Wash. Co. v. Estate of Jefferson

• Decision Date: 26 May 1886
• Parties: IN RE WASHINGTON CO. v ESTATE OF JEFFERSON. JEFFERSON'S EX'RS v WASHINGTON CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

35 Minn. 215

28 N.W. 256

IN RE WASHINGTON CO.vESTATE OF JEFFERSON.

JEFFERSON'S EX'RSvWASHINGTON CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 26, 1886.

Appeal from a judgment of the district court, Washington county.

Searles, Ewing & Gail, (Gordon E. Cole, of counsel,) for appellants, Cyrus Jefferson's Ex'rs.

Ira W. Castle and Fayette Marsh, for respondent, Washington Co.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

Cyrus Jefferson, who died since 1883, was from 1869 to his death a resident and citizen of the state of New York. During that time he loaned and invested large sums of money upon bonds and notes secured by mortgages of real estate in the county of Washington, in this state, which loans and investments were made by and through his agent, William M. McCluer, residing in Stillwater, said county. The principal remitted the money for investment to his agent, and the latter had authority to negotiate and make loans for his principal upon such real-estate mortgage security as in his judgment seemed sufficient; and also authority to receive and collect such loans, principal and interest, when due; to discharge mortgages securing the same; and to reloan and reinvest moneys thus collected in new loans, on new securities; and during said time he did so loan and invest, receive, collect, discharge, and reloan and reinvest, for and in the name of his principal, having full control over the matter. In the years 1882 and 1883 the amount so invested and controlled by said agent was $122,000. The agent in those years having refused, on the request of the assessor in said city, to list such loans for taxation, the latter listed and assessed the amount thereof as the personal property of said Jefferson, and the same was entered on the tax-lists, and the taxes in each of those years extended over it. Jefferson having died, and administration of his estate having been opened in Washington county, claims for taxes were presented to the probate court as claims against the estate. They were allowed by the probate court, and, on appeal to the district court on questions of law alone, the decision of the probate court was affirmed.

There are some questions made which we will consider before coming to the main question in the case:

First. That the proceedings are not properly entitled. The statute does not prescribe nor indicate any formal mode for entitling proceedings to establish claims against the estates of deceased persons. Any entitling or description of the proceeding which will identify it is sufficient.

Second. That taxes are not debts which can be proved against the estates of deceased persons. It is not material whether a personal tax is a debt in the sense that an action against the person may be maintained to recover it. It is at least a claim against the property which survives the death of the person against whom it is levied, and remains a claim against his estate. The statute regards it as a debt to be paid out of the estate. In prescribing the order of preference in which debts shall be paid, where the estate is not sufficient to pay all, it provides (section 38, c. 53, Gen. St. 1878) that, after paying the necessary expenses of the funeral, last sickness, and administration, the executor or administrator shall “pay the debts against the estate in the following order. *** Second, public rates and taxes.” This, we think, is conclusive that, for the purpose of proof and payment out of the estate, a personal tax is a debt.

Third. That the tax duplicate is not evidence of the levy and existence of the tax. In support of this, defendant cites the case of Howes v. Gillett, 23 Minn. 231, in which it was held that, as an official decument, a tax duplicate is proper evidence of its own existence and contents, but not of any of the tax proceedings anterior to itself. That case arose under the General Statutes of 1866. Subsequently (in 1874) what is now section 52, c. 11, Gen. St. 1878, was enacted. It reads:

“It shall be the duty of the county auditor to make, in each tax book or list, a certificate in the following form, viz.:

“I, A. B., auditor of _______ county and state of Minnesota, do hereby certify that the following is a correct list of the taxes levied on the real and personal property in the [town or district, as the case may be] of _______, for the year 18-.

“Witness my hand and official seal this _______ day of _______.

“__________, County Auditor.”

In the hands of the treasurer, as authority to him to receive and collect the taxes, the duplicates or tax-lists were as effectual before this certificate was required as since. We can conceive of no reason why the legislature should have provided for the certificate, except to give the duplicates or lists greater authenticity; that is, to make them official evidence of the levy of the taxes. The rate of state tax is certified by the state auditor to the county auditor; the record of the amount to be raised for county tax is in his office; the taxes voted by incorporated cities, townships, and school-districts are certified to him; and from the amounts, of which the evidence is thus in his office, he calculates the rates, and completes the levy by making out the lists. It would seem strange (though it certainly was so before 1874) that his completed work should prove nothing but the fact of its completion. To simplify the proof of the levy, and to avoid the inconveniences that would arise whenever proof of the levy might be necessary, if it were required to go back of the duplicates, was, we think, the purpose of requiring the official certificate of the auditor; and that it was intended to make the certified list prima facie evidence of the due levy of the taxes on it.

The main question in the case is, can credits due to a resident of another state, from a resident within this state, for moneys loaned and invested by, and which credits are managed and controlled by, an agent of the creditor, resident within this state, be taxed here, under the present statute?

In the case of City of St. Paul v. Merritt, 7 Minn. 258, (Gil. 198,) it was decided that credits due to a non-resident were not, under the statutes then in force, taxable in this state. That case was different on the facts from this in one essential particular, to-wit, that in that case there was no...