Warner v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 02 December 1884
• Citation: 21 N.W. 483,65 Iowa 126
• Parties: WARNER v. JOHNSON & HAKEMAN
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

21 N.W. 483

65 Iowa 126

WARNER v. JOHNSON & HAKEMAN

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

December 2, 1884

Appeal from O'Brien District Court.

ACTION for the recovery of specific personal property. The judgment of the district court awards the property to defendants. Plaintiff appeals.

REVERSED.

Barrett & Bullis, for appellant.

J. B Dunn, for appellees.

OPINION

REED J.

The case was submitted in the district court on an agreed statement of facts. It is shown by this statement that plaintiff entered into a written contract with A. C. Satterly for the sale of a fire-proof safe to him. Satterly paid no part of the purchase price, but gave his promissory notes therefor. It was stipulated in the contract, and also in the notes, that the title to the safe should not pass from plaintiff until the purchase price was paid, but neither of the instruments was acknowledged or recorded. Plaintiff resided at Cincinnati, in the state of Ohio, and he shipped the safe from that point by rail, consigned to Satterly, at Sheldon, in this state, that being his place of residence. After the safe arrived at Sheldon, and while it lay at the depot in charge of the railroad company, Satterly sold it to Davidson & Woodruff, who paid him the price agreed upon, and received from him an order for the delivery of the safe to them, on which they procured it from the railroad company. They afterwards sold and delivered it to Alexander Davidson, and he sold and delivered it to H. E Thayer & Co. Defendants were members of that firm, and upon its dissolution succeeded to whatever right it had in said safe. Satterly has never paid any portion of said notes, and none of the subsequent purchasers had any actual notice of the condition of the sale from plaintiff to Satterly. The value of the safe is less than $ 100, and the trial judge has certified that the case involves the following question of law, on which it is desirable to have the opinion of this court, viz: "Had Satterly such actual possession of the safe at the time of the sale to Davidson & Woodruff as to bring the case within the meaning of section 1922 of the Code? That is to say, which had the better claim to the safe, and the ownership thereof, plaintiff or defendants, under these facts?"

Before the enactment of section 1922, it was well settled in this state that, when personal property was sold on condition that the title should not pass until the price was paid, the vendee was not regarded as a purchaser until this condition was performed, and he could not convey any interest in the property as against the vendor, even to an innocent purchaser. See Bailey v. Harris, 8 Iowa 331; Baker v. Hall, 15 Iowa 277; Knoulton v Redenbaugh, 40 Iowa 114. It was doubtless to prevent the injustice that parties were sometimes enabled to practice under the rule established by these cases that the section was enacted. It is as follows: "No sale, contract, or lease, wherein the transfer of title or ownership of personal property is made to depend on any condition, shall be valid against any creditor or purchaser of the vendee or lessee in actual possession obtained in pursuance thereof without notice, unless the same be in writing, executed by the vendor or lessor, and acknowledged and recorded as chattel mortgages." It is very clear that this statute in no manner changes, as between themselves, any of the rights of the immediate parties to a conditional transfer of...