Waste Disposal Center, Inc. v. Larson

• Decision Date: 02 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 13-00-241-CV.,13-00-241-CV.
• Citation: 74 S.W.3d 578
• Parties: WASTE DISPOSAL CENTER, INC., Appellant, v. Michelle LARSON and Soila Valdez, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

74 S.W.3d 578

WASTE DISPOSAL CENTER, INC., Appellant, v. Michelle LARSON and Soila Valdez, et al., Appellees.

No. 13-00-241-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi.

May 2, 2002.

Rehearing Overruled May 30, 2002.

Linda C. Breck, Ronald B. Brin, Thomas F. Nye, Brin & Brin, Corpus Christi, for Appellant.

Denman H. Heard, Richard N. Countiss, John E. Williams, Jr., Jeffrey S. Thompson, Williams-Bailey Law Firm, Thomas E. Bilek, Hoeffner, Bilek & Eidman, Houston, for Appellees.

Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices HINOJOSA and RODRIGUEZ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice RODRIGUEZ.

This is a limited appeal from a jury trial. See Tex.R.App. P. 34.6(c)(1). Appellant, Waste Disposal Center, Inc. (Waste Disposal), appeals from a judgment rendered in favor of appellees, Soila Valdez and Michelle Larson. By four issues, Waste Disposal contends there is no evidence to support the jury's award of actual damages, and because there is no evidence of actual damages, exemplary damages and court costs should not have been recovered. By three issues, cross-appellants, Soila Valdez, Marcus, Norma and Frederick Atkinson, as statutory wrongful death beneficiaries and sole heirs of Frederick James Atkinson (Deceased), Javier Gomez, Jr., by next friend Dolores L. Gomez, and Abel and Belinda Valdez (landowners), bring a cross-appeal against cross-appellees, Waste Disposal and the estate of Franklin F. Kelley (Estate). The landowners contend the trial court erred in dismissing their suit against the Estate on jurisdictional grounds and by failing to charge the jury on their claims of strict liability. Cross-appellant Soila Valdez also argues that the exemplary damages cap is not constitutional. We affirm, in part, and reverse and render, in part.

I. Background

Multiple plaintiffs, including Valdez and Larson, filed suit against numerous defendants who owned, operated, or transported waste to a landfill located at the intersection of County Road 39 and FM 1945 in Sinton, Texas. The plaintiffs sought damages for both personal injury and property damages, alleging multiple causes of action, including negligence, trespass, and nuisance. Valdez and Larson, among other plaintiffs, went to trial against several defendants including Browning Ferris, Inc., a/k/a BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc. (BFI), and appellant, Waste Disposal. The jury found Waste Disposal's and BFI's negligence proximately caused property damage to Larson and Valdez. It also found Waste Disposal and BFI committed a willful trespass and created a nuisance on Valdez's property. The jury awarded Valdez $20,000.00, and Larson $2,500.00, for diminution of the market value of their respective properties. The jury further awarded Valdez $25,000.00 for mental anguish arising as a result of the willful trespass and the nuisance. No mental anguish damages were awarded to Larson. Finally, the jury awarded Valdez $1,000,000.00 in exemplary damages against BFI and $500,000.00 in exemplary damages against Waste Disposal.

After the jury verdict, but prior to entry of judgment, Valdez and Larson fully compromised and settled their claims with some of the defendants, including BFI. Without granting Waste Disposal's motion to disregard the jury's findings, and after applying the settlement credit, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Valdez and against Waste Disposal in the sum of $200,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus post-judgment interest and costs of $50,753.87.

II. Diminution of Market Value

By its first issue, Waste Disposal contends there is no evidence of a diminution in market value of either Valdez's property or Larson's property. Waste Disposal argues that testimony given by Valdez and Larson reflects only their personal, subjective feelings, and does not quantify market value or any reduction thereof.

