Watco Cos. v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 01 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 113,156.,113,156.
• Citation: 52 Kan.App.2d 602,371 P.3d 360
• Parties: WATCO COMPANIES, INC., d/b/a South Kansas and Oklahoma Railroad, Appellant, v. Shane CAMPBELL and Jerry Standlee, Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

52 Kan.App.2d 602

371 P.3d 360

WATCO COMPANIES, INC., d/b/a South Kansas and Oklahoma Railroad, Appellant,

v.Shane CAMPBELL and Jerry Standlee, Appellees.

No. 113,156.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

April 1, 2016.

Kenneth E. Barnes and Kyle S. Belew, of The Barnes Law Firm, of Kansas City, Missouri, and Daniel F. Church, of Morrow Willnauer Klosterman Church, LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, for appellant.

Dana M. Harris and Matthew W. Greenberg, of Harris & Hart, L.L.C., of Leawood, for appellees.

Before HILL, P.J., McANANY and ARNOLD–BURGER, JJ.

ARNOLD–BURGER

, J.

To quote federal Magistrate Judge James O'Hara, who was the judge to hear the federal court proceedings regarding this matter, “[t]his is a very simple personal injury case gone seriously awry.” Fox v. Watco. Companies, Inc., Case No. 09–CV–2078–JPO, filed in United States District Court for the District of Kansas, Order dated April 25, 2011 (entering consent judgment and dismissing federal case). The case involves a collision between a truck and a train, where the train conductor was injured. After Magistrate Judge O'Hara dismissed the federal case and Watco filed an action in Crawford County for comparative implied indemnity, the district court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants Shane Campbell and Jerry Standlee. The district court granted defendants' motion on two separate grounds, finding that the plaintiff, Watco Companies, Inc. (Watco), came into the litigation with unclean hands and it was not the real party in interest. Watco appeals. Because we find that Watco's conduct justifies a finding of unclean hands, we affirm the district court's dismissal of this action.

Factual and Procedural Background

Jack Fox was working as a conductor on a train owned and operated by Watco. Shane Campbell was driving a commercial water delivery truck owned by Jerry Standlee. Campbell was looking at his phone as he approached the intersection with the railroad tracks and failed to stop and yield to the approaching train, causing a collision. At the time, Watco employees were involved in pushing freight cars through the intersection as part of a switching and coupling operation. Fox was riding on a railcar as it approached the tracks. He was injured in the collision and filed suit against Watco, in federal court, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). The suit alleged that Watco's negligence in failing to provide proper working radios and flagmen at the crossing contributed to Fox's damages. Watco then asserted a third-party claim against both Campbell and Standlee. Watco claimed damages to its train and equipment, including downtime as a result of Campbell's negligence. In addition, Watco sought judgment against Campbell and Standlee (Defendants) in the amount of any judgment that Fox may obtain against Watco, but Fox did not amend his complaint to assert claims against Defendants and continued to assert claims solely against Watco.

Prior to trial in that case, Fox and Watco reached a settlement. As part of the agreement, a consent judgment was entered against Watco in the amount of $962,037. In addition to the consent judgment, Fox and Watco entered into an agreement to stay execution of the judgment (Agreement). The terms of the Agreement required Watco to pay Fox $200,000 in exchange for Fox's agreement not to execute on the remaining outstanding amount of the consent judgment unless or until Watco was able to recover from Defendants. The Agreement also established a payment schedule. If Watco was only able to recover $100,000 or less, all monies recovered would, after expenses were deducted, go straight to Fox. If Watco was able to recover more than $100,000 but less than $300,000, Fox would receive the first $100,000 recovered and then Fox and Watco would split the remainder evenly. If more than $300,000 was recovered, Watco would keep the first $200,000, then Fox would receive the remainder. Under the Agreement, there was no situation in which Watco would be required to pay Fox more than the $200,000 it initially paid.

After the Agreement was entered, the federal district court dismissed the remaining third-party claim between Watco and Defendants without prejudice. Watco then filed the present action in state court seeking comparative implied indemnity from Defendants for the amount of the consent judgment, $962,037, and $1,249.92 for damages and downtime to its train.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that Watco had unclean hands, was barred from recovery by the doctrine of in pari delicto, was not the real party in interest, and was not entitled to recovery because the Agreement violated federal law. The district court granted Defendants' motion, finding Watco in violation of the clean hands doctrine and finding that it was not the real party in interest. Watco now appeals.

AnalysisStandard of review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case. On appeal, the same rules apply; summary judgment must be denied if reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence. Stanley Bank v. Parish, 298 Kan. 755, 759, 317 P.3d 750 (2014)

. Where there is no factual dispute, appellate review of an order regarding summary judgment is de novo. Martin v. Naik, 297 Kan. 241, 246, 300 P.3d 625 (2013). In addition, the district court's reasons for its decision on a summary judgment motion are immaterial if the ruling was correct for any reason. Bomhoff v. Nelnet Loan Services, Inc., 279 Kan. 415, 421, 109 P.3d 1241 (2005) (citing Dickerson v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 253 Kan. 843, Syl. ¶ 3, 863 P.2d 364 (1993) ). There is no dispute regarding any genuine issue as to any material fact in this case.

Consideration of certain evidence in support of summary judgment

As a preliminary matter, Watco argues that the district court should not have considered the Agreement in rendering its decision. Specifically, Watco argues that reliance on the Agreement was erroneous because the document was not properly authenticated as required by K.S.A. 60–464

and was therefore inadmissible as evidence in support of summary judgment. After a thorough review of the cases cited by Watco, we reject its argument.

K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60–256(c)(2)

instructs that summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits or declarations show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Kansas courts often restate the rule as: “ ‘ “Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” ’ ” Stanley Bank, 298 Kan. at 759, 317 P.3d 750. But we note that the phrase often recited in Kansas cases does not contain an exclusive list of the evidence a court may consider when ruling on a summary judgment motion. The statute indicates that in addition to the evidence cited in Stanley Bank, courts may consider other discovery and disclosure materials on file as well as “sworn or certified” copies of documents referenced in affidavits or declarations. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60–256(c)(2), (e)(1).

Clearly, the Agreement was part of the discovery materials in the case, provided to Defendants from Watco. It was attached as an exhibit to the Defendants' Answer, it weighed prominently in federal Magistrate Judge O'Hara's order dismissing the case filed in federal court, and Watco admitted in interrogatories filed in this case that it had provided the Agreement to Defendants and would provide additional copies if needed. Watco has never challenged the veracity of the multiple copies of the Agreement included in the record, nor does it question its existence. We can conceive of no reason why the Agreement would not be appropriate to consider in ruling on a summary judgment motion.

Not to be deterred, Watco also argues that Kansas Supreme Court Rule 141(d)

(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 242) limits submissions in support of summary judgment to material that is admissible in evidence by authorizing objection to material that is not “presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” K.S.A. 60–464 governs the authentication of documents generally. The statute instructs that “[a]uthentication of a writing is required before it may be received in evidence.” K.S.A. 60–464. However, the proper method for authenticating a document is vague. The statute merely states that “[a]uthentication may be by evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of its authenticity or by any other means provided by law.” K.S.A. 60–464. Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) contains similar language stating that “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Federal courts have recognized that documents obtained through a request for production of documents may, in appropriate cases, be relied upon as authentic because the method in which they are obtained lends them automatic credibility. See Anderson v. Cramlet, 789 F.2d 840, 845 (...