Warren v. Sanger Independent School Dist.

• Decision Date: 24 November 1926
• Docket Number: (No. 704-4632.)
• Citation: 288 S.W. 159
• Parties: WARREN et al. v. SANGER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

288 S.W. 159

WARREN et al. v. SANGER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. et al.

(No. 704-4632.)

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section B.

November 24, 1926.

Certified Questions from Court of Civil Appeals of Second Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by A. F. Warren and others against the Sanger Independent School District and others, for an injunction. From a decree dissolving the injunction and dismissing the cause, plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which certified a question to the Supreme Court. Question answered.

Culp, Culp & Culp, of Gainesville, for appellants.

McLean, Scott & Sayers, of Fort Worth, for appellees.

SPEER, J.

The Court of Civil Appeals for the Second district has certified to the Supreme Court the question whether or not the district judge erred in this case in dissolving a temporary writ of injunction previously granted to restrain the trustees of Sanger independent district and others from unlawfully expending funds of the district, assessed and collected for the maintenance of the public schools for the current year, merely because the complainants had not first applied to the school authorities of the state for such relief, the threatened wrong being the disbursement of current school funds in payment of a debt covering a deficiency in the maintenance of the schools for a previous year. The court not only dissolved the injunction, but dismissed the cause for want of jurisdiction.

We answer that the court did err in dismissing the cause for want of jurisdiction.

Undoubtedly, the court had the power to grant the writ, unless the statutes regulating the public schools have conferred the exclusive right primarily upon the school authorities.

Article 2656 (4510-4513) of the Revised Civil Statutes 1925, provides:

"The state superintendent shall be charged with the administration of the school laws and a general superintendency of the business relating to the public schools of the state. * * * He shall hear and determine all appeals from the rulings and decisions of subordinate school officers, and all such officers and teachers shall conform to his decisions. Appeal shall always be from his rulings to the state board."

It has been uniformly held that the resort to the school authorities must first be made before the courts will be authorized to hear any complaint as to a matter properly belonging to the administration of the school laws. It is a condition precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the civil courts. Jennings v. Carson (Tex. Com. App.) 220 S. W. 1090; South S. A. etc., Dist. v. Martine (Tex. Civ. App.) 275 S. W. 265; McCollum v. Adams (Tex. Civ. App.) 110 S. W. 526; Trustees, etc., v. Dudney (Tex. Civ. App.) 142 S. W. 1007; County Trustee, etc., v. Bell Point School Dist. (Tex. Civ. App.) 229 S. W. 697. But, in the very nature of things, such exclusive prior jurisdiction pertains only to such matters as are by law placed under the supervision of the school authorities. An examination of the cases recognizing this prior jurisdiction will show that they are instances of that character. It is only as to matters committed to the school authorities that they have a right to decide at all. Of course, jurisdiction carries with it the right to decide wrong as well as right. The test is the power to hear and decide one way or the other. To attempt to hear and decide in favor of a matter that is expressly forbidden by law is not the exercise of jurisdiction at all. The attempt is futile and the pronouncement void. The act of defendant trustees, however commendable the spirit in which it was done, creating the debt here sought to be paid, was void. It was contrary to the express provisions of law (Rev. Civ. Stat. 1925) art. 2749 (2823, 2824), forbidding trustees to create a deficiency debt against the district in the employment of teachers. The debt as against the district being void, there was nothing for the school authorities to pass upon. There was no room for the exercise of any sort of...