WAS, LLC v. Coll (In re DC Energy, LLC)

• Decision Date: 05 August 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 14–12923 tr7,Adv. No. 15–1024 t
• Citation: 555 B.R. 786
• Parties: In re: DC Energy, LLC, Debtor. WAS, LLC, Petrosource, LP, and EPM Energy, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. Clarke Coll, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of New Mexico

555 B.R. 786

In re: DC Energy, LLC, Debtor.

WAS, LLC, Petrosource, LP, and EPM Energy, LLC, Plaintiffs

v.Clarke Coll, Defendant.

Case No. 14–12923 tr7

Adv. No. 15–1024 t

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Mexico.

Signed August 5, 2016

Christopher M. Gatton, Giddens, Gatton & Jacobus, P.C., Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiffs.

Stephanie L. Schaeffer, Thomas D. Walker, Walker & Associates, P.C., Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Hon. David T. Thuma

, United States Bankruptcy Judge

Before the Court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs ask the Court to impose a constructive trust in their favor on all funds in the Debtor's operating account. Defendant, contrariwise, seeks a declaratory judgment that the subject funds are estate property. After considering the summary judgment papers and the record, the Court concludes that imposing a constructive trust is not appropriate, and that the funds belong to the estate. Defendant therefore is entitled to summary judgment.

I. FACTS

For the limited purpose of ruling on the summary judgment motion, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute about the following facts:¹

1. Debtor is a New Mexico limited liability company.

2. Dan and Colleen Johnson formed Debtor and owned all membership interests until February 2013, when they sold 100% of their membership interests to Tomahawk Resources, LLC. 3. Debtor's business was² disposing of saltwater and other byproducts generated by oil production companies in the Permian Basin, together with recovering and selling “skim oil” extracted from the saltwater.

4. Debtor owned what it called a saltwater disposal system, which consisted of leased land,³ disposal wells, well bores, easements, barrels, flow lines, and pipes (the “SDS”).

5. Between about April 2010 and November 2012, Debtor sold interests in the SDS to third parties. The main buyers were Plaintiffs Eric McClusky, d/b/a/ EPM Energy, LLC (“EPM Energy”); Petrosource, LP (“Petrosource”); and Larry Borders and Mickey Welborn, d/b/a WAS, LLC (“WAS”).

6. The purchase agreements between the Debtor and each buyer stated, inter alia:

The Sellers agree to sell and assign to Buyer an undivided [amount] percent ( [ ]%) interest in the Saltwater Disposal System, the purchase shall be accomplished by Seller assigning the interests in the Saltwater Disposal System, as described to Buyer in the form of an assignment attached as “Exhibit A”.

7. Each assignment, with minor variations, contains the following language:

Dan Johnson and Colleen Johnson, d/b/a DC Energy LLC ... hereby transfer, grant, sell, assign and convey unto Assignee an undivided [ ]% interest in the Saltwater Disposal System, the [ ]% Income is to [sic] paid to Buyer and calculated each month on the Gross receipts ... At anytime a well is added to the Saltwater Disposal System it will automatically become a part of this assignment/agreement.

8. The purchase agreements are reasonably well-drafted commercial contracts, containing provisions about price; closing date and obligations; a warranty; conditions to closing; remedies for breach; governing law; recovery of attorney fees; and assignability. In exchange for the purchase price, Debtor assigned to the buyer a designated portion of the SDS.

9. The purchase agreements created a right to receive the designated amount of income generated by the SDS. Debtor was to remit to the buyer each month the agreed-upon percentage of SDS income. The purchase agreements do not require Debtor to segregate the buyer's SDS income from Debtor's. The agreements do not contain any language about fiduciary duty, bailment, trust, or the like.

10. The purchase agreements included the following:⁴

11. Plaintiffs ended up with the following percentages of the SDS and its income:

12. Debtor stopped paying Plaintiffs in September 2013.

13. Debtor filed its Chapter 11 case on September 30, 2014.

14. Pre-petition, Debtor failed to pay Plaintiffs $318,647 of SDS income, as follows:

15. Debtor had $31,861 in its bank account on the petition date.

16. Debtor transferred the funds into a debtor-in-possession operating account. During the Chapter 11 case, the balance was reduced to $13,482. That balance is traceable to amounts owed to Plaintiffs from pre-petition SDS income.

