Warner v. McLean Trucking Co.

• Decision Date: 22 November 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. C-1-82-1364.
• Citation: 627 F. Supp. 203
• Parties: David K. WARNER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. McLEAN TRUCKING COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

627 F. Supp. 203

David K. WARNER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. McLEAN TRUCKING COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. C-1-82-1364.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, W.D.

November 22, 1985.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert Karl Handelman, Mary J. Kilroy, Handelman & Kilroy, Columbus, Ohio; of counsel: Paul E. Tobias, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiffs.

Robert J. Hollingsworth, Cincinnati, Ohio, Sorrell Logothetis, Dayton, Ohio, Dennis J. Buckley, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DAVID S. PORTER, Senior District Judge:

This is a class action brought by dock workers, yardmen, and city-combination drivers who are members of Local 100, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), and who are employed by McLean Trucking Company's breakbulk facility in Cincinnati, Ohio. The case involves McLean's implementation of a flexible work week in November 1982 without a vote by the affected employees. Plaintiffs allege that this violated their rights, and they consequently assert breach of contract claims pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) against McLean, the Ohio Conference of Teamsters¹ (Conference or OCT), and the Ohio Joint State Committee² (State Committee or OJSC). Plaintiffs also assert breach of the duty of fair representation claims against Local 100, the OCT, the OJSC, and the Ohio Highway Drivers' Council³ (Council or OHDC). In addition, plaintiffs claim that the Conference and the State Committee violated their rights under section 101(a) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1982). Finally, plaintiffs assert a cause of action against McLean for misrepresentation.

This case is now before this Court on defendant McLean's motion for summary judgment (doc. 55), plaintiffs' response thereto (doc. 58), and McLean's reply (doc. 63). After reviewing those documents and all other pleadings in the case, it was determined that judgment could not be rendered for the relief requested, and consequently a hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) was deemed appropriate. That hearing was held July 12, 1985 to "ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). At the hearing representatives of plaintiffs and all defendants appeared and responded to questions from the Court. Following the hearing, all the parties submitted a joint Statement of Stipulated Facts (doc. 72).⁴ Those facts, upon which we rely in part for our statement of facts below, are incorporated by reference in this Memorandum as facts "without substantial controversy" which will be deemed established at trial. Other facts which are "actually and in good faith controverted" will be discussed below.

Subsequent to the hearing, defendants Ohio Conference of Teamsters, Ohio Highway Drivers' Council, and Ohio Joint State Committee, (hereinafter collectively "union defendants") filed a motion for summary judgment (doc. 73) which plaintiffs oppose (doc. 83); the union defendants also filed a reply brief (doc. 85). Defendant Local 100 filed its own motion for summary judgment (doc. 75), to which plaintiffs responded (doc. 81), and Local 100 replied (doc. 82). This memorandum and order will now examine the merits of each of these motions for summary judgment.

A motion for summary judgment should be granted only if there are no issues regarding material facts and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, we must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as the nonmoving parties. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Felix v. Young, 536 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir.1976). Moreover, the burden is upon defendant to show their entitlement to summary judgment. Applying this standard to the facts in this case, we conclude that McLean's motion for summary judgment must be denied, while Local 100's should be granted, and the motion of the OCT, OJSC, and OHDC must be denied in part and granted in part.

I. FACTS

This case centers around a dispute concerning the manner in which McLean Trucking Company instituted a flexible work week in 1982. At that time the trucking industry was undergoing deregulation during a period of general economic recession. Trucking companies were fiercely competitive, causing some to go out of business or to lay off workers. It was important for them to attempt to achieve the most advantageous treatment possible in their negotiations with local unions. One goal for these trucking companies was the institution of an unlimited flexible work week. The purpose of instituting a flexible work week was to allow the trucking company to have seven different weekly work schedules, each beginning on a different day of the week. This permits the company to work a greater number of employees more hours without having to pay overtime. From the point of view of the trucking company, therefore, this was desirable because it permitted them to increase productivity at a minimal cost. From the point of view of organized labor this could also be considered advantageous because the result could be an increase in the total number of persons employed. For employees who were already working at the trucking companies, however, the seven-day flexible work week was not desirable because it diminished their opportunity for overtime pay.

