Watanabe v. Foodland Supermarket, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 12 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. CAAP–12–0000204.,CAAP–12–0000204.
• Citation: 135 Hawai'i 407,353 P.3d 410 (Table)
• Parties: Lin C. WATANABE, Claimant–Appellee, v. FOODLAND SUPERMARKET, LTD., Employer–Appellant, and First Insurance Company of Hawaii, Ltd., Insurance Carrier –Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Court of Appeals

135 Hawai'i 407
353 P.3d 410 (Table)

Lin C. WATANABE, Claimant–Appellee
v.
FOODLAND SUPERMARKET, LTD., Employer–Appellant
and
First Insurance Company of Hawaii, Ltd., Insurance Carrier –Appellant.

No. CAAP–12–0000204.

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai‘i.

June 12, 2015.

Scott G. Leong, Shawn L.M. Benton, (Leong Kunihiro Lezy & Benton), on the briefs, for employer-appellant.

LEONARD, Presiding Judge, and GINOZA, J.; and REIFURTH, J., dissenting.

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER

This workers' compensation case arises out of a March 11, 2010 incident during which Claimant–Appellee Lin C. Watanabe (Watanabe ) aggravated a pre-existing back injury while in the course of her employment as a stocking clerk at Foodland Supermarket in Kihei Town Center, Kihei, Hawai‘i. Employer–Appellant Foodland Supermarket, Ltd. and Insurance Carrier–Appellant First Insurance Company of Hawaii, Ltd. (collectively, “Foodland ”) appeal from the February 16, 2012 Decision and Order of the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB ).

On appeal, Foodland challenges the LIRAB's Conclusion of Law (COL ) 1, which states that:

1. The Board concludes that [Foodland] may be liable for, and [Watanabe] entitled to, medical care, services and supplies after May 3, 2010.

As the Board has previously stated in Jochola v. Maui Economic Opportunity, Inc. et al. [,] AB 2005–206(M) [ (Haw. LIR App. Bd. Sept 25, 2008) ]:

The entitlement of an injured worker to receive medical care, services, and supplies as the nature of the injury requires for so long as reasonably needed is one of the core components of compensation. Simply because an injury returns to pre-work injury status does not necessarily mean that the duty to pay compensation ends. Absent a showing of an intervening or superseding event or cause (see, for example, Diaz v. Oahu Sugar Co., Ltd., 77 Haw[ai‘i] 152 (1994) ), fraud (see HRS § 386–98(e) ), or other appropriate terminating event, there is a likelihood that such obligation to provide medical care, services, and supplies will not terminate. No such terminating event has been shown in this case. However, a claimant's entitlement to such care, services, and supplies is dependent upon all other requirements of Chapter 386, HRS and the Hawaii Workers' Compensation Medical Fee Schedule being met, (e.g., such care, services, and supplies, so long as reasonably needed and as the nature of the injury requires, and appropriately requested, reported, authorized, and billed).

Accordingly, the Board concludes that [Watanabe]'s rights under Section 386–21, HRS, are not terminated. [Foodland] may be liable for, and [Watanabe] may be entitled to, medical care, services, and supplies after May 3, 2010, for her low back injury consistent with and subject to the foregoing.

Specifically, Foodland argues that the LIRAB erred by (1) relying on Jochola v. Maui Econ. Opportunity, Inc., Case No. AB 2005–206(M) (7–03–00739) to conclude that an employer's obligation to provide medical care, services, and supplies will not terminate absent an intervening or superseding event, and (2) concluding that Foodland may be liable for, and Watanabe may be entitled to, medical care, services, and supplies after May 3, 2010 for the March 11, 2010 work injury.

Upon careful review of the records and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised,¹ we resolve Foodland's point of error as follows:

(1) Although Foodland challenges a single COL, COL 1 actually consists of two determinations: the conclusion that the principle articulated in Jochola is correct and the conclusion that when the principle is applied to the LIRAB's findings, Foodland may be liable for future medical care, supplies, and services. The first determination is a conclusion of law, and “[p]ursuant to [Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) ] § 91–14(g) [ (2012) ], an agency's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” United Pub. Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL–CIO v. Hanneman, 106 Hawai‘i 359, 363, 105 P.3d 236, 240 (2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The second is an application of the law to the facts and circumstances of this particular case and thus resolves a mixed question of fact and law. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai‘i 97, 119, 9 P.3d 409, 431 (2000). Thus, it is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Id.

