Waterhouse Const. Group v. 5891 Sw 64TH St.
Decision Date | 07 February 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 3D06-1452.,3D06-1452. |
Citation | 949 So.2d 1095 |
Parties | WATERHOUSE CONSTRUCTION GROUP, INC., Ofer Zosman, individually, Carlos DeLeon, individually, and Adrian Triana, individually, Appellants, v. 5891 SW 64TH STREET, LLC., and Thomas Hoffman, individually, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Diane S. Perera and James C. Kellner, for appellants.
Gustavo Gutierrez, Coconut Grove; Seth Loft; Kimberly L. Boldt, for appellees.
Before WELLS and CORTIÑAS, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
This is an appeal from the portion of an order denying the defendants', Waterhouse Construction Group, Inc. ("Waterhouse"), Ofer Zosman ("Zosman"), Carlos DeLeon ("DeLeon"), and Adrian Triana ("Triana") (collectively "defendants"), motion to dismiss or motion to stay litigation pending arbitration and motion to compel arbitration of plaintiffs' claims and defendants' counterclaims. We reverse.
5891 SW 64th Street, LLC ("Street"), owned the property which is the subject of this litigation. Thomas Hoffman ("Hoffman"), a real estate developer, and Street (collectively "plaintiffs") agreed to develop the subject property. Subsequently, in April 2004, Street and Hoffman entered into a joint venture agreement (the "JV Agreement") with defendants Zosman and DeLeon to build various homes on the subject property. The JV Agreement specified that defendant Waterhouse would act as the general contractor in the development project. Notably, defendants Zosman and DeLeon are both officers and directors of Waterhouse, and defendant Triana is an agent of Waterhouse. Several months after the parties entered into the JV Agreement, Street entered into a construction contract (the "Construction Contract") with Waterhouse for the construction of a single family residence on the subject property.
In January 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against Zosman, DeLeon, and Triana for alleged breaches of the JV Agreement. Count I of the complaint alleged that Zosman and DeLeon failed to provide an accounting and diverted joint venture funds by entering into side agreements. Count V of the complaint alleged that Zosman, DeLeon, and Triana violated section 772.103, Florida Statutes, by engaging in a pattern of fraudulent racketeering activity, including forging two Release/Waiver of Liens ("RICO claims"). The remaining counts of the complaint included damages against Waterhouse for numerous breaches of the Construction Contract with Street; however, at a subsequent hearing on the defendants' motions to stay litigation and compel arbitration, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all of their claims against Waterhouse. Therefore, the remaining counts of the plaintiffs' complaint are Count I for breach of the JV Agreement and Count V for the RICO claims.
Defendants Waterhouse, Zosman, and DeLeon filed counterclaims against the plaintiffs for breaches of the Construction Contract and the JV Agreement. Additionally, based on paragraph 15.8 of the Construction Contract, Waterhouse simultaneously moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration of its counterclaims.1 Similarly, based on paragraph 21(f) of the JV Agreement, Zosman and DeLeon moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration of the plaintiffs' remaining claims and their individual counterclaims.2
Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on the defendants' motions to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the defendants' motions as to the plaintiffs' claims and also denied the motions as to the defendants' counterclaims for breach of the Construction Contract and the JV Agreement.3 The defendants now appeal the trial court's denial of their request to stay litigation and compel arbitration.
We review an order denying a motion to compel arbitration de novo. Briceno v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So.2d 176, 179 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (citing Tropical Ford, Inc. v. Major, 882 So.2d 476, 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)). There are "three elements for courts to consider in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration of a given dispute: (1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitration was waived." Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.2d 633, 636 (Fla.1999) (citing Terminix Int'l Co., L.P. v. Ponzio, 693 So.2d 104, 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)). At issue in this case are the last two elements of the analysis set forth in Seifert.4
However, in this case we are also confronted with the issue of whether Zosman, DeLeon, and Triana can compel Hoffman and Street to arbitrate the RICO claims. We must address this issue first because if we determine that a party may not be compelled to arbitrate, the issues of whether the plaintiffs' claims are arbitrable and whether the defendants have waived the right to arbitrate need not be reached.
