WATERFRONT COM'N v. CONST. & MARINE EQUIP.
Decision Date | 18 June 1996 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 95-3067(WHW). |
Citation | 928 F. Supp. 1388 |
Parties | WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF NEW YORK HARBOR, Plaintiff, v. CONSTRUCTION AND MARINE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
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Gerald P. Lally, David B. Greenfield, Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, New York City, for Plaintiff Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor.
Ronald H. DeMaria, DeMaria, Ellis, Hunt & Friedman, Newark, New Jersey, for Defendant Construction and Marine Equipment Co., Inc.
The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor ("Commission") has applied for a preliminary injunction restraining Construction and Marine Equipment Co., Inc. ("CME") from performing certain activities that allegedly violate the Waterfront Commission Act, N.J.S.A. § 32:23-1 et seq. (the "compact").1 Pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 32:23-90, the Commission seeks to enjoin CME from performing services as a stevedore without being licensed, as required by N.J.S.A. § 32:23-19; employing persons to perform the services of longshoremen and checkers who are not included in the longshoremen's register, required by N.J.S.A. § 32:23-27 and -105; and employing persons as pier superintendents or hiring agents without those employees having first obtained a license, as required by N.J.S.A. § 32:23-12. The defendant, CME, offers several defenses.
For reasons discussed below, the Court grants the Commission's application for a preliminary injunction.
In June 1953, the legislatures of New Jersey and New York adopted identical statutes creating the Waterfront Commission, a bistate instrumentality. N.J.S.A. § 32:23-1 et seq.; N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 9801 et seq. (McKinney). Plaintiff, the Commission, was formed to seek to eliminate racketeering and other criminal, corrupt and evil labor conditions on the waterfront of the Port of New York District. Reporting for work, large groups of longshoremen would appear at "shape ups." To get work, they would have to pay kickbacks, gamble with a particular person, or borrow at usurious rates from designated lenders. These practices not only "depressed and degraded" waterfront labor, as Article I of the compact put it, but also were criminal or led to crime.
Mainly, the supply of waterfront labor would be regulated by a longshoremen's register.2 This register would include "all qualified longshoremen eligible." N.J.S.A. § 32:23-27. And after December 1, 1953, no person could work as a longshoreman within the Port of New York district unless his name was on the register, and no person could employ someone to work as a longshoreman in the district unless that worker was registered. The register was meant to ensure that the supply of waterfront labor did not outstrip demand, and thus remove the vulnerability of laborers to unscrupulous hiring practices.
A primary duty of the Commission is to maintain the longshoremen's register. This responsibility, as contained in N.J.S.A. §§ 32:23-24 and -38, allowed the Commission to control the labor supply by adding or removing names from the register. The Commission can eliminate individuals from the register who had not been working as longshoremen or looking for such work, and to include additional individuals "on a temporary basis to meet special or emergency needs." See N.J.S.A. §§ 32:23-34 & -38.
In the early 1960s, new technological developments transformed the cargo transportation industry. The traditional labor-intensive methods of unloading break-bulk vessels gave way to more efficient methods such as containerization. Ships now regularly carry their goods in gigantic containers, which can be moved ashore by gigantic land-based cranes. Containerization has greatly reduced the need for longshoremen.
Recognizing this, in 1965, waterfront management and labor entered into a collective bargaining agreement that guaranteed an annual income to waterfront laborers, regardless of the availability of work.
In 1966, the New Jersey and New York legislatures passed legislation to amend the compact. This legislation, signed into law by the governors of the two states, included § 5-p, which places control over the opening and closing of the register in the Commission. In New Jersey, § 5-p was codified as N.J.S.A. § 32:23-114:
In fulfilling its responsibilities under this section, the Commission must consult with waterfront management, labor, and other interested parties. The Commission's determinations are subject to judicial review.
Pursuant to its power under § 5-p to "suspend the acceptance of applications for inclusion in the longshoremen's register for such periods of time as the Commission may from time to time establish ...," the Commission has opened and closed the register. However, since 1969, the Commission has chosen not to open the register. Recently, the Commission conducted public hearings to determine if the register should be opened.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. As the Supreme Court defined in Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981), "because congressional consent transforms an interstate compact within the Compact Clause into a law of the United States, ... the construction of an interstate agreement sanctioned by Congress under the Compact Clause presents a federal question." Id. at 438, 101 S.Ct. at 707 (citations omitted); see also Waterfront Comm'n v. Sea Land Service, Inc., 764 F.2d 961, 963 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1985). For the reasons following, the Court determines that the Waterfront Commission compact, including § 5-p, is within the Compact Clause and that Congress has consented to it. Therefore, this Court has federal question jurisdiction.
The Commission argues that CME lacks "standing" to raise any constitutional defenses on behalf of its employees or others.
It is certainly true that one may not claim standing to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953). However, standing is rarely raised with regard to a defendant. When it is, courts have generally focused on whether the defendant has a sufficient interest to present a justiciable controversy. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Jamison, 787 F.Supp. 231, 235 n. 1 (D.D.C.1990); Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3531 (...
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