed the purchasers at an administrator's sale to put valuable improvements thereon under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for them to assert their claim, was not confusing and misleading as putting too much stress on the question whether they allowed improvements to be made, and too little stress on the question whether their conduct was inequitable.
Error from Superior Court, Troup County; C. E. Roop, Judge.
Action by Mary Warner and others against B. H. Hill and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs brings error. Affirmed.
T. T. Miller, of Columbus, and Hatton Lovejoy, of La Grange, for plaintiffs in error.
Little, Powell, Smith & Goldstein, of Atlanta, and E. T. Moon, of La Grange, for defendants in error.
For the plaintiffs' case, see Warner v. Hill, 149 Ga. 464, 100 S.E. 393, in which this court reversed a judgment of nonsuit. The case is here again, the plaintiffs complaining of the judgment of the trial court overruling their motion for a new trial. The verdict of the jury is in the shape of questions propounded by the court, and answers of the jury to such questions.
1. In the first ground of the amendment to the motion for new trial it is alleged that the jury erred in finding, in answer to question 11, propounded to them by the court, that both Mary Warner and Will C. Warner actually and knowingly received from their guardian some part of the proceeds of the administrator's sale of the land of their ancestor, with knowledge of the irregularities on account of which they attack said sale and seek to recover said land, because said finding of the jury is contrary to the evidence and without evidence to support it. These two plaintiffs testified that they had never received any part of the proceeds of the administrator's sale of this land from their guardian; that, after this suit was filed, they gave receipts to their guardian, who was their father, in full for their portions of these funds, for the purpose of allowing him to be discharged as such guardian; but no money was actually received by either of them from their guardian. The receipt of Mary Warner, acknowledging the payment to her, after she reached her majority, by her guardian of $495.56, the same shown to be a portion of the proceeds of the sale of this land by the administrator, was in evidence. The sworn return of her guardian to the ordinary, in which the payment of this money by him to his ward is alleged, was in evidence. The receipt of Will Warner, acknowledging the payment to him, after he became of age, by his guardian, of $501.96, the same shown to be a portion of the proceeds of the sale of this land; and the sworn return of his guardian to the ordinary, in which the payment of this money by him to his ward is alleged--were introduced in evidence, and were before the jury. It thus became a question of fact, to be settled by the jury, whether they actually received these sums of money from their guardian. They testified that they had not received these sums. In their receipts they acknowledged the receipt of these sums. The sworn returns of their guardian alleged the payment of these sums to these wards. On this conflicting evidence the jury resolved the matter in favor of the defendants.
But the actual receipt of these funds by these wards is not necessary to show their ratification of the illegal sale of this land by the administrator. Of course, the receipt by them of their portions of these funds, with knowledge of the facts, would ratify the illegal sale of the administrator. When their guardian received their portions of the proceeds of this sale from the administrator, and they afterwards, with knowledge of the facts, receipted him therefor, this would amount to a ratification of his act in their behalf and of the administrator's sale. They treated these funds as their own. They could have repudiated the administrator's sale and the action of their guardian in receiving for them their portions of the proceeds of this sale; but, instead of doing this, they treated these funds in the hands of their guardian as their property, and recognized his liability to them therefor. When they did this and receipted him as their guardian for these funds, they ratified his act in receiving them, and thus ratified the sale of the administrator of this land from which these funds arose. Where executors, acting under direction in the father's will, collected a policy of insurance, to the proceeds of which testator's children were entitled, and for which they could have sued the insurance company thereon, and the children procured a decree in chancery against the executors for the whole amount of the collection, one of them could not afterwards recover against the insurance company in an action on the policy. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. May, 82 Ga. 646, 9 S.E. 597.
These children had the right, had they chosen to exercise it, to repudiate the act of their guardian in receiving these funds. Instead of doing so, they chose to adopt his act and to receipt him for these funds. If these wards, after becoming of age, had sued their guardian for these funds, with knowledge of the irregularities in the administrator's sale, they would have clearly ratified his act in receiving these funds and the administrator's sale. It amounts to the same thing, when they settled with the guardian, after he received these funds, and receipted him in full therefor, whether they actually received these funds or not. The obtaining of a judgment against the guardian was not essential in order to make their election final. Ingraham v. Barber, 72 Ga. 158; Smith v. Estey Organ Co., 100 Ga. 628, 28 S.E. 392; Pearce v. Borg Chewing-Gum Co., 111 Ga. 847, 36 S.E. 457; McClellan v. McClellan, 135 Ga. 95; Board of Education v. Day, 128 Ga. 156 (5), 167, 57 S.E. 359. Generally the question of ratification is one which depends upon the intention of the parties, and is a matter of fact to be determined by the jury. Gray v. Bass, 42 Ga. 270; Burr...
To continue reading
Request your trial