Waters v. Mason

Decision Date16 March 2023
Docket NumberCIVIL 1:22-cv-448
PartiesJOHN VINCENT WATERS, Petitioner, v. BERNADETTE MASON, Superintendent, et al., Respondents.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM OPINION [1]

Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

In 1982, John Waters committed a hideous crime, sexually assaulting and murdering an eleven-year-old boy. Waters was himself a youth at the time of this murderous sex crime, as he was sixteen years of age. Initially sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, Waters obtained a re-sentencing in 2017 following United States Supreme Court decisions setting aside mandatory life sentences for juvenile killers like Waters.

While this resentencing provided Waters with all the relief he was constitutionally entitled to receive, the petitioner now seeks to have this lesser sentence set aside based upon his novel and eccentric beliefs that the Pennsylvania courts are now essentially powerless to further punish him for the horrific crimes he committed.

We disagree.

Pending before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by John Waters. In 1982, when he was sixteen years old Waters was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”) stemming from the brutal sexual assault and murder of his eleven-year-old neighbor, Stephen Turner. Waters was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder and received a concurrent sentence of 4 to 10 years for IDSI. Following the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), which rendered life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders unconstitutional, Waters was resentenced in 2017 to a term of 35 years to life imprisonment, with a consecutive sentence of 4 to 10 years for his IDSI conviction.

Waters now asserts that his resentencing was unconstitutional, in that his sentence violates Due Process, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the separation of powers. After consideration, we find that Waters' claims are without merit. Accordingly, we will deny this petition.

II. Statement of Facts and of the Case

The factual background of the instant case was aptly summarized by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in its decision affirming Waters' initial conviction and sentence:

On October 14, 1981, the body of an eleven year old boy, Steven Turner, was found stabbed and bludgeoned to death in an abandoned farm house within a mile of his home in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. The body, covered by stones and boards, was discovered in the evening as a result of a search for the boy which commenced when he did not come home for dinner.
An autopsy revealed that the 4 foot 9 inch, 80 pound sixth grader had died as a result of multiple head injuries. He had sustained a massive fracture of the skull from blows to the back and the side of the head, a broken jaw on each side of the face, a stab wound to the back of the neck and a stab wound to the back of the chest. He had also been subjected to a post-mortem incise wound on the right wrist and stab wound in the front of the neck. The blade of a knife, with its handle broken off, was left in the victim's neck. The autopsy report also indicated that sperm was present in the victim's mouth.
The appellant, John Vincent Waters, a 152 pound, sixteen year old, 5 foot 8 inch high school student told police during an original canvass of the neighborhood, that he had last seen the victim on the afternoon he disappeared. He told the police that he had observed the victim getting into an unknown car which subsequently drove out of the development.
As a result of a further canvass of the neighborhood, the police obtained a steak knife from the appellant's mother. The knife which she had in her house matched the one found at the murder scene including the blade which had been left in the victim's throat.
On October 25, 1981, the police requested that the appellant and his father report to the municipal building for questioning concerning the homicide. The appellant was given the Miranda warnings in the presence of his father. Thereafter he and his father consulted with each other. The appellant waived his rights and agreed to speak to the police without having his father present. His father had no objection to such an interrogation.
During the course of the questioning, the appellant made an inculpatory statement, admitting that he had engaged in oral intercourse with the victim and then had killed him.

Commonwealth v. Waters, 483 A.2d 855, 857-58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).

Waters was convicted by a jury of IDSI in May of 1982, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the murder charge. Id. at 857. Following a second trial in September of 1982, Waters was convicted of first-degree murder. Id. Waters was then sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder and a concurrent term of 4 to 10 years for IDSI. Id. The Superior Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on October 12, 1984, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur on February 14, 1985. Waters filed a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and his petition was denied on June 3, 1985.

Waters then filed a petition under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq., on July 14, 2010, arguing that his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), which held that life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide were unconstitutional. However, the PCRA court dismissed Waters' petition as untimely on December 13, 2010, noting that Graham did not apply to Waters, as he had been convicted of first-degree homicide. (Doc. 14-2, at 55-57). On appeal, Waters again raised the Graham case as an avenue for sentencing relief, as well as claims that his life without parole sentence violated both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution. (Id., at 78-79). On August 16, 2011, the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court's decision holding that the petition was untimely. (Id. at 77-82). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur on November 22, 2011. (Id., at 84).

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Miller, Waters filed a second PCRA petition on July 3, 2012, and an amended counseled petition on October 12, 2016, after Montgomery rendered Miller retroactive. Waters' PCRA petition was granted on February 2, 2016, finding that Miller and Montgomery constituted a “new constitutional right” exception to the PCRA's time bar. Subsequently, the trial court held resentencing hearings on November 13 and December 4, 2017, and Waters was resentenced to a term of 35 years to life with the possibility of parole for the murder and a consecutive term of 4 to 10 years for IDSI. Waters filed a motion to modify his sentence arguing that the consecutive 4-to-10-year term violated the Double Jeopardy clause, and this motion was denied by the trial court on December 15, 2017. (Doc. 14-2, at 86).

Waters then filed an appeal of the trial court's resentencing. While he was appointed counsel, who filed a statement pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b), Waters also filed his own pro se 1925(b) statement, as well as a request to proceed pro se. Ultimately, Waters retained new counsel, who filed an amended 1925(b) statement, after which the trial court filed its 1925(a) opinion recommending that Waters' sentence be upheld. Waters' arguments on appeal challenged the consecutive term of 4 to 10 years for IDSI, as well as the trial court's jurisdiction to impose the 35-years-to-life sentence for his murder conviction. The Superior Court ultimately upheld Waters' sentence, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur on March 24, 2021.[2] (Doc. 14-4, at 35-49, 61). On May 24, 2021, the Superior Court vacated its order imposing the costs of prosecution on Waters but affirmed his sentence in all other respects. (Id., at 51-59).

While Waters' appeal of his resentencing was pending, he filed a petition for habeas corpus with this court on July 3, 2018. Waters v. Delbalso, et al., Civ. No. 18-CV-1333. The district court ultimately dismissed Waters' petition as premature because he had not yet exhausted his administrative remedies. Following the conclusion of his state court appeals, on March 24, 2022, Waters filed the instant habeas petition. (Doc. 1).

Waters' petition raises several grounds for habeas relief. First, he asserts that the term “life imprisonment” set forth in 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1102(a) is void as applied to him, and because of an ambiguity in the term, the sentencing court had no jurisdiction to sentence him. Second, he claims that the resentencing regime following Miller violates Pennsylvania's separation of powers. Finally, he asserts that his new sentence of 35 years to life and a consecutive 4 to 10 years for IDSI violates Due Process, the rule of lenity, and the law of the case doctrine. Much of Waters' arguments revolve around the Pennsylvania courts' application of Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (Batts II), which held that after Miller, a juvenile offender could still be sentenced to a maximum sentence of life imprisonment so long as that sentence was accompanied by a minimum sentence.

For their part, the respondents assert that Waters' petition is untimely, and that his claims have not been fully and properly exhausted in the state courts. Moreover, they contend that his claims are without merit. After review of the petition and the underlying state court record,...

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