17. Post-petition, Debtor continued to operate the SDS and deposit all income into its operating account.

18. Debtors failed to pay Plaintiffs at least $57,685 due from post-petition SDS income, as follows:

19. The exact numbers are difficult to ascertain, as Debtor reported different amounts on its draft profit and loss statements, final profit and loss statements, and operating reports.

20. Debtor converted the case to Chapter 7 on August 11, 2015.

21. Debtor had about $80,000 in its operating account on the conversion date, of which at least $71,167 is traceable to Plaintiffs' portion of SDS income ($13,482 in prepetition and $57,685 in post-petition funds). Plaintiffs assert that a constructive trust should be imposed on the traceable funds.

22. Filed claims in this case exceed $2.5 million, including more than $530,000 of general unsecured claims. Plaintiffs' claims are a little over half of the unsecured claims pool.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standards.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56

. Rule 56 applies in adversary proceedings. See Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7056. “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and ... [must] demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the movant carries this burden, Rule 56 requires the non-moving party to designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. F.D.I.C. v. Lockhaven Estates, LLC, 918 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1231 (D.N.M.2012) (citing Celotex ). Further, the party opposing summary judgment must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.” Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).

To deny a motion for summary judgment, genuine fact issues must exist that “can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)

. A mere “scintilla” of evidence will not avoid summary judgment. Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1539 (10th Cir. 1993). Rather, there must be sufficient evidence on which the fact finder could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Vitkus, 11 F.3d at 1539.

B. Constructive Trust Property is Not Part of the Bankruptcy Estate.

The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)

. “The bankruptcy estate includes all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” Willess v. U.S., 560 Fed.Appx. 762, 764 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) ). “Property subject to a trust is not [estate] property ... because the debtor [has no] ... equitable interest in property he holds in trust for another.” In re Lucas, 300 B.R. 526, 533 (10th Cir. BAP 2003). Consequently, if the Court imposed a constructive trust on the money at issue, it would be removed from the bankruptcy estate and unavailable to Debtor's other creditors. Id.

C. Constructive Trust Standards.

1. State law. State law is the starting point for determining whether a constructive trust may and should be imposed. In re Foster, 275 F.3d 924, 926 (10th Cir. 2001)

(courts must “look to state law to determine whether a party has met th[e] burden” of establishing constructive trust requirements); In re C.W. Mining Co., 740 F.3d 548, 561 (10th Cir. 2014) (applying Utah constructive trust law) ; In re Taylor, 133 F.3d 1336, 1342 (10th Cir. 1998) (same). Under New Mexico law, a constructive trust is an equitable remedy used “to prevent the unjust enrichment that would result if the person having the property were permitted to retain it.” Tartaglia v. Hodges, 129 N.M. 497, 10 P.3d 176, 189 (N.M.App.2000) (quotations omitted). See also

Bassett v. Bassett, 110 N.M. 559, 798 P.2d 160, 167 (1990) (“A constructive trust arises where a person who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.”). The entitlement to “a constructive trust must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” Matter of Estate of McKim, 111 N.M. 517, 807 P.2d 215, 217 (1991).

There is no precise test in New Mexico to determine when a constructive trust should be imposed. Aragon v. Rio Costilla Co-op. Livestock Ass'n, 112 N.M. 152,812 P.2d 1300, 1304 (1991)

(“The circumstances where a court might impose such a trust are varied.”).⁵ Constructive trust claimants must generally show some wrongdoing such as fraud, duress, undue influence, breach of a fiduciary duty, or abuse of confidence. Gushwa v. Hunt, 145 N.M. 286, 197 P.3d 1, 7 (2008) ; Tartaglia, 10 P.3d at 189 ; City of Rio Rancho v. Amrep Southwest, Inc., 150 N.M. 428, 260 P.3d 414, 428 (2011) ; Aragon, 812 P.2d at 1304.

In addition to proving wrongdoing sufficient to invoke the equitable remedy of a constructive trust, the plaintiff must “be able to trace the wrongfully held property.” Foster, 275 F.3d at 926–927

. See also

In re Seneca Oil Co., 906 F.2d 1445, 1450–1451 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[T]o obtain a constructive trust over property of a bankrupt, a...