Washington v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 30 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 2023-15-2 |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | QUINTON N. WASHINGTON, S/K/A QUINTIN N. WASHINGTON v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judges Petty and Beales
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Joan J. Burroughs (The Law Office of Joan J. Burroughs, PLC, on brief), for appellant.
Elizabeth Kiernan Fitzgerald, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Quinton N. Washington ("appellant") appeals his convictions of second-degree murder, in violation of Code § 18.2-32, and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony, in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond ("trial court"), appellant was sentenced to twenty-one years' incarceration. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in four respects:
For the following reasons, this Court affirms appellant's convictions.
The offense
On appeal, "we consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing from that evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial." Williams v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 439, 442, 642 S.E.2d 295, 296 (2007) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004)).
So viewed, the Commonwealth's evidence was that on the evening of October 3, 2013, Johnson had driven to a pharmacy parking lot to meet appellant so that she could transfer physical custody of their son, Q.W., to appellant. Richardson, Johnson's boyfriend, accompanied her and Q.W. While they waited for appellant to arrive, Richardson began smoking a cigarette.
After appellant arrived, Johnson transferred Q.W.'s belongings to appellant's trunk. During this time, appellant exited his vehicle and began yelling at her, Appellant then walked over to Richardson, who was seated in the front passenger's seat ofJohnson's car, and yelled,
Richardson calmly responded to appellant that the smoke was not bothering Q.W. because the windows were down. Appellant replied, "I don't give an 'f' about no 'mf'n' window being down." Appellant then "yanked the door open[]" with such force that the door handle came off, and tried to pull Richardson out of the vehicle. A struggle ensued, and Richardson pushed appellant out of the car. Johnson attempted to insert herself between appellant and Richardson and while her back was toward Richardson, she noticed appellant holding a gun. Johnson screamed, "Stop, no, no, no." A witness, standing approximately fifty feet away, noted that Richardson had a frightened expression as he attempted to "climb away" from appellant to the driver's side of the vehicle.
Appellant pushed Johnson out of his way, stepped closer to the vehicle, and shot Richardson two or three times. Richardson fell back; appellant turned his back on Richardson and walked away, saying "he pulled a gun out on me." After walking twenty or thirty feet, appellant turned around, walked back to Richardson's door, and discharged another "four or five" shots into the vehicle. After this second round of shots, appellant loudly stated,
Richardson died as a result of gunshot wounds to his torso and head. Appellant had discharged a total of seven bullets, three of which were lethal, using a semi-automatic pistol that required appellant to pull the trigger before each shot was fired.
Pretrial motions
Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to admit evidence of prior bad acts and gang affiliation/membership "to show [Richardson's] propensity for turbulence and violence." TheCommonwealth responded with a motion in limine to preclude the admission of such evidence. The trial court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible, reasoning that Richardson's gang affiliation, without more, was not relevant and that his prior bad acts were not sufficiently "related in time, place, and circumstance" to the factual circumstances at issue.
During trial, Johnson testified that she had not seen Richardson with a gun on the day of the shooting nor on any previous occasion. In response, defense counsel asked Johnson to confirm that her testimony had been that "[she had] never heard of [Richardson] having a firearm." Johnson clarified that her testimony on direct, had been that she had never seen Richardson with a gun. The Commonwealth objected, and the trial court sustained the objection "because it was a different question." The trial court suggested defense counsel rephrase the question. Nevertheless, defense counsel continued asking questions premised on the witness' knowledge regarding Richardson having a gun. The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's repeated objection.
After the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, appellant moved to strike, arguing that there was no evidence of malice because the firearm could only have originated from Johnson's vehicle. The trial court denied the motion, and appellant presented his evidence.
In addition to testimony of another witness, appellant testified in his own defense. Appellant stated that he and Richardson "never had no problems before" but that he became angry because Richardson was smoking around Q.W. According to appellant, Richardson had been "fidgeting or pulling something out" and when appellant looked into the vehicle, Richardson was pointing a gun at him through the door. Appellant then "snatched the door open," and the men began to struggle over the gun. After appellant removed the gun from Richardson's grasp, he saw Richardson reach for the other side of the car. Appellant testifiedthat he believed Richardson was reaching for "something else" so he shot Richardson. According to appellant,
Contrary to the testimony of other witnesses, appellant stated that he never walked away from the vehicle. Instead, appellant testified that he was frightened, did not know what Richardson was doing, and Appellant also admitted, however, that he did not see another weapon nor did Richardson verbally threaten him at any point. After the close of all the evidence, appellant renewed his motion to strike, which the trial court denied.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charges of second-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. This appeal followed.
The Commonwealth argues that appellant's first assignment of error—the admissibility of Richardson's prior bad acts to show appellant's reasonable apprehension—should be procedurally defaulted. Specifically, the Commonwealth contends that contrary to appellant's argument on appeal, "the thrust of [appellant's] argument to the trial court was consistently that specific bad acts should come in to show . . . which person was the aggressor."
Under Rule 5A:18, "[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling." Importantly, "[t]he primary function of Rule 5A:18 is to alert the trial judge to possible error so that the judge may consider the issue intelligently and take any corrective actions necessary to avoid unnecessary appeals, reversals and mistrials." Martin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 524, 530, 414 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1992) (quoting Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 480,405 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1991) (en banc)). Once this function has been achieved, "the minimum amount of specificity necessary to fulfill the requirements of Rule 5A:18" has been met. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 303, 314 n.2, 709 S.E.2d 175, 181 n.2 (2011) ().
In this case, appellant's assignment of error was sufficiently preserved. Before the trial court, appellant argued that the prior acts were admissible to determine "who the initial aggressor was; . . . [and] the reasonable apprehension that [appellant] may have experienced and on the likelihood of the decedent's aggressive behavior." The trial court ruled that the acts were inadmissible "in and of [themselves]" because they were too...
To continue reading
Request your trial