Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 1365.
Decision Date | 15 February 1935 |
Docket Number | No. 1365.,1365. |
Citation | 80 S.W.2d 327 |
Parties | WASHINGTON NAT. INS. CO. v. COOK. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Eastland County; B. W. Patterson, Judge.
Action by Joe E. Cook against the Washington National Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed and rendered.
Turner, Seaberry & Springer, of Eastland, for appellant.
R. N. Grisham, of Eastland, for appellee.
Upon the findings of a jury in answer to special issues, judgment was awarded to appellee against appellant for $3,000, on an accident insurance policy. Since we have determined that one question, of the many presented, is controlling, only such statement of the case will be made as throws light upon that question. One of the defenses pleaded by the appellant was as follows:
If that defense is to be sustained, all other issues become immaterial. The only attack made upon the release executed by appellee was a want of consideration for its execution. The issues submitted to the jury with reference thereto, and the answers returned to these issues, were as follows:
Appellee's injuries were received on March 30, 1931, from a gas explosion. In addition to external burns, his mouth and throat were seared, and the evidence supports the jury's finding that tuberculosis resulted therefrom. After the accident, he spent a few days in a hospital in Gorman and then returned to his home in Desdemona, from which he made frequent visits to his doctor at the hospital. T. J. Duncan was the local agent of appellant, through whom appellee procured his policy of insurance. Shortly after the accident, the plant superintendent of the company by which appellee was employed advised Duncan of appellee's injury. On or about April 12th, Duncan visited appellee in his home, the visit being described in appellee's brief as "a friendly call and for the purpose of finding out how plaintiff was getting along; nothing being said by either of them about pay." Three days later Duncan again visited appellee, bringing with him a blank preliminary notice of accident to be filled out by the insured. This blank form was one evidently adopted by the appellant for use by claimants as a preliminary notice. On the reverse side of this instrument was a form for the surgeon's preliminary report. This report had been executed by Dr. Ed Blackwell, appellee's attending physician on the day before. One of the interrogatories answered by the surgeon was as follows: "How soon, in your opinion, from the date of injury, will claimant be able to perform some of his or her duties?" To which he answered, "About two or three weeks." The preliminary notice of accident executed on that day by the appellee recited in its caption that "* * * for the purpose of applying for such benefits as I may be entitled to, make answer to the following questions. * * *" One of the questions answered by the appellee in this report was as follows: "If paid at once without requiring further proofs, what number of days' indemnity are you willing to accept in full payment of claim for this injury?" To which the claimant answered, "15 days." This preliminary report was sent to the appellant's head office in Chicago. On the same day that appellee executed this preliminary report, Duncan drew a draft upon appellant as follows:
Appellee indorsed his name on the back of that draft, under the following release:
This draft on its face contained, among others, the following indorsements: "Approved for payment Apr. 22, 1931 by U. S. Nat'l L. & C. Co.," and, "Paid Chk No. 27995 April 22 1931 Washington Fidelity National Insurance Company."
There was no discussion between appellee and Duncan at or prior to the time this draft was drawn as to the liability of appellant. The testimony about this matter given by the appellee himself is as follows:
Appellee returned to his employment on April 18th, and continued therein until June 2d, thereafter, but, according to the findings of the jury, which are supported by the evidence, he was really unable to perform labor during that time, and has been continuously unable to do so since that time. His physician, Dr. Blackwell, frankly admits that, in the light of the facts as they have now developed, he was mistaken in advising his patient to resume his employment.
By the court's charge the burden of proving that there was no consideration for the release was properly placed upon appellee. We have concluded, not only that he failed to discharge that burden, but that, as a matter of law, this release was based upon a valid consideration. Appellee's claim was single. It did not consist of two separate demands so as to make applicable the rule that the payment of one would not afford a consideration for the release of the other. The fact that there was no dispute between the parties is not controlling. There was no occasion for any dispute. No one knew the extent, or probable duration, of appellee's injuries. He and his physician were in a better position than was appellant's agent to make an estimate thereof. Dr. Blackwell was not appellant's representative, but was the physician of appellee's own choosing. The parties dealt at arms' length concerning a claim of unknown and unknowable amount. Appellee stated in his preliminary report, which was sent to appellant's home office, that, if paid at once without requiring further proofs, he was willing to accept fifteen days indemnity ($50) in full payment of his claim. A draft for $50 was drawn on appellant, on the reverse side of which was a release duly executed by appellee exonerating it from any further liability on the claim. That release could be delivered to appellant and thereby become effective only by the acceptance and payment by it of the draft. One week later it accepted and paid same and appellee received the full amount which he offered to accept for his claim. There would not have been a more definite consideration shown had the facts established a dispute as to liability. The question was not discussed and the amount collectible, if any, was unknowable at the time. That was sufficient. Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Heavin (Tex. Com. App.) 39 S.W.(2d) 851; Inter-Ocean Casualty...
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