Wasserboebr v. Boulier

• Decision Date: 12 January 1892
• Citation: 84 Me. 165,24 A. 808
• Parties: WASSERBOEBR v. BOULIER.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

24 A. 808

84 Me. 165

WASSERBOEBR

v. BOULIER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 12, 1892.

(Official.)

Report from supreme judicial court, Penobscot county. Assumpsit by Harvey P. Wasserboehr against Theodore Boulier. On report. Judgment of nonsuit.

C. A. Cushman, for plaintiff.

P. H. Gillin, for defendant.

FOSTER, J. The plaintiff, a wholesale liquor dealer, residing in Boston, seeks to recover a balance of $241.55 for intoxicating liquors sold the defendant upon an order given to the plaintiff's agent or traveling salesman, at the defendant's shop in Old Town, in this state. The contract with the agent was that the plaintiff should send the defendant five barrels of whisky and one barrel of port wine in original packages, and that the defendant was to have ten days after receiving the goods in which to return them if they were not satisfactory. The plaintiff filled the order, and shipped the liquors to the defendant. A part of them were returned.

We do not think the plaintiff is entitled to recover, for reasons which we shall state.

It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the delivery of the liquors, which had been ordered by the defendant, to a common carrier in Boston, the plaintiff being duly licensed to sell at wholesale, for transportation to the defendant, was in law a delivery to him there; and that this delivery was a completion of the sale in Massachusetts; and that, the sale being valid by the laws of that state, the defendant is liable for their value.

The first question to be considered is whether the sale was made in Maine or Massachusetts. The validity of the sale may depend upon the decision of this question, for it is a general principle of law that the validity of a contract is to be decided by the law of the place where it was made, unless either expressly or impliedly it appears that it is to be performed elsewhere. And it is also an established principle that, if valid by the law of the place where made, it is generally valid everywhere; and if. In the jurisdiction where made, the law would enforce It, it will be enforced in the jurisdiction to which a party may he compelled to resort for a remedy for its violation. But to this rule there is this exception: that no state or nation is bound to recognize or enforce contracts which are injurious to its own interests, or the welfare of its people, or which are in fraud or violation of its own laws. Banchor v. Mansel, 47 Me. 58, 60; Smith v. Godfrey, 28 N. H. 379; Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253.

It was in accordance with these general principles that the courts have held that the price of liquors sold and delivered in a state where such sale is legal, and nothing remains to be done by the vendor to complete the transaction, can be recovered in another state where such sale would be illegal,—Torrey v. Corliss, 33 Me. 333; Banchor v. Cilley, 38 Me. 553; Orcutt v. Nelson, 1 Grav, 536; McIntyre v. Parks, 3 Mete. (Maes.) 207; Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374; Scudder v. Bank, 91 U. S. 406; though it is otherwise if the contract contains any ingredient or participation on the part of the original vendor that the goods shall be illegally sold, or that he shall do any act, beyond the mere sale, to assist or facilitate the illegal act, or to aid the purchaser in his unlawful design in the subsequent unlawful disposition of the goods, or if the goods are to be delivered in the place where the sale is prohibited,— Smith V. Godfrey, 28 N. H. 379; Banchor v. Mansel, 47 Me. 58; Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253; Lindsey v. Stone, 123 Mass. 332; Wilson v. Stratton, 47 Me. 120, 120, 127. This principle is illustrated in the case of Tyler v. Carlisle, 79 Me. 210, 212, 9 Atl. Rep. 356, which was an action to recover money lent to be used for gambling purposes, and the distinction is there drawn between the mere loaning of money with a knowledge it is to be so used, and a loan made with the express understanding, intention, and purpose that it is to be used to gamble with.

But omitting all consideration of the question whether the original vendor had knowledge of the intended illegal disposition of the liquors by the vendee, or participated in assisting or facilitating the vendee in any unlawful acts in relation to them, we think the plaintiff cannot maintain his action for other reasons.

1. The sale was not made in Massachusetts, not with standing the order was filled in Boston, and delivery there made to a common carrier. It became a completed contract after the arrival of the goods at their place of destination in Maine. The sale was conditional. The defendant was to have 10 days in which to test the liquors, and, if not satisfactory, to return them. And in such case it has...