Warren v. Warren
| Decision Date | 17 February 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 37993,37993 |
| Parties | WARREN v. WARREN. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Ronald N. Winston, Atlanta, for Nancy O. Warren.
J. Guy Sharpe, Marietta, for David Robert Warren.
Appellant wife and appellee husband were married six years ago in Michigan. In 1978, the couple moved to Georgia and appellee purchased a family residence in Cobb County. In January 1981, the parties voluntarily separated and entered into an agreement which established their "rights and obligations with respect to custody of their [two] children, child support, alimony, a division of their property, the payment of debts, etc." The agreement provides: Shortly after signing the agreement, appellee moved to North Carolina because of a job transfer.
In February, appellant commenced this action for divorce, alimony, custody and child support. She also challenged the validity of the separation agreement, contending she signed it under duress. Appellee answered asserting, inter alia, that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him in that he is a resident of North Carolina. The trial court agreed, ruling that it would proceed only as to the issues of 1) divorce and 2) child support and alimony to the extent of the value of the residence in question.
We granted appellant's interlocutory application in order to determine whether appellee is subject to in personam jurisdiction pursuant to the "transacts any business" section of the long-arm statute (Code Ann. § 24-113.1(a)).
The "transacts any business" portion of the long-arm statute typically has been utilized to obtain jurisdiction over non-resident business entities which have purposefully availed themselves of the right to conduct commercial activities in this state. See Hollingsworth Cunard Line Ltd., 152 Ga.App. 509, 263 S.E.2d 190 (1979). Furthermore, this court has "interpreted the long-arm statute liberally" (Goldkist, Inc. v. Baskin, 623 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1980))--within a long-arm category, such as "transacts any business," jurisdiction will be exercised to the extent permitted by procedural due process. See, e.g., J. C. Penney Co. v. Malouf, 230 Ga. 140, 196 S.E.2d 145 (1973) ("transacts any business"); Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Co., 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973) ("tortious act").
Understandably, most litigation arising under the "transacts any business" section of long-arm statute has centered on whether the "business" that an individual has transacted is sufficiently connected with this state to satisfy the requirements of due process. Relatively little has been said with respect to an additional consideration governing the determination of whether long-arm jurisdiction is proper, i.e., "whether the legislature has granted to the courts the statutory authority to exercise its jurisdiction over the defendant under the circumstances." Mabry v. Fuller-Shuwayer Co., 50 N.C.App. 245, 273 S.E.2d 509, 511 (N.C.App.1981). This consideration, however, is the focus of the present inquiry. Specifically we must determine whether marriage, raising a family, or signing a separation agreement constitutes the transaction of business within the meaning of the Georgia long-arm statute.
While the phrase "transacts any business" is not free of all ambiguity, the term "business" is commonly understood as applying to dealings of a commercial, industrial, or professional nature. A number of states, recognizing the distinction between the transaction of "business" and the performance of family obligations, have specifically enacted "domestic relations" long-arm...
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