Warner v. Wartburg Coll.
| Decision Date | 30 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 21-CV-2029-CJW-MAR,21-CV-2029-CJW-MAR |
| Parties | SYDNEY WARNER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WARTBURG COLLEGE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 2
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND ........................................................... 2
III. APPLICABLE LAW ....................................................................... 3
IV. ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 5
V. LEAVE TO AMEND ..................................................................... 20
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 21
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on defendant Wartburg College's ("defendant" or "Wartburg") motion to dismiss plaintiff Sydney Warner's ("plaintiff") petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 11). Plaintiff timely filed a resistance. (Doc. 17). Defendant timely filed a reply. (Doc. 27). For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part defendant's motion.
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court accepts the following facts stated in plaintiff's petition as true. (Doc. 2). Defendant is a private college in Waverly, Iowa. (Id., at 2, 4). Plaintiff is a resident of Iowa and, during the relevant time period, was a full-time undergraduate student at Wartburg pursuing a music degree. (Id., at 4). Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of herself and "all people who paid tuition and fees for the Spring 2020 Semester at Wartburg[.]" (Id., at 1). Plaintiff alleges that she and other students "lost the benefit of the education [and services] for which they paid" due to defendant's response to the COVID-19 pandemic (the "Pandemic"). (Id.).
Plaintiff "entered into a contractual agreement with Wartburg" to enroll in the Spring 2020 Semester. (Id.). "Approximate tuition costs at Wartburg . . . for the Spring 2020 Semester [we]re $21,750 for full-time undergraduate students." (Id., at 4). Plaintiff alleges that defendant's Academic Catalog, website, and marketing materials comprise the terms of her contract with defendant. (Id., at 2, 7). Plaintiff alleges that such terms entitled her, upon the payment of tuition and fees, to an on-campus college education, including "access to campus facilities and activities, and in-person instruction in a physical classroom." (Id., at 1).
In February 2020, the Spring 2020 Semester began at Wartburg. (Id., at 4). On March 16, 2020, defendant announced that, because of the Pandemic, all in-person classes would be suspended effective March 18, 2020. (Id., at 6). Thus, on March 18,2020, all classes transitioned to an online, remote format for the remainder of the Spring 2020 Semester, which ended in May 2020. (Id., at 4, 6). While online courses were taking place, defendant's campus was closed. (Id., at 6). Despite the shift to online learning and closure of its facilities, defendant did not refund any portion of the tuition or fees paid by plaintiff and other students. (Id., at 5).
On March 15, 2021, plaintiff filed her petition against defendant in the Iowa District Court for Bremer County. (Id., at 1). On April 19, 2021, defendant removed the case to this Court under Title 28, United States Code, Section 1332(d). (Doc. 1). In her petition, plaintiff asserts a claim for breach of contract against defendant as well as an alternative claim for unjust enrichment. (Id., at 13, 15).
III. APPLICABLE LAW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) provides that a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . and a demand for the relief sought."
Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a party may assert the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by motion. "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," but "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that recovery is very remote and unlikely." Id. at 555-56. Indeed, a theory asserted need only be plausible, which requires "enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discoverywill reveal evidence of [the conduct alleged]." Id. at 556. In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n, 734 F.3d 830, 834 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. When a pleading contains no more than conclusions, however, those conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. "[T]here is no justification for dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of statement, except where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim." Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Worcester, 108 F.2d 302, 306 (8th Cir. 1940).
"Though matters outside the pleading may not be considered in deciding a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, documents necessarily embraced by the complaint are not matters outside the pleading." Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). A contract forming the basis for a claim for relief is "evidently embraced by the pleadings." Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003). Thus, "[i]n a case involving a contract, the court may examine the contract documents in deciding a motion to dismiss." Stahl v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 327 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 2003).
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court will first address plaintiff's breach of contract claim before turning to her alternative unjust enrichment claim. As an initial matter, there is no dispute between the parties that plaintiff's claims arise under Iowa law. See (Docs. 11-1, at 10, 16; 17, at 6, 17). Thus, the Court will apply Iowa law.
In her breach of contract claim, plaintiff alleges that the Academic Catalog constituted an offer by defendant to plaintiff and other students to enter a contract. (Doc. 2, at 13). By paying tuition and fees and selecting courses for the Spring 2020 Semester offered in the Academic Catalog, plaintiff alleges that under the terms of that contract she and others "were entitled to in-person educational services [at Wartburg] through the end of the Spring 2020 Semester." (Id., at 13-14). Plaintiff concludes that moving classes online and closing campus deprived her and other students of the in-person educational benefits they paid for. (Id.). Thus, plaintiff requests that defendant "return the pro-rated portion of any Spring 2020 Semester tuition and fees for education services not provided since Wartburg . . . shut down on March 18, 2020." (Id., at 14).
Defendant argues that plaintiff's breach of contract claim fails for three reasons. First, it amounts to a non-justiciable educational malpractice claim. (Doc. 11-1, at 7-10). Second, plaintiff fails to identify any contractual language entitling her and other students to in-person, on-campus instruction and services. (Id., at 10-14). Last, no breach occurred because defendant reserved the right to modify its courses and programs under the contract. (Id., at 14-16). The Court will address each argument in turn.
Claims for educational malpractice attack the quality of the education offered by an educational institution, focusing on "the reasonableness of the conduct engaged in by [school officials] in providing their basic functions of teaching, supervising, placing, andtesting students in relationship to the level of academic performance and competency of the student." Sain v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 626 N.W.2d 115, 121 (Iowa 2001). Iowa courts have refused to recognize such a cause of action, as has nearly every other court to consider it. Id. Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court has held that educational malpractice claims are improper because such claims lack "a satisfactory standard of care by which to measure an educator's conduct," present "inherent uncertainty in determining the cause and nature of any damages," and threaten a flood of litigation against schools. Moore v. Va...
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