Washington Timber & Loan Co. v. Smith

• Decision Date: 08 April 1904
• Citation: 34 Wash. 625,76 P. 267
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: WASHINGTON TIMBER & LOAN CO. v. SMITH et al.

76 P. 267

34 Wash. 625

WASHINGTON TIMBER & LOAN CO. v. SMITH et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 8, 1904

Appeal from Superior Court, Snohomish County; John C. Denney, Judge.

Action by the Washington Timber & Loan Company against E. M. Smith and another. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Sherwood & Mansfield and Brownell & Coleman, for appellant.

Ballinger Ronald & Battle and McGuinness & Miller, for respondents.

HADLEY J.

It is sought by this action to procure a decree canceling and declaring void a certain tax deed. The deed was made by the county treasurer of Snohomish county by authority of tax foreclosure proceedings. The proceedings were instituted by Snohomish county to foreclose against real estate upon which delinquent tax certificates had been issued to the county. The action was for the purpose of foreclosing the lien for delinquent and unpaid taxes for the year 1895 and years prior thereto, and included a large amount of property other than that involved in the present suit. The complaint in this action alleges a number of reasons, which, it is claimed rendered the foreclosure ineffectual and the deed void. It is alleged that the sum paid at the tax sale was $224.15, and that the land is worth $1,500. It is also alleged that a tender of the amount, with 15 per cent. per annum interest from date of sale, was made, which was refused, and that the tender was kept good by bringing the money into court. A general demurrer to the complaint was sustained. The plaintiff elected to stand upon its complaint and refused to plead further. Judgment was thereupon entered dismissing the action. The plaintiff has appealed.

This action not only involves the particular property and taxes mentioned in the complaint, but also indirectly involves the validity of the foreclosure proceedings by which Snohomish county attempted to enforce the lien for all delinquent taxes for the year 1895 and previous years upon property against which certificates of delinquency had not been issued to individuals. The first point urged is that there was no sufficient description of the land in the foreclosure proceedings. As an example of the several descriptions, the following, as one, appears in the certificate of delinquency and in the judgment: 'NE 4 of SW 4 Sec. 4 Twp. 30 Range 6,' etc. In the summons the description of the same tract is as follows: 'NE 1/4 SW 1/4 Sec 4 T 30 R 6,' etc. In all the proceedings the property is described by capital letters alone followed simply by the figure '4' arranged somewhat in the position of an algebraic exponent, or by the fraction '1/4'. It is urged that the use of the fraction '1/4' in the summons is a fatal variance from the description used elsewhere in the proceedings, and, in any event, that the use of mere letters is not a sufficient description. Decisions from the states of Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota are cited in support of appellant's argument. The following cases are cited: Keith v. Hayden (Minn.) 2 N.W. 495; Knight v. Alexander (Minn.) 37 N.W. 796; Powers v. Larabee (N. D.) 49 N.W. 724; Power v. Bowdle (N. D.) 54 N.W. 404; Turner v. Hand County (S. D.) 77 N.W. 589; Stokes v. Allen (S. D.) 89 N.W. 1023. The above decisions in the main seem to sustain appellant's argument. In this state, however, we have the following statutory provision: 'In all proceedings relative to the levy, assessment, or collection of taxes and any entries required to be made by any officer, or by the clerk of the court, letters, figures and characters may be used to denote townships, ranges, sections, parts of sections, lots or blocks, or parts thereof, the year or the years for which the taxes were due, and the amount of taxes, assessments, penalties, interest and costs.' Section 1748, 1 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. Appellant anticipates the force of the above statute, and insists that it should not weigh against its argument, for the reason that Minnesota has a similar statute, and that the decisions cited from that state were made in the face of the statute. The Minnesota statute appears to have been passed in 1878. See section 1627, vol. 1, Gen. St. Minn. 1894. The first cited decision from that state--Keith v. Hayden, supra--involved a title made under the general tax law of 1874. The opinion is brief, and no reference is made to any statute. Presumably, there was no similar statute prior to 1878. The later case of Knight v. Alexander, supra, involved a title acquired under a tax judgment entered in 1880. The statute of 1878 was then in force, but no reference is made to it in the opinion. The opinion seems to have simply followed Keith v. Hayden. We, however, believe that force should be given to our own statute in the premises, and if the abbreviations--whether of letters or figures--and their relations to each other as used are such as are commonly understood in the descriptions of lands, they should be held sufficient. We think they are such in this case. For example, 'NE 4 SW 4 Sec. 4 Twp. 30 R. 6' and 'NE 1/4 SW 1/4 Sec. 4 Twp. 30 R. 6' are commonly understood to mean the same thing, and are read as follows: 'Northeast quarter of southwest quarter of section 4, township 30, range 6.' Moreover, we think the weight of authority is against the strict rule announced by the states whose decisions are cited above. Taylor v. Wright, 121 Ill. 455, 13 N.E. 529; Jordan, etc., Ass'n v. Wagoner, 33 Ind. 50; Havard v. Day, 62 Miss. 748; State v. Mayor, 36 N. J. Law, 288; Jenkins v. McTigue (C. C.) 22 F. 148; Goe v. Hetherington, 51 Iowa, 345, 1 N.W. 677; Minter v. Durham (Or.) 11 P. 231. The above cases hold that the use of the commonly understood abbreviations similar to those used in the case at bar is sufficient, and that a description is certain which can be made certain. After each abbreviated description in the case at bar appeared the following, '40 acres,' which, taken in connection with the well-understood meaning of the abbreviations when applied to land descriptions, we think rendered these descriptions sufficiently certain. The use of the fractional abbreviation '1/4' in the summons, instead of the figure '4' in its algebraic exponent position, was not a variance, since, as a matter of common knowledge, both are used to designate the same thing in the descriptions of lands.

