Waters v. National Biscuit Co.

• Decision Date: 23 February 1966
• Docket Number: No. 41509,No. 3,41509,3
• Parties: Girthie WATERS v. NATIONAL BISCUIT COMPANY
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 676

147 S.E.2d 676

113 Ga.App. 170

Girthie WATERS v. NATIONAL BISCUIT COMPANY.

No. 41509.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 3.

Feb. 23, 1966.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under Code Ann. § 114-709 additional compensation may be awarded for a change in condition from a specific disability to a general disability.

2. The evidence authorized a finding of causal relationship between claimant's original injury and the general disability shown at the hearing to determine change in condition.

3. Where it appears that an award of the board was based upon an erroneous legal theory and that for this reason the board has not considered all the evidence in light of applicable legal principles, the case should be remanded to the board for further findings.

This is an appeal from a judgment affirming an award denying workmen's compensation.

In March, 1960 the claimant suffered a compression fracture of the radius of her left arm in an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment. For several months the employer paid claimant compensation for total disability according to agreements approved by the board. After a hearing to determine a change in condition, the board made an award directing the employer to pay claimant compensation for total loss of use of the specific member.

In November, 1962 the claimant requested another hearing on the ground of a change in condition. After a hearing held in February, 1963 the board made an award stating as follows:

'Claimant fractured her left arm in February, 1960, and except for a brief period when she tried to work, claimant was totally disabled until on or about December 18, 1961. * * * Claimant, upon her return to work, apparently tried several jobs and finally ended upon a sorting job which required her to sit on an elevated platform which she reached by climbing a ladder composed of about eight steps, with a hand rail on the right side. * * * Claimant descended the ladder in an awkward manner, in that instead of coming down backwards, she came down frontwards, swinging her right arm across her body to hold the rail; * * * on the night of February 21, 1962, at the end of her shift, as she descended the ladder, her 'back gave way' and she twisted around and hurt her right shoulder and back * * *.

'The original injury in this case was a fracture of the distal end of the left radius; therefore it was from the beginning, and remains, a specific member injury. There is nothing in the evidence to show that the disability now contended by the claimant is in any way related to the original accident or to the injury to the left arm. Consequently any disability now suffered by the claimant would not be established by a change in condition but would be the result of a new accident, if any.'

J. Richmond Garland, M. T. Hartman, III, Atlanta, for appellant.

Woodruff, Savell, Lane & Williams, John M. Williams, Lawson Cox, Atlanta, for appellee.

BELL, Presiding Judge.

1. In a portion of the award, the board stated, 'The original injury in this case was a fracture of the distal end of the left radius; therefore it was from the beginning, and remains, a specific member injury.' The stated conclusion, if it means what it apparently does, that there can be no award under Code Ann. § 114-404 or § 114-405 for general incapacity as a change in condition after an award under Code Ann. § 114-406 for industrial handicap, is a misconception of the law. 'As we comprehend Code Ann. § 114-709, compensation may be awarded for disability resulting from an injury to a specific member of the body as a change in condition from a related general disability stemming from an accident. We think there may be a change in condition from a specific to a general disability or vice versa, provided, of course, that the claimant's total compensation does not exceed the limit prescribed by Code Ann. § 114-404.' General Motors Corp., Fisher Body Division v. Bowman, 107 Ga.App. 335, 339, 130 S.E.2d 163, 165; Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America v. Rucker, 87 Ga.App. 375, 381, 73 S.E.2d 609; United States Casualty Co. v. Truett, 108 Ga.App. 322, 323, 132 S.E.2d 789. Thus if there was a causal relationship between claimant's original specific disability and the general disability shown at the hearing of February, 1963, she was entitled to compensation for total incapacity under Code Ann. § 114-404 irrespective of the fact that the result of her injury at first amounted merely to a specific disability.

2. Dr. William A. Wood testified that in January, 1961, 'On examination she did have rather marked spasm of the right trapezius muscles which extend across the right shoulder. She did have full range of motion in her neck and it was my impression that this condition was mostly aggravated or brought about by her previous injury to her arm which she had worn in a cast for several months.'

In an examination in April, 1961, Dr. Charles M. Taylor 'found that she had muscle spasm in the neck, back and shoulder area.' He testified, 'That could be due to a nerve involvement resulting from pressure on the nerves in the brachial prexus * * *. It could be the result of the injury, the injury to the wrist itself. * * * The fall that she had is possibly the main cause of the muscle spasm, and also the wearing of the cast, by creating a unilateral muscular pull.'

In February, 1963, Dr. James McCall found that 'There was swelling in the right hand and wrist and also in the medial portion of the elbow. * * * On our foramen compression test there was a positive finding there causing a sharp paid down the right arm and into the right shoulder, even going on out into the hand.'

Dr. Darius Flinchum's testimony indicated the condition of claimant's right arm and hand was a reactive state associated with the condition of claimant's shoulder, which other medical testimony showed could have been caused by the original injury.

Moreover, there was evidence that claimant had developed mental disorder in connection with her physical incapacities.

One psychiatrist's opinion was, 'The central problem seems to resolve around the disability of her left wrist. * * * Her injury, incapacitation, and in particular, rejection by employers she felt owed her more, produced the emergency situation in the current depressive reaction.'

Another psychiatrist testified, 'I think that her emotional disorder is so pronounced that she would not be able to function normally, or to make an employee worthy of her hire, so to speak. * * * The symptoms started after the first accident, and after she had been returned to duty. *...