Warrick v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 02 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. S115738.,S115738.
• Citation: 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 2,35 Cal.4th 1011,112 P.3d 2
• Parties: Donald Paul WARRICK, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; City of Los Angeles Police Department et al., Real Parties in Interest.
• Court: California Supreme Court

29 Cal.Rptr.3d 2

35 Cal.4th 1011

112 P.3d 2

Donald Paul WARRICK, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent;

City of Los Angeles Police Department et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. S115738.

Supreme Court of California.

June 2, 2005.

Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Leslie Ringold and Mark G. Harvis, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Cheryl J. Ward and Claudia McGee Henry, Assistant City Attorneys, Kim Rodgers Westhoff, Martin R. Boags and Michelle S. Wright, Deputy City Attorneys, for Real Parties in Interest.

KENNARD, J.

On a showing of good cause a criminal defendant is entitled to discovery of relevant documents or information in the personnel records of a police officer accused of misconduct against the defendant. (Evid.Code, § 1043, subd. (b).)¹ Good cause for discovery exists when the defendant shows both "`materiality' to the subject matter of the pending litigation and a `reasonable belief' that the agency has the type of information sought." (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222 (Santa Cruz).) A showing of good cause is measured by "relatively relaxed standards" that serve to "insure the production" for trial court review of "all potentially relevant documents." (Ibid.)

At issue here is the first part of the good cause requirement—the materiality to the pending litigation of the discovery sought. Specifically, the question is this: What must the defendant show to warrant the court's in-chambers review of documents or information in the officer's personnel file that is potentially relevant to the claimed misconduct? We hold that to obtain in-chambers review a defendant need only demonstrate that the scenario of alleged officer misconduct could or might have occurred.

I.

According to the police report, which was attributable to the three arresting officers, about 6 p.m. on April 23, 2002, Officers Quezada, Lopez, and Ramirez of the Special Enforcement Unit of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) were in a marked car patrolling Fifth Street between Spring Street and Towne Avenue, an area known for violent crime and narcotics activities. The officers noticed defendant standing next to a wall looking at a clear plastic baggie in his left hand; the baggie contained "off-white solids." When the officers got out of the patrol car, defendant fled, discarding "numerous" off-white lumps "resembling rock cocaine." While Officer Quezada retrieved 42 lumps from the ground, Officers Lopez and Ramirez arrested defendant after a short pursuit. Defendant had an empty baggie in his hand; his pockets contained $2.75 in cash and three porcelain spark plug chips, which Officer Quezada described as "a common tool" of auto thieves for smashing car windows. Defendant was arrested for possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11351.5), and for possession of burglary tools (Pen.Code, § 466). At the time of the arrest, defendant was on parole for burglary.

Defendant was charged with one count of possessing cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11351.5), and was alleged to have a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony (Pen.Code, §§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subd. (b)), as well as having served a prior prison term (id., § 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant pled not guilty and denied the allegations.

Before trial, defendant filed a so-called Pitchess motion (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305 (Pitchess)) under section 1043 for disclosure of any previous citizen complaints against the three arresting officers for making false arrests, falsifying police reports, or planting evidence. Defendant also sought discovery of a long list of other misconduct by the officers. (See post, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d pp. 9-10, 112 P.3d pp. 8-9.) In support of the motion, defense counsel submitted a declaration giving this version of the events leading to defendant's arrest: When the three officers got out of the patrol car, defendant, who feared an arrest on an outstanding parole warrant, started to run away, but within moments the officers caught up with him. Meanwhile, there were "people pushing and kicking and fighting with each other" as they collected from the ground objects later determined to be rock cocaine. After two officers retrieved some of the rocks, an officer told defendant, "`You must have thrown this.'" Defendant denied possessing or discarding any rock cocaine. He said he was in the area to buy cocaine from a seller who was present there. Defense counsel suggested that the officers, not knowing who had discarded the cocaine, falsely claimed to have seen defendant, who was running away, do so. Seeking to show that the officers had falsely arrested defendant and fabricated the facts in the arrest report, the defense sought to discover previous complaints against the officers for dishonesty.

In opposition, the city attorney on behalf of the LAPD argued that defendant had done nothing more than deny his guilt, and that he had not affirmatively set out any facts to describe a specific factual scenario. Arguing that defense counsel's declaration was essentially a denial of the charges, the "logical equivalent" of defendant's not guilty plea, the city attorney maintained that defendant "needs to assert plausible facts, not reenter his plea." The city attorney also asserted that defendant's contention that the officers falsely claimed to have seen defendant discard the cocaine was not plausible because defendant failed to explain how he happened to be in precisely the area where rock cocaine was allegedly discarded by another person, or why the officers would accuse him of having possessed the cocaine, or, knowing that he was innocent, why they would have planted it on him. According to the city attorney, a scenario "which might have happened" was implausible; to be plausible a scenario must be "believable."

Concluding that defendant had not made the required showing of good cause, the trial court declined to order the LAPD to produce the officers' records for in-chambers review, and it denied defendant's Pitchess motion. Referring to the allegations in defense counsel's affidavit, the trial court stated: "It appears to me that this is not police misconduct but really an argument about what happened, one that should be resolved by the trial court, but not one that gives rise to looking at a police personnel file based on the paucity of information and the implausibility of the defendant's allegation as to why somehow these officers must have engaged in misconduct." The court paraphrased defendant's claim of officer misconduct in these words: "I don't know what they did, but I did not have drugs, therefore they must have done something wrong."

In August 2002, after the Court of Appeal's summary denial of his petition for a writ of mandate, defendant sought review in this court. We granted review and transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal, directing that court to issue an order to show cause why defendant was not entitled to the relief he sought. After issuing the order and receiving briefing from the parties, the Court of Appeal denied issuance of the writ. It held that defendant had satisfied only one of the two requirements for good cause. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that defense counsel's declaration presented a specific factual scenario of police misconduct. But the court concluded, as the trial court had, that defendant's declaration failed to satisfy "the second element of good cause, the articulation of a `plausible factual foundation'" for his officer misconduct claim. Quoting a dictionary definition of the word "plausible" as "`worthy of approval or acceptance; credible; believable,'" the Court of Appeal concluded that defendant's factual scenario failed to show "a degree of reasonable probability, a degree of apparent credibility greater than mere possibility." It held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying defendant's Pitchess motion, and it denied defendant's petition for a writ of mandate. As we explain below, the Court of Appeal applied a stricter standard for obtaining in-chambers review of officer personnel information than is required by law.

II.

This court's 1974 decision in Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pages 536 to 537, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305, established that a criminal defendant could "compel discovery" of certain relevant information in the personnel files of police officers by making "general allegations which establish some cause for discovery" of that information and by showing how it would support a defense to the charge against him.

In 1978, the California Legislature codified the holding of Pitchess by enacting Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, as well as Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045. (Added by Stats.1978, ch. 630, §§ 1-3 & 5-6, pp. 2082-2083; see City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 9, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202, 52 P.3d 129.) To initiate discovery, the defendant must file a motion supported by affidavits showing "good cause for the discovery," first by demonstrating the materiality of the information to the pending litigation, and second by "stating upon reasonable belief" that the police agency has the records or information at issue. (§ 1043, subd. (b)(3).) This two-part showing of good cause is a "relatively low threshold for discovery." (Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222.)

If the trial court finds good cause for the discovery, it reviews the pertinent documents in chambers and discloses only that information falling within the statutorily defined standards of relevance. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226-1227, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482, 36 P.3d 21; see City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 9-10, ...