Warnock v. Florida Hotel and Restaurant Commission

• Citation: 178 So.2d 917
• Decision Date: 05 October 1965
• Docket Number: No. 65-215,65-215
• Parties: L. WARNOCK, Appellant, v. FLORIDA HOTEL AND RESTAURANT COMMISSION, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 917

178 So.2d 917

L. WARNOCK, Appellant, v. FLORIDA HOTEL AND RESTAURANT COMMISSION, Appellee.

No. 65-215.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 5, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 25, 1965.

Julius I. Friedman, Miami, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Gerald Mager, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before HENDRY, C. J., and CARROLL and SWANN, JJ.

SWANN, Judge.

The appellant, L. Warnock, the operator of a business in Miami Beach, Florida, described as Abbott Towers Apartment, was served with a notice of hearing by the appellee, Florida Hotel and Restaurant Commission, advising that he was operating his business in violation of Section 509.242(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., by advertising his business as a 'motel', when the establishment did not fulfill the requirements for a 'motel' classification.

After a hearing, the appellee issued its order which suspended the license of appellant for a period of twelve months and provided that the suspension would be null and void if appellant ceased to advertise his premises as a motel. The appellant petitioned for certiorari to the Circuit Court. A hearing was held and an order was entered denying the petition for certiorari.

On appeal the appellant contends that the Commissioner's suspension order was imposed solely for non-compliance with Section 509.242(1)(c), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., in that there was insufficient off-street parking on the premises; and that Section 509.242 is unconstitutional.

Section 509.242(1)(c), Florida Statutes, defines a motel as follows:

'(c) Motel.--(Motor hotel, motor court, court, tourist court, motor lodge, etc.).-- Any building or group of buildings, usually one story but limited to three stories, which offers units easily accessible to the travelers with an exit to the outside of each unit, daily or weekly rates, off-street parking for each unit, a central motel office on the property with specified hours of operation, a bath or connecting bath for every rental unit, and at least six rental units, recognized as a motel in the community in which it is situated and by the industry, is declared to be a motel.' (Emphasis supplied).

Appellant admits that he was operating his establishment as a motel, although it was licensed as 'Abbott Towers Apartment'. The testimony showed that the premises could qualify as a motel and advertise as such, except that there were no parking facilities on the premises of the establishment. Appellant urges that since there was sufficient parking on the streets, it was not necessary to provide 'off-street parking' on the premises for each unit.

Appellee contends that it has interpreted and construed Section 509.242(1)(c), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., since its enactment in 1957, as requiring off-street parking for each unit to be located on the premises of the establishment.

The law is will established that contemporaneous construction of a statute by those charged with its enforcement and interpretation is entitled to great weight, and that courts will not depart from such construction unless it is clearly erroneous. United States Gypsum Company v. Green, Fla.1959, 110 So.2d 409.

It is our view that the words used by the legislature requiring off-street parking for each unit means that the off-street parking shall be located on or adjacent to the premises of the motel establishment and that this construction of the statute by appellee is both reasonable and proper.

The appellant contends that the Act is unconstitutional in that it is impossible to perceive from the title of the Act that advertising will be prohibited without proper classification, inasmuch as the title states that it requires the classification of public lodging establishment for statistical purposes, and further, that such establishments must make application for such classification. The appellant claims that no mention of statistical purposes is found in the body of the act and that under the authority of State v. Tindell, Fla.1956, 88 So.2d 123, this violates the provisions of the organic law and is therefore unconstitutional.

Appellant further suggests that the regulations and statutes involved herein are penal in nature and consequently should be strictly construed in his favor. It is to be noted that the only 'penalty' involved is the inability to advertise or hold one's establishment out as a 'motel'. There is nothing to prevent the appellant from continuing to utilize the classification which he presently holds, to-wit: Abbott Towers Apartments.

The general law on this point is as...