Warren v. Board of Appeals of Amherst

• Decision Date: 18 February 1981
• Citation: 383 Mass. 1,416 N.E.2d 1382
• Parties: Dorothy WARREN v. BOARD OF APPEALS OF AMHERST et al. * 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1382

416 N.E.2d 1382

383 Mass. 1

Dorothy WARREN v. BOARD OF APPEALS OF AMHERST et al. ^*1

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampshire.

Argued Oct. 9, 1980.

Decided Feb. 18, 1981.

John H. Madden, Jr., Boston, for John E. Deady.

Roy H. Anderson, Springfield, for plaintiff.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, KAPLAN, WILKINS, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

QUIRICO, Justice.

The plaintiff Dorothy Warren, claiming to be aggrieved by a decision of the zoning board of appeals of the town of Amherst (board) in granting a variance to John E. Deady for the use of land owned by him and adjoining the property of the plaintiff, appealed from that decision to the Superior Court. G.L. c. 40A, § 17. The case was referred to a master for hearing. He filed his report four months after the date of the reference. Three months later, after various objections and motions relating to the report had been disposed of, a judge of the Superior Court entered a judgment sustaining the action of the board in granting the variance. ² The plaintiff appealed therefrom to the Appeals Court, which reversed the judgment and ordered the entry of judgment that the decision of the board was in excess of its authority and it was therefore annulled. Thereafter we granted Deady's application for further appellate review. G.L. c. 211A, § 11. We conclude, as did the Appeals Court, that the judgment entered in the Superior Court was erroneous, and that it should be reversed.

The lot of land for which the variance was granted is owned by Deady and his wife. ³ The lot is located on the westerly side of East Pleasant Street in Amherst and is shown as lot numbered 33 on various zoning plans of the town. It has a frontage of ninety-eight feet on the westerly side of East Pleasant Street, and a depth of one hundred fifty-one feet. Its westerly or rear boundary line is ninety-six feet long. Its total area is 14,647 square feet. The abutting lot to the west is identified as lot numbered 32 and a part of its southerly line fronts on a private way known as Mount Pleasant Road.

A history of the ownership and use of the two lots, to the extent that it appears in the record before us, may be helpful. A Mr. and Mrs. Ritchie purchased lot 32 in 1940 and built a single house thereon which they occupied for many years. In 1959, they purchased the vacant lot 33. Mrs. Ritchie became the sole owner of the two lots on the death of her husband. In 1970, Mrs. Ritchie sold lot 32 with the house thereon, but retained lot 33. In 1972, she conveyed lot 33, which was still vacant, to Mr. and Mrs. Deady, who are her son-in-law and daughter.

In 1976, in anticipation of offering lot 33 for sale as a building lot for a single family dwelling, Deady applied for a variance from the board of appeals to allow the construction of such a dwelling on the lot. He took this action because he learned that the town's zoning by-law required a minimum frontage of one hundred feet for a buildable lot in the single family residential district in which lot 33 is located, and he knew that the frontage of his lot was only ninety-eight feet. The by-law also required that a buildable lot in such a district have a minimum area of twelve thousand square feet, and lot 33 met that requirement. After giving the required notice of the application and holding a public hearing thereon, the board granted the variance, and on February 14, 1977, it duly filed its decision thereon in the office of the town clerk. The variance was granted on two conditions, one of which was "(t)hat lot dimensions as currently registered must not be altered."

The board prefaced its decision by the statement, quoted in the margin, of what it believed to be the law governing the granting of variances, ⁴ and then stated the following reasons for granting the variance in this case: "The Board recognizes that the proposed use for a lot for a single family residence is clearly the only appropriate use for the land and that to deny the variance would in effect render the land without value. To deny permission to sell this land for residential use, when all other requirements can be met, would constitute hardship in this case.

"The fact that lot # 33 was separated from the house lot # 32, preceding adoption of this by-law with its current frontage requirements, establishes conditions peculiar to this parcel, thus satisfying the first condition of the variance. Since the proposed single family residential use is allowed by right, within dimensional requirements, in the general residence zone, and the lot is surrounded on all sides by single family homes, the intent of the By-Law is upheld and the public good is maintained by granting this variance."

There then followed the plaintiff's appeal from that decision to the Superior Court, the court's reference of the case to a master, whose findings of fact were in favor of the board and Deady, the Superior Court's judgment sustaining the board's decision, and the plaintiff's appeal therefrom to the Appeals Court, all as described at the beginning of this opinion.

