Washington Statewide Organization of Stepparents v. Smith, 43188

• Decision Date: 19 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 43188,43188
• Citation: 536 P.2d 1202,85 Wn.2d 564
• Parties: , 75 A.L.R.3d 1119 WASHINGTON STATEWIDE ORGANIZATION OF STEPPARENTS et al., Appellants, v. Sidney E. SMITH, Secretary, Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, and the State of Washington, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 564

85 Wn.2d 564

536 P.2d 1202, 75 A.L.R.3d 1119

WASHINGTON STATEWIDE ORGANIZATION OF STEPPARENTS et al., Appellants, v. Sidney E. SMITH, Secretary, Washington State Department of

Social and Health Services, and the State of

Washington, Respondents.

No. 43188.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

June 19, 1975.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 12, 1975.

Legal Services Center, Linda L. Dawson, Patrick H. McIntyre, Francis E. McFarlane, Peter D. Francis, Seattle, for appellants.

Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Walter E. White, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for respondents.

ROSELLINI, Associate Justice.

In this class action, the appellants ask the court to hold that the provisions of RCW 26.16.205 and 26.20.030 ¹ do not apply to those members of the class who were married prior to 1969 when these statutes were amended to impose a duty of support upon stepparents; and a further holding that in any event the statutes are unconstitutional because public assistance regulations promulgated pursuant to them deny equal protection of the laws to the members of the class. ² The trial court, after hearing and entering findings of fact and conclusions of law, dismissed the action with prejudice. We agreed to hear the appeal.

RCW 26.16.205 provides:

The expenses of the family and the education of the children, including stepchildren, are chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or separately: Provided, That with regard to stepchildren, the obligation shall cease upon the termination of the relationship of husband and wife. RCW 26.20.030 provides, Inter alia, that every person who

(b) (w)ilfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance for his or her child or stepchild or children or stepchildren or ward or wards: Provided, That with regard to stepchildren the obligation shall cease upon termination of the relationship of husband and wife; . . .

shall be guilty of a felony if there is a child under 16 years of age, or of a misdemeanor if there is no child under 16.

The duty of support was imposed upon stepparents in Laws of 1969, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 207, §§ 1--2. The appellants who were married prior to 1969 contend that when they entered into the relationship, they contracted to assume only those duties and obligations which were imposed by law at that time; that there was no statutory or common law duty of support at that time, ³ and that these statutes impair the obligation of their contract, in violation of U.S.Const. art. 1, § 10. They cite a number of New York cases which have held that, in that state, marriage is a contract, the obligations of which may not be changed after the contract is entered into. These include Kane v. Necci, 245 App.Div. 1, 280 N.Y.S. 489 (1935), Rev'd on other grounds 269 N.Y. 13, 198 N.E. 613 (1935); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 22 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Dom.Rel.Ct. of City of New York 1940); Cavanaugh v. Valentine, 191 Misc. 48, 41 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup.Ct.1943).

The New York cases, we find, are out of harmony with the general rule and with this court's only pronouncement upon the subject which the research of counsel and this court has revealed. In Maynard v. Hill, 2 Wash.Terr. 321, 327, 5 P. 717, 719 (1884), Aff'd 125 U.S. 190, 8 S.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888), it was contended as it is here that marriage is a contract, the obligations of which are protected by the federal constitution. This court said:

And it has been so often decided that such relation is a status rather than a contract, and that the vested rights therein, if any, must yield to the public interest in the regulation and control of such status, and the opinions therein rendered have been so numerous and able, that we content ourselves with a reference to a few of such decisions, from which it will appear that the marriage relation is not a contract within the meaning of the constitutional restrictions above referred to.

While we have not had occasion to cite the case again upon the point, we have cited it upon a related point in Loomis v. Loomis, 47 Wash.2d 468, 288 P.2d 235 (1955), and Tupper v. Tupper, 63 Wash.2d 585, 388 P.2d 225 (1964). In the latter case we again recognized that marriage is a status.