It is next urged that the judgment in the foreclosure case is unintelligible as to amount. The judgment, as far as it refers to the lands involved in this suit, is as follows:

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total Tax Int'st To Whom and Assessed Description Sec. Twp. Range Acres Years Valuation Cost due Amount Paid Remarks or Name or or January of By of Owner Lot Block 31 1898 Judgeme- nt -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- J.H. Smock NE 4 SW 4 4 30 6 40 95 130 4 07 407 331 625 226 218 33 638 10 319 4365 594 208 630 126 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- J.H. Smock NW 4 SW 4 4 30 6 40 95 120 4 16 416 306 555 231 202 28 656 10 328 4118 528 186 560 112 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- J.H. Smock SW 4 SW 4 4 30 6 40 95 180 6 25 625 459 625 344 299 33 656 10 328 4765 528 186 560 112 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- John H. NW 4 NW 4 9 30 6 40 95 235 8 15 815 599 625 Smock 448 390 31 656 10 328 5266 512 180 560 112 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Appellant asks the following questions: 'What was the judgment rendered by the court against each tract of land?' 'Take the amount entered against the first description. Was it 407 or 4365?' 'Are cents or dollars, or both, refered to?' 'Is the amount the first amount appearing or the last amount appearing?'

Having regard to appellant's inquiries, we refer first to the perpendicular column at the top of which is the following 'Total Tax Int'st and Costs due January 31, 1898.' It will be observed that a line is drawn through the center of the column so designated, and from the context it was evidently intended that this line should fill the place of a decimal designation between dollars and cents, as is usual in such columns. It is therefore apparent that the amount of tax, interest, and costs against the first-described tract at the date named was $4.07. Referring now to the next column, designated as 'Amount of Judgment,' we find the same figures first reproduced in that column, but without any decimal line or point separating them. It is evident, however, from the previous column, and from the record back of the judgment, that the sum named in the previous column was the amount due as stated in the certificate of delinquency, reckoned to January 31, 1898, and that the certificate was intended to be as of that date. When the same figures reappear in the next column as a part of the amount of the judgment, they must, therefore, refer to the same thing as in the previous column, since the law first provides that the judgment shall be for the amount of the certificate, and next that 15 per cent. per annum interest shall be added thereto. Bearing the latter fact in mind, and computing interest upon $4.07 at the rate named from January 31, 1898, to the date of the judgment, October 29, 1901, we have $2.26, which figures correspond to those next appearing in the column. It is thus apparent that the first figures mean $4.07, the original amount in the certificate; that the others mean $2.26, the interest thereon; and that the...