During the relevant time period for this case, McLean Trucking Company and Local 100 were signatories to a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement, the National Master Freight Agreement and Central States Area Local Supplemental Agreement (NMFA). The NMFA became effective on April 1, 1982 following ratification by the membership of Local 100. Article 61 of the NMFA provided for a standard work week of five consecutive days, beginning Monday or Tuesday. Work weeks starting on other days, called flexible weeks, could be established at break-bulk terminals upon (1) the employer's notice, and (2) fulfilling "certain mutually agreed to standards." NMFA, art. 61, § 1. The NMFA did not specify what these standards should be, but it did provide that "any such agreed-to procedure" must be submitted for approval by the Central States Joint Area Rider Committee. Thus, the requirements for instituting a flexible work week are established by riders to the NMFA that may be negotiated between locals and employers.

At the time the 1982-85 NMFA was ratified, a document entitled "Guidelines for Operation of Flexible Work Week" established the "mutually agreed-to procedures" for deviations from the standard work week specified in the NMFA (Exhibit C to doc. 58). These Guidelines were agreed to by the Ohio Highway Drivers' Council, representing the Ohio teamster union locals, and the Ohio Motor Carriers Labor Relations Association, representing the trucking companies covered by the NMFA (including defendant McLean). Article 7 of the Guidelines, titled "Implementation" set forth three prerequisites for the implementation of a flexible work week: (1) approval by the local union, (2) approval by a majority of the affected employees, and (3) the sanction of the Ohio Joint State Committee.

Pursuant to these Guidelines, McLean and Local 100 had entered into the McLean Breakbulk Agreement which established that the work week at McLean could begin on Thursdays in addition to Mondays and Tuesdays as provided in the 1979-82 NMFA. This agreement thus permitted the McLean breakbulk facility to operate seven days a week. As required by the Guidelines, the McLean Breakbulk Agreement was ratified by a secret ballot vote of the affected employees, and it became effective in September 1981. Other trucking companies in Ohio had different provisions for their flexible work weeks. For example, in November 1981 Lee Way Motor Freight and Local 100 agreed that they would operate under a plan calling for work weeks starting all seven days of the week.

Thus, the system in operation under the 1979-82 NMFA and applicable flexible work week Guidelines authorized negotiation between locals and employers to determine what if any deviation from the standard work week would govern their relationship. It is undisputed that under these procedures the affected employees were entitled to vote on such a plan, which then had to be approved by the local union and the Ohio Joint State Committee.

For existing riders such as the Guidelines or the Breakbulk Agreement to remain in effect following the adoption of the 1982-85 NMFA they had to be submitted to the appropriate Joint Area Committee as required by article 2, section 5(a) of the NMFA. Failure to do so would render them "null and void." NMFA, art. 2, § 5(a). Instead of submitting the existing flexible week riders for approval, however, the Presidents and Secretary-Treasurers of the Teamsters Freight Locals in Ohio met in Columbus on March 30, 1982, and voted unanimously to authorize the Ohio Conference of Teamsters, acting through the Ohio Highway Drivers' Council, to renegotiate the Guidelines for the Flexible Work Week. At the same meeting a motion was made and seconded that a state-wide work week be adopted.

The negotiation of a new set of guidelines during the term of the 1982-85 NMFA was governed by article 2, section 5(b) of the NMFA which required that such new riders must be approved by the Joint Area Committee. Once such a new rider was approved, the NMFA provided that it "shall be made available, if requested, to all Employers similarly situated in the geographic area to which the Riders apply." NMFA, art. 2, § 5(c). This provision is the so-called "most favored nation" clause which McLean claims entitled them to implement the flexible work week unilaterally once another employer in the area had done...