Maynard v. Hill, supra, will be found cited as a leading case in 52 Am.Jur.2d Marriage § 6 (1970), and in a number of treatises and texts. See J. Madden, The Law of Persons and Domestic Relations, ch. 1, §§ 1--3, at 4 (1931); F. Battershall, The Law of Domestic Relations in the State of New York, ch. 1, at 3 (1910); F. Keezer, The Laws of Marriage and Divorce, ch. 1, § 1, at 8 (J. Morland 3d ed. 1946); H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, § 2.2 (1968). See also R. Young, An Evaluation of Washington Marriage Laws, 12 Wash.L.Rev. 112, at 117 (1937). All of these writers agree that the prevailing rule is that while the marriage relation is entered into by civil contract, the rights, duties and obligations incident to the relationship are governed by statute. The applicable principles are well stated in Madden's treatise, at pages 4 and 5:

The following quotations from legal writers and judicial opinions illustrate the universal opinion that the marriage relation is a status, and that the act of contracting marriage results in a change of status.

'Marriage has been well said to be something more than a contract, either religious or civil; to be an institution.' 'Marriage is a state or relation, depending for its existence upon the fact of parties competent to contract the relation, and their legal, voluntary, present consent to do so, with such formalities as the law of the place requires for its valid solemnization.' 'When the contracting parties have entered into the married state, they have not so much entered into a contract as into a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest, not upon their agreement, but upon the general law of the state, statutory or common, which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations. They are of law, not of contract. It was a contract that the relation should be established, but, being established, the power of the parties, as to its extent or duration, is at an end. Their rights under it are determined by the will of the sovereign, as evidenced by the law. They can neither be modified nor changed by any agreement of parties.' 'Marriage is not a contract, but one of the domestic relations. In strictness, though formed by contract, it signifies the relation of husband and wife, deriving both its rights and duties from a source higher than any contract of which the parties are capable, and, as to these, uncontrollable by any contract which they can make. When formed, this relation is no more a contract than 'fatherhood' or 'sonship' is a contract.'

(Footnotes omitted.)

RCW 26.04.010 declares that marriage is 'a civil contract.' It is apparent that the purpose of this statute was to make it clear that marriage is governed by civil law rather than by ecclesiastical law. See the authorities cited above, which discuss the purposes of such statutes.

The legislature, in the remainder of RCW 26.01--.21, proceeds to regulate the relationship of marriage with respect to the rights and duties of the parties. Those regulatory measures have been changed from time to time. For example, the provisions with regard to dissolution were changed in Laws of 1973, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 157. The laws with respect to community property were changed in Laws of 1972, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 108, §§ 3--6. The laws with respect to antenuptial and separate debts were changed in Laws of 1969, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 121, § 1.

If the appellants' theory were correct, none of these new provisions would apply to marriages entered into before their enactment. It is immediately apparent why the courts in most jurisdictions have consistently held that, while marriage is entered into by contract, the legal duties and rights of the parties with respect to the marriage relationship are determined by statute and may be altered by the legislature after the marriage is contracted. We adhere to that view.

The appellants point out that the statutes contain no language evidencing an intent that they should have retroactive effect. We agree. The statutes apply prospectively only. They impose no penalties for past omissions. They do, however, impose a duty upon stepparents from and after their effective date.

Regulations of the Department of Social and Health Services, since the enactment of RCW 26.16.205 and 26.20.030(1)(b), have treated children who live with a stepparent the same as children who live with both natural parents. ⁴ The appellants contend that they are denied equal protection of the laws because the regulations do not apply wih like force to homes where the natural parent is living with, but not married to a member of the opposite sex.

The appellants concede the applicable rule to be that a legislative classification will be sustained if there is in fact a reasonable basis for the distinction. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970), Rehearing denied 398 U.S. 914, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970). In that case the United States Supreme Court upheld a state welfare program which placed a ceiling upon the amount of aid which any one family could receive per month. The result of this policy was that children in large families received less per capita than children in small families. The court found a reasonable basis for the discrimination in the state's interest in encouraging employment and in avoiding discrimination between welfare families and families of the working poor.

The department could reasonably have considered the fact that where a mother has remarried, her husband has made a serious commitment to her and it can therefore be assumed that his earnings will be available to meet the needs of the...