A. Standard of Review

In determining whether legally sufficient evidence supports the jury's findings, we must review all evidence in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered, and disregard all inferences to the contrary. Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex.2001). We must determine whether that evidence "would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions." Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997); see Formosa Plastics Corp., v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex.1998); Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins Fund v. Serrano, 985 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied). The verdict must remain intact unless there is (1) no evidence of a vital fact; (2) the evidence supporting the fact has no legal viability; (3) the evidence is no more than a scintilla; or (4) the evidence conclusively proves the opposite fact. Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660, 666 (Tex.1990).

B. The Law

A property owner can provide opinion testimony regarding diminution in market value resulting from permanent damage to land, but the testimony must show that the diminution refers to market value rather than intrinsic value or some other value. Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex.1984). Texas courts have defined market value as the price that property would bring when offered for sale by one who desires, but is not obliged to sell, and is bought by one who is under no necessity to buy. City of Harlingen v. Estate of Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex.2001) (citing State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 618, 89 S.W.2d 979, 979, modifying 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 194, 202 (1936)); Bailey County Appraisal Dist. v. Smallwood, 848 S.W.2d 822, 824-25 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, no writ). "On the other hand, intrinsic value is an inherent value not established by market forces; it is a personal or sentimental value." Star Houston, Inc. d/b/a Star Motor Cars v. Kundak, 843 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 739 (5th ed. 1979)).

C. Valdez's Property

Valdez testified she paid $45,000.00 for her property. The purchase value was also supported, in part, by the admission of the 1981 deed and deed of trust that established the assumption of two debts totaling $37,521.80. While the general rule is that statements about the initial cost of a home are not admissible to show market value at the time of loss, see Redman Homes, Inc. v. Ivy, 920 S.W.2d 664, 669 (Tex.1996), no objection was made to this evidence. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1. Nonetheless, Valdez also testified that her property was not worth what she originally paid for it, that her property "is not worth anything anymore," and nobody "would buy the place as it is." She also testified that she would not want to "sell her property to another person"; she would not give another family the problems she has had. This is some evidence of Valdez's opinion concerning how the market value has diminished as a result of permanent damage to the land. See Porras, 675 S.W.2d at 504. It is some evidence of the price her property would bring if she desired but was not obliged to sell to one who was under no necessity to buy. See City of Harlingen, 48 S.W.3d at 182; Bailey, 848 S.W.2d at 824-25.

Waste Disposal argues that market value is not established when an owner testifies that her property has no value, with nothing more to support her testimony. The cases Waste Disposal relied on, however, are distinguishable from the present case. Pontiac v. Elliott, 775 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied), and Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis, 704 S.W.2d 363, 371 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 709 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.1986), involved deceptive trade practice claims. In each case, the measure of damages was the difference between the market value of the vehicle warranted and the market value of the vehicle delivered. Elliott, 775 S.W.2d at 399; Lewis, 704 S.W.2d at 371. In the present case, Valdez's complaints are of negligence, trespass and nuisance, not that she received less than she was promised when she purchased her home.

Reviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to Valdez, we conclude the evidence "would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions." Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 711 (Tex. 1997). Thus, the evidence is legally sufficient to establish a diminution in market value of Valdez's property.

D. Larson's Property

Larson testified the normal resale value, the market value, of her property before the waste disposal issues arose was $40,000.00. This value included the initial cost of the land in 1996, and subsequent improvements. Larson further testified the current value for the land "with the contamination" was zero, and she would not sell the land to anyone and doubted that "anybody would buy it."

Applying the same analysis as above, we conclude that this evidence is legally sufficient to establish a diminution in market value of Larson's property.

Waste Disposal's first issue is overruled.

III. Mental Anguish Damages Awarded Valdez

In its second issue, Waste Disposal contends there is no evidence to support the jury's award of mental anguish damages to Valdez as a result of the alleged property damage.

A. The Law

"[A]n award of mental anguish damages will survive a legal sufficiency challenge when the plaintiffs have introduced direct evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of their mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in the plaintiffs' daily routine." Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995). When a claimant fails to present direct evidence of the nature, duration, or severity of mental anguish, we apply a traditional no evidence standard to determine whether the record reveals any evidence of "a high degree of mental pain and distress" that is more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger, to support any award of damages. Id.

B. Analysis

Valdez provided the following...