The Appeals Court summarily reversed the judgment of the Superior Court by an order which, in its entirety, read as follows: "Upon consideration of the appendix and briefs under the provisions of Rule 1:28 of this court, ( ⁵ ) and upon the authority of Raia v. Board of Appeals of North Reading, 4 Mass.App. 318, 321-322, 347 N.E.2d 694 (1976), it is ordered that the following entry be made on the docket of the Superior Court Department in the above matter: The judgment is reversed and a new judgment is to be entered that the decision of the board of appeals was in excess of its authority and is annulled." We then granted Deady's application for further appellate review.

Before proceeding to a consideration of the several issues argued by the parties before this court it may be helpful to determine what issues are before us. The administrative proceedings in this case started with Deady's filing of an application for a variance. The application was processed, heard and decided by the board as one involving a variance. The judicial proceedings before the Superior Court involved no issue other than the validity of the board's action in granting Deady a variance. An examination of the briefs submitted by each party to the Appeals Court demonstrates that there, also, the sole issue presented was the validity of the variance. ⁶ After the Appeals Court summarily decided the variance issue against him, Deady, in his application for further appellate review, stated only that he sought "review of the question whether the authority of the Raia decision can in equity and in justice be applied in the facts of this case." After we allowed his application, we requested supplemental briefs on the issue whether any provision of G.L. c. 40A, § 6, exempts Deady's lot 33 from the minimum frontage requirement of 100 feet fixed by the by-law. Both parties have complied with our request. ⁷

We turn now to a consideration of the two issues presented by the briefs of the parties.

1. Exemption under G.L. c. 40A, § 6. Deady contends in his supplemental brief that his lot # 33 is exempt from the zoning by-law's requirement of a minimum frontage of 100 feet because of language in the nature of a "grandfather" clause in (a) the present G.L. c. 40A, § 6 (as inserted by the revision and rearrangement of c. 40A by St.1975, ch. 808, § 3), ⁸ or (b) the former G.L. c. 40A, § 5A (as appearing in St.1961, c. 435, § 1). ⁹ See Clarke v. Board of Appeals of Nahant, 338 Mass. 473, 155 N.E.2d 754 (1959), and Vetter v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Attleboro, 330 Mass. 628, 116 N.E.2d 277 (1953). The plaintiff argues in her supplemental brief that Deady cannot prevail on this issue because "(t)he record does not reflect that (Deady's) land complied with the requirements of the zoning ordinance in effect at the time when he recorded his ownership of the lot in question. He therefore may not claim the benefit of compliance with an ordinance whose requirements are not before the court."

The plaintiff's position is well taken. The record before us is inadequate to enable us to pass on this issue. The zoning by-law was not included in the record on appeal and is not an appropriate subject of judicial notice. Lawrence v. Falzarano, --- Mass. ---, --- n.10, ^a 402 N.E.2d 1018 (1980). "Neither a trial judge nor this court can consider such alleged (by-laws) unless they are put in evidence." Fournier v. Central Taxi Cab, Inc., 331 Mass. 248, 249, 118 N.E.2d 767 (1954), and cases cited. Trustees of the Stigmatine Fathers, Inc. v. Secretary of Administration & Fin., 369 Mass. 562, 568, 341 N.E.2d 662 (1976). There are no findings, nor is there any agreement in the record, sufficient to enable us to determine whether, on the facts and the law applicable thereto, Deady's lot is exempt from the frontage requirement of the present by-law.

Quite apart from the reason stated above for not deciding this issue on the record which is before us, there is a second, more compelling reason for not doing so. We have already noted above that this issue was not raised before the board. If Deady is correct in his present contention that his lot is exempt from the frontage requirement, he may have been entitled as of right to a building permit for a single family dwelling; and if the inspector, upon a proper application, refused to issue such a permit, Deady's next step would have been an appeal to the board. G.L. c. 40A, §§ 7, 8 and 14. If, after having taken those steps, he were aggrieved by the action of the board, judicial review of that action would be available to him by an appeal to the Superior Court under G.L. c. 40A, § 17. Deady, however, did not follow that route. Instead he applied in the first instance for a variance, an action which may in fact be inconsistent with the present claim of entitlement to a permit as of right. ¹⁰ The factual and legal basis...