Warner v. Patton

• Decision Date: 19 June 1929
• Docket Number: (No. 3215.)
• Citation: 19 S.W.2d 1111
• Parties: WARNER et al. v. PATTON et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 1111

19 S.W.2d 1111

WARNER et al. v. PATTON et al.

(No. 3215.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Amarillo.

June 19, 1929.

Rehearing Denied September 18, 1929.

As Modified by Order of September 26, 1929.

Appeal from District Court, Foard County; Robert Cole, Judge.

Suits by J. B. Easley against Geo. P. Warner and others and by T. S. Patton and others against the heirs and trustees of the David Wallace estate, which were consolidated and tried together. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Reversed and rendered.

James B. Watson, Hugh B. Smith, and Thompson & Barwise, all of Fort Worth, for appellants.

Allen & Jarman, of Oklahoma City, Okl., Oswalt & Myers, of Crowell, and O. O. Franklin, of Vernon, for appellees.

RANDOLPH, J.

This suit consists of two suits, originally filed in the district court of Foard county, Texas; the first having been brought by J. B. Easley, as plaintiff, against Geo. P. Warner, Clara N. Warner, James B. Watson, and the heirs of David Wallace, as defendants, and on the same day another suit was filed by T. S. Patton et al., as plaintiffs, against the heirs and trustees of the David Wallace estate. The two suits were consolidated by agreement of the parties and tried together. The parties will be designated herein as in the trial court.

The two suits were for the title and possession of land and the oil and gas mining rights involved in the reservations contained in several deeds to sections 21, 23, 27, and 95, in block A, Texas & New Orleans Railway Company survey, Foard county, Texas. The case was submitted to a jury upon special issues, and on the answers returned by them the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs for the oil and gas mining rights in controversy, as against the defendants, and from this judgment the defendants have appealed.

In each of the cases, the plaintiffs in their petition claimed certain of the named sections of land as owners thereof and alleged common source of title. The controversy between the parties arises over a reservation of the mineral rights and minerals, as made in the habendum clause of the deeds, which reservations are practically identical in the several deeds and are as follows: "But do hereby expressly reserve and except * * * all the mines, minerals, and mineral rights whatsoever that may be within, upon, or under the said tract of land or any part thereof."

The defendants contend that this reservation as a matter of law reserves the oil and gas on, in, or under the land, as well as metallic ore, such as copper, silver, lead, or iron. On the other hand, plaintiffs contend that the terms "minerals" or "mineral rights," as used in said reservation, were only intended to reserve metallic ore and metals and mineral products, in the ordinary methods of mining ore and metals, and in effect that the words "minerals" and "mineral rights" were not understood in the community, or generally in the state of Texas, to include oil and natural gas, and further, if the reservation as drawn was sufficient in legal effect to include oil and natural gas, it was a mutual mistake of the parties.

The defendants, in answer to this last proposition, say that the plaintiffs' action is based upon the question of mutual mistake, and the right to reform the instrument is barred by the statutes of limitation. Before going to the heart of the case, we shall dispose of the last question just stated. If the plaintiffs' case is based upon their right to reform the language of the reservations, certainly the assertion of such right comes too late after 25 years. It would clearly be barred. Cleveland State Bank v. Gardner (Tex. Com. App.) 286 S. W. 173.

But we do not think a reformation of the deed was necessary to the assertion of the plaintiffs' rights. If the language of the reservation as a matter of law, included oil and gas, then the plaintiffs could not recover. On the other hand, if the reservation did, as a matter of law, exclude oil and gas as minerals, the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover, and hence the instrument under which the plaintiffs claim the oil and gas would need no reformation.

The only question for our consideration is: Were the terms "minerals" and "mineral rights" such as to definitely include all minerals and oil and gas as minerals as a matter of law under the term "minerals"? This, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' plea that such was not the intention of the parties at the time of the execution of the reservations. We think that the intentions of the parties cannot give such effect to the reservations, in view of the interpretation given to the term "minerals" and "mineral rights" by the courts of this state. We can serve no useful purpose in discussing the evidence in this case, or the effect of the plaintiffs' pleading and evidence upon the question of intention of the parties, especially where we do not conclude that the plaintiffs' evidence establishes the fact of their intention to exclude oil and gas from the reservations. In any event, we think that the law of Texas had definitely fixed the status of oil and natural gas as minerals at the time of the making of the reservations. Further, for the same reason, we do not deem it necessary to discuss the decisions of other state courts.

The language...