[A] mixed determination of law and fact is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding or determination, or (2) despite substantial evidence to support the finding or determination, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

Id.

(1)(a) “Immediately after a work injury sustained by an employee and so long as reasonably needed the employer shall furnish to the employee all medical care, services, and supplies as the nature of the injury requires.” HRS § 386–21(a) (Supp.2014). The LIRAB erred insofar as it held that a superceding or intervening event is required before an employer's liability under HRS § 386–21 terminates.

Generally, when an agency interprets a statute that the agency is tasked with upholding, our review is generally deferential:

Ordinarily, deference will be given to decisions of administrative agencies acting within the realm of their expertise. The rule of judicial deference, however, does not apply when the agency's reading of the statute contravenes the legislature's manifest purpose. Consequently, we have not hesitated to reject an incorrect or unreasonable statutory construction advanced by the agency entrusted with the statute's implementation.

Coon v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 98 Hawai‘i 233, 245, 47 P.3d 348, 360 (2002) (citations, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Even under a deferential review, we conclude that the LIRAB's statutory interpretation is in error.

We first note that the principle expressed by the LIRAB has been disagreed with and narrowed by this court in a previous, albeit unpublished, decision. In Perkins v. Puna Plantation Haw., Ltd., No. CAAP–12–0000563, 2013 WL 5019431 at *3 (App. Sept. 13, 2013) (mem.), although we stated that “[e]ven if there is no present manifestation of symptoms, it may be possible to predict that a claimant will require medical treatment in the future as a result of a work injury[,]” we ultimately held that “even absent an intervening cause, fraud, or other terminating event, an award of future treatment cannot be affirmed without evidence in the record supporting a determination that future treatment will be ‘reasonably needed’ to relieve the claimant from the effects of the work injury.” Id. (citation omitted).

We conclude that there is no reason to depart from this holding. HRS § 386–21(a) requires that the medical treatment be “reasonably needed ... as the nature of the injury requires.” “Therefore, an award of future treatment as part of the original claim cannot be affirmed without evidence in the record supporting a determination that future treatment will be ‘reasonably needed’ to relieve the claimant from the effects of the work injury.”Kuaimoku v. State, Dept. of Educ.-Kauai, No. CAAP–11–0000616, 2014 WL 2921835 at *2 (App. June 27, 2014) (sdo) (citation omitted), cert. denied, No. SCWC–11–0000616, 2014 WL 4811494 (Haw. Sept. 29, 2014). Indeed, the holding of Jochola expresses that “a claimant's entitlement to such care ... is dependent upon all other requirements of Chapter 386, HRS ... (e.g., such care, services, and supplies, so long as reasonably needed and as the nature of the injury requires ....)” Case No. AB 2005–206(M) (7–03–00739) (emphasis added). Although workers' compensation statutes are to be interpreted liberally (see, e.g., Flor v. Holguin, 94 Hawai‘i 70, 79, 9 P.3d 382, 391 (2000) ), a test based solely on the existence of a “terminating event” might hold an employer liable for future medical care even if such medical care is no longer reasonably necessary to relieve the claimant from the effects of the work injury. Thus, the express requirements of HRS § 386–21(a) would be violated. While a terminating event may provide compelling evidence that treatment is no longer reasonably necessary due to the subject work injury, it is not a prerequisite for the termination of liability. See Perkins, 2013 WL 5019431 at *3. We conclude that, whether future medical treatment is reasonably necessary to relieve the claimant from the effects of the work injury, is the proper test for determining the termination of an employer's liability under HRS § 386–21(a).²

(1)(b) Although we disagree with the Jochola opinion insofar as it requires a terminating event, we do not disagree with its determination that: “[s]imply because an injury returns to pre-work injury status does not necessarily mean that the duty to pay compensation ends.” Case No. AB 2005–206(M) (7–03–00739).

In Alayon, we wrote:

If the portion of an employee's injury and condition that is attributable to a work-related accident has been resolved and the employee has returned to his or her pre-work-accident condition, it is not clear why an

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