Florida courts have clearly recognized that a non-signatory may compel a signatory to arbitration when the non-signatories received rights and assumed obligations under the agreement. Koechli v. BIP Intern., Inc., 870 So.2d 940, 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ( ); see also Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Maharaj, 787 So.2d 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Ocwen Fin. Corp. v. Holman, 769 So.2d 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In Turner Construction Co. v. Advanced Roofing, Inc., 904 So.2d 466 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), we recognized the principle set forth in Koechli, Tenet, and Ocwen, and concluded that, in addition to receiving rights and assuming obligations under the agreement, the non-signatory party must also be an agent, officer, or director of a signatory. Turner, 904 So.2d at 470 (citing MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Because there are two agreements at issue, which involve five parties, we begin by setting forth all the claims and all the parties that can potentially arbitrate each claim before we begin the analysis set forth in Seifert. We conclude that all the defendants may compel the plaintiffs to arbitration. Zosman and DeLeon may compel Hoffman and Street to arbitrate their counterclaims for breach of the JV Agreement because all parties to the counterclaims are also signatories to the JV Agreement. Similarly, Waterhouse's counterclaims are clearly arbitrable as the parties to those counterclaims, Waterhouse and Street, are also signatories to the Construction Contract. We also find that Zosman, DeLeon, and Triana can rely on the arbitration provisions in either the Construction Contract or the JV Agreement to compel Hoffman and Street to arbitrate the RICO claims against them. As noted above, the parties to the Construction Contract are Waterhouse and Street, and the parties to the JV Agreement are Zosman, DeLeon, Hoffman, and Street. Pursuant to the Construction Contract, Waterhouse had a duty to furnish Street with the Release/Waiver of Liens at issue, in order to receive the necessary funds to continue construction. Moreover, the JV Agreement created a duty on Waterhouse, Zosman, and DeLeon to provide documentation directly relating to the Release/Waiver of Liens.5 It is evident from the record that Zosman, DeLeon, and Triana also assumed the obligation of executing these duties under both agreements by preparing and submitting these documents to the plaintiffs. Moreover, as required by Turner, Zosman, DeLeon, and Triana were all officers, directors, or agents of Waterhouse.
Next, we must determine whether counts I and V are arbitrable claims. We disagree with the trial court that the plaintiffs' remaining claims are not arbitrable. It is well-settled that "arbitration is a favored means of dispute resolution ...." Ronbeck Constr. Co., Inc. v. Savanna Club Corp., 592 So.2d 344, 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (quoting Roe v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 533 So.2d 279, 281 (Fla.1988)). This court has consistently acknowledged the important public policy in favor of arbitration. See, e.g., Zager Plumbing, Inc. v. JPI Nat'l Constr., Inc., 785 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Universal Employment Agency, 664 So.2d 1107, 1108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Middleton, 648 So.2d 1200, 1201-02 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Lapidus v. Arlen Beach Condo. Ass'n, 394 So.2d 1102, 1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Thus, we start our analysis by noting that "[a]ll questions concerning scope or waiver of the right to arbitrate under contracts should be resolved in favor of arbitration rather than against it." Zager, 785 So.2d at 662 (citing Beverly Hills Dev. Corp. v. George Wimpey of Fla., Inc., 661 So.2d 969, 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)).
Here, the JV Agreement stipulates that "the parties agree to an arbitration process, to try to resolve any [and] all disputes." We construe the terms "any [and] all disputes" to include count I of the plaintiff's complaint for alleged breaches of the JV Agreement and count V for the alleged RICO claims. Moreover, the Construction Contract similarly states that "[a]ll claims or disputes . . . shall be decided by arbitration." We construe these terms to include count V of the complaint for the alleged RICO claims. See Royal Caribbean, 664 So.2d at 1108-09 ( ); Ronbeck, 592 So.2d at 346-47 (...
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