Washington v. Few

• Docket Number: C. A. 9:23-01146-MGL-MHC
• Decision Date: 23 June 2023
• Parties: William Washington, Plaintiff, v. John Cannon Few, Chief Justice; A. Claire Allen, Clerk of S.C. Court of Appeals, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

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William Washington, Plaintiff, v. John Cannon Few, Chief Justice; A. Claire Allen, Clerk of S.C. Court of Appeals, Defendants.

C. A. No. 9:23-01146-MGL-MHC

United States District Court, D. South Carolina

June 23, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMENDATION

Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge

This a civil action filed by Plaintiff William Washington, an inmate at the Evans Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.

By dated May 3, 2023, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to provide the necessary information and paperwork to bring his case into proper form for evaluation and possible service of process. Plaintiff was also notified of pleading deficiencies and given the opportunity to amend his Complaint. See ECF No. 5. The time for Plaintiff to bring his case into proper form has passed, and Plaintiff has failed to bring his case into proper form and has not filed an amended complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff proceeding pro se, brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983) for an alleged denial of due process and denial of access to the courts. Defendants are Judge John Cannon Few (Judge Few) and A. Claire Allen (Allen), a clerk of the South Carolina Court of Appeals. In the “Statement of Claim” portion of his Complaint, Plaintiff writes:

A timely appeal was filed and the motion to proceed in IFP was denied April 8, 2010[.] This injury denied petitioner ac[c]ess to the court and the right to appeal April 12, 2010[.] The actual injury resulted from the denial of access to the courts which denied petitioner the right to appeal[.] The facts underlying my claim are the plaintiff was entitled to be heard from the U.S. District Court final disposition[.] The plaintiff was not entitled to continuously pursue his claim, from the S.C. Court of Appeals final ruling[.]

ECF No. 1 at 5-6. (errors in original). He asserts that the injuries he received were “the unconstitutional denial of due process and access to the court and petitioner was entitled to an appeal. An[d] plaintiff prays for service of process.” ECF No. 1 at 6. (errors in original). He requests an award of $7,000,500. Id.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A pro se Complaint is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).

III. DISCUSSION

It is recommended that this action be summarily dismissed for the reasons discussed below.

A. Lack of Jurisdiction

To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to appeal the results of a ruling from a state court action to this court, the current action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because federal district courts do not hear “appeals” from state court actions. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983) (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can only be conducted by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); see also Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2020). To rule in favor of Plaintiff on claims filed in this action may require this court to overrule and reverse orders and rulings made in the state court. Such a result is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Davani v. Virginia Dep't. of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719-720 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293-294 (2005); Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 1997).^[1] Appeals of orders issued by lower state courts must go to a higher state court. Secondly, the Congress, for more than two hundred years, has provided that only the Supreme Court of the United States may review (review is discretionary by way of a writ of certiorari and is not an appeal of right) a decision of a state's highest court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Ernst v. Child and Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491(3d Cir. 1997). This Court cannot sit in judgment of a state court decision, and must dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Moore v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 3:15CV515, 2016 WL 775783, at *5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2016).

B. Judicial Immunity - Judge Few

Even if Plaintiff can establish subject matter jurisdiction, Defendant Judge Few should be summarily dismissed as a party defendant because, based upon the facts alleged, he is entitled to judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351-64 (1978); Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (a suit by South Carolina inmate against two Virginia magistrates); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985)(“It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions.”); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) (immunity presents a threshold question which should be resolved before discovery is even allowed). Further, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. Judicial immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (holding that “immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly”). Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11.

C. Quasi-Judicial Immunity - Defendant Allen

Defendant Allen, a state court employee, should be summarily dismissed as a party defendant because she is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1983) (noting that quasi-judicial immunity accorded to individuals who play integral part in judicial process); Johnson v. Turner, 125 F.3d 324, 332 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding clerk's office employees, acting as a judge's designee, are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity). [C]ourt clerks enjoy derivative absolute judicial immunity when they act in obedience to a judicial order or under the court's direction. McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 5 (4th Cir. 1972); see also Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that causes of action against clerks of court for negligent conduct impeding access to the courts cannot survive).

D. Access to the Courts/Failure to State a Claim

Plaintiff's access to the court claims are also subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff has not identified an actual injury that resulted from Defendants' actions or inactions. A claim for denial of access to the courts must be pled with specificity. Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996). Additionally, to maintain a valid constitutional claim for denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must show actual injury. Cochran, 73 F.3d at 1317; see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). The plaintiff has not plausibly alleged actual injury. He alleges that he was not able to pursue a claim, but has provided no facts as to what claim he was unable to pursue. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations fail to demonstrate that a non-frivolous post-conviction or civil rights legal claim was frustrated or impeded. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353-55; see also Griffith v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., C/A No. 2:12-cv-00239-DCN, 2012 WL 2048200, at *1 (D.S.C. June 6, 2012) (finding that the plausibility standard requires more than “ ‘an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))).

E. Statute of Limitations

Plaintiff's claims are also barred by the applicable statute of limitations. State law concerning limitation of actions applies in claims brought under § 1983. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985), partially superseded by statute as stated in Jones v. R .R. Donnelly & Sons, Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377-380 (2004). In South Carolina, the applicable statute of limitations is generally three years. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530. Conversely, federal law governs the question of when a cause of action accrues. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Under federal law, the running of the statute of limitations begins when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury. Id. Plaintiff asserts that his motion to proceed was denied on April 8, 2010, and his right to appeal was denied on April 12, 2010. See ECF No. 1 at 5. However, Plaintiff did not file this action until more than twelve years later.^[2]

F. Failure to Bring Case...