Warren v. State

• Decision Date: 07 May 1902
• Citation: 68 S.W. 275
• Parties: WARREN v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

68 S.W. 275

WARREN v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 7, 1902.

Appeal from district court, Limestone county; L. B. Cobb, Judge.

John Warren was convicted of murder in the first degree, and appeals. Affirmed.

Robt. A. John, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HENDERSON, J.

Appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and his punishment assessed at death; hence this appeal. There is no statement of facts in the record. The only bill of exceptions is presented to the charge of the court; and it is alleged that the court failed to charge the jury on reasonable doubt. An inspection of the court's charge shows that the court submitted murder both in the first and second degrees; and the court charged on the question of reasonable doubt as between the degrees of murder, telling the jury, in effect, if they were not satisfied from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant killed deceased with his express malice, etc., to find him guilty of murder in the second degree. An inspection of the record further shows that appellant, after being duly admonished by the court, entered a plea of guilty to the indictment; the indictment being in the ordinary form, embracing a charge of murder upon express malice. The judgment of the court also shows that evidence was introduced, in that it recites that the jury heard the evidence submitted, etc. It has been held that the plea of guilty admits the charge in the indictment. Crow v. State, 6 Tex. 334; Martin v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 638, 36 S. W. 587, 38 S. W. 194. So it follows that appellant, by his own confession in open court, admitted his guilt of murder. Article 712, Pen. Code, however, requires the jury must find the degree of murder, and this apprehends the introduction of testimony in connection with the plea of guilty, in order to enable them to determine the grade of the murder and fix the punishment. Was it necessary on this state of case for the court to give a charge on reasonable doubt as to the guilt of appellant of the offense of murder? Or could it assume as a fact the guilt of appellant, predicated on his judicial admission that he was guilty of murder? As we understand, the doctrine of reasonable doubt applies alone to criminative facts. On the plea of guilty as presented to the jury, there was no criminative fact to be found by them. That is, they were authorized to find appellant guilty of murder on his plea alone. They were required to determine the degree of...