Washington v. Lake County, Ill.

• Decision Date: 12 March 1991
• Docket Number: No. 88 C 8642.,88 C 8642.
• Citation: 762 F. Supp. 199
• Parties: Eddie WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. LAKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, Lake County Sheriff's Department, and Lt. Harry Frossard, Individually and as an Agent of Lake County, Illinois and of the Lake County Sheriff's Department, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

762 F. Supp. 199

Eddie WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. LAKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, Lake County Sheriff's Department, and Lt. Harry Frossard, Individually and as an Agent of Lake County, Illinois and of the Lake County Sheriff's Department, Defendants.

No. 88 C 8642.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

March 12, 1991.

Joel S. Siegel, Arvey, Hodes, Costello & Burman, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Eddie Washington, pro se.

Alan Michael Kaplan, Daniel Playfair Field, Brydges, Riseborough, Morris, Franke & Miller, Waukegan, Ill., for defendants.

ORDER

NORGLE, District Judge.

Before the court is the summary judgment motion of defendants County of Lake (the "County") and Harry Frossard ("Frossard"). For the reasons discussed below, defendants' motion is granted.

FACTS

Plaintiff Eddie Washington ("Washington") was employed as a jailer with the Lake County Sheriff's Office from September 12, 1986 to July 13, 1987, when he was discharged.¹ Plaintiff, who is black, alleges that during his employment with the Sheriff's Office, he was harassed and discriminated against by Frossard, one of Washington's white superior officers. Washington also claims that his discharge was brought about in large part by disparaging departmental correspondence, generated by defendant Frossard, which became part of Washington's personnel file. He asserts that the true basis for his discharge was racial animosity.

In his amended complaint, Washington asserts a Title VII claim against Lake County for discriminatory employment practices and a due process and equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both Lake County and Frossard, in his individual capacity. Washington seeks reinstatement and back pay pursuant to his Title VII claim, and compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to his § 1983 claim. Finally, Washington seeks compensation for allegedly damaging evaluation reports added by Frossard to his personnel file which he claims have hampered his efforts to obtain new employment.

In their motion, defendants do not challenge plaintiff's prima facie case, nor do they attempt to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for Washington's discharge. Rather, they have moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Washington is entitled to no relief on his claims. Defendants argue that even assuming, without admitting, that Washington was unlawfully discriminated against and fired, he was never entitled to his job in the first instance and therefore is entitled to no relief. This argument is premised upon defendants' assertion that Washington's employment with the Sheriff's Office was obtained fraudulently because Washington had made material misrepresentations on his employment application form.

The undisputed facts² in support of defendants' position establish that Washington falsely stated on his application that he had never been convicted of an offense other than a minor traffic violation. Question number 5 on the "Personnel Data Sheet" portion of Washington's employment application with Lake County asks:

Have you ever been convicted of an offense other than a minor traffic violation? (Do not include convictions while a minor and/or convictions sealed by Court order.) If so, please state the nature of the offense(s), date(s), city and state, and disposition. A conviction record is not an automatic bar to employment and the nature, recency, and disposition of an offense will be considered only as it relates to the job for which you are applying.³

On his application form, Washington checked the box next to this question marked "no" and wrote nothing on the blank lines appearing after the question.

At the bottom of the last page of Washington's application form is a signature clause which is offset by the word "READ" printed boldly in large print above it, and the word "IMPORTANT," printed vertically in large type and bold print on either side of it. The relevant language in this clause states:

I agree that if any misrepresentation has been made by me or the results of such investigations are not satisfactory in the judgment of Lake County, any offer of employment may be withdrawn or my employment terminated immediately without any obligation or liability to me other than for payment, at the rate agreed upon, for services actually rendered if I had been employed.

In support of their position that Washington made material misrepresentations on his application, defendants have submitted certified copies of two convictions: a 1974 guilty plea to a charge of criminal trespass, for which Washington was sentenced to pay a fine; and a 1981 conviction for third degree assault in St. Louis. In the latter case, Washington was convicted after a three day jury trial on the merits, and received a twenty eight day jail sentence, suspended in favor of a sentence of two years probation.

The crux of defendants' summary judgment motion is that they never would have hired Washington in the first place had they been aware either that he had these two prior convictions or that he made a material misrepresentation on his application form. Washington, in turn, argues that two material fact issues preclude summary judgment: first, whether his answer to Question 5 on his application constitutes an intentional misrepresentation; and second, whether the County would have rejected Washington's application or refused to hire him had it known of his prior convictions.

DISCUSSION

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A plaintiff cannot rest on mere allegations of a claim without any significant probative evidence which support his complaint. Id.; see First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968). "One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims and defenses." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Accordingly, the nonmoving party is required to go beyond the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file to designate specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id.

As noted above, defendants assert that the after-acquired evidence of Washington's convictions and the corresponding misrepresentation on his employment application preclude him from obtaining any relief to which he might otherwise be entitled under Title VII or § 1983. Defendants cite Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988) in support of their position that this after-acquired evidence provides an affirmative defense to Washington's Title VII claim. In Summers, an employee filed suit against a former employer under Title VII for age and religious discrimination. The employee had been placed on probation for two known falsifications on insurance claims records at his former job, but was ultimately discharged for poor performance. Four years after discharging this employee, the former employer discovered 150 instances in which the employee had falsified company records. The employer argued that the 150 falsifications, unknown at the time of discharge, should be considered in determining the remedy available to the employee. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the employer, holding that "while such after-acquired evidence cannot be said to have been a `cause' for Summers' discharge in 1982, it is relevant to Summers' claim of `injury,' and does itself preclude the grant of any present relief or remedy to Summers." Summers, 864 F.2d at 708. The court reasoned that the case was:

akin to the hypothetical wherein a company doctor is fired because of his age, race, religion, and sex and the company, in defending a civil rights action, thereafter discovers that the discharged employee was not a "doctor." In our view, the masquerading doctor would be entitled to no relief, and Summers is in no better position.

Id. After finding no denial of these falsifications in Summers' deposition testimony, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment for the defendant.

The Summers rationale has recently been applied in numerous district court cases, Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F.Supp. 515 (D.Kan.1991); Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F.Supp. 487 (D.Colo.1991); Sweeney v. U-Haul Co., No. 89 C 3761, 1991 WL 1707 (N.D.Ill. January 8, 1991); O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F.Supp. 656 (D.Utah 1990); Carroll v. City of Chicago, No. 87 C 8995, 1990 WL 37631 (N.D.Ill. March 20, 1990); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F.Supp. 991 (D.Kan.1989), and has been cited favorably by the Seventh Circuit, see Powers v. Chicago Transit Authority, 890 F.2d 1355, 1360 (7th Cir.1989); Smith v. General Scanning Co., 876 F.2d 1315, 1319, n. 2 (7th Cir.1989) (stating in dictum that "it would hardly make sense to order Smith reinstated to a job which he lied to get and from which he properly could be discharged for that lie"). The present case falls squarely within the common fact pattern of the district court cases cited above. In each of these cases, a plaintiff who had made material misrepresentations on his or her employment application was precluded from obtaining relief under Title VII from the defendant employer. Relying on the Summers decision, each of these cases held that the misrepresentations, though not known to the employer at the time of p...