Waters v. Whiting

• Decision Date: 01 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 431,431
• Citation: 113 Md.App. 464,688 A.2d 459
• Parties: Mary G. WATERS v. Ella Mae WHITING, et al. Ella Mae WHITING, et vir v. Nick STEVENSON, et al. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 464

113 Md.App. 464

688 A.2d 459

Mary G. WATERS v. Ella Mae WHITING, et al.

Ella Mae WHITING, et vir v. Nick STEVENSON, et al.

No. 431, Sept. Term, 1996.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 31, 1997.

Nathaniel Fick, Towson, for appellant Waters.

Joann M. Wood (David W. Densford, on the brief), Leonardtown, for Whiting, et vir.

Bryan T. Dugan (Bill D. McKissick and Dugan & McKissick, L.L.C., on the brief), Lexington Park, for appellees Stevenson, et al.

Argued before CATHELL, DAVIS, and EYLER, JJ.

EYLER, Judge.

On October 19, 1993, appellees, Ella Mae Whiting and Donald Earnest Whiting, sued appellant Mary G. Waters, as well as Lenell Waters, Nick and Cheryl Stevenson, and Raymond and Belva Mathieson. The Whitings voluntarily dismissed the Mathiesons and Lenell Waters from the suit prior to trial.

On November 7 through 9, 1995, a jury trial was held in the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County on issues raised in a second amended complaint filed by the Whitings against Mary Waters and the Stevensons. The second amended complaint contained eight counts: civil conspiracy, interference with prospective advantage, trespass, invasion of privacy, violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution. The jury returned a verdict for the Whitings against Cheryl Stevenson and Mary Waters for interference with prospective advantage, against Mary Waters and the Stevensons for invasion of privacy, against Cheryl Stevenson and Mary Waters for intentional infliction of emotional distress as to Ella Mae Whiting, and against Mary Waters for malicious prosecution as to Ella Mae Whiting. The jury assessed damages against Cheryl Stevenson in the total amount of $9,000 and against Mary Waters in the total amount of $14,000. ¹

Judgment was entered against Mary Waters and the Stevensons on November 9, 1995. On November 20, 1995, the Stevensons timely filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, on November 22, 1995, Mary Waters filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The latter motion was not filed within 10 days after entry of the judgment. Consequently, Mary Waters, believing that the November 9 judgment was final and appealable as to her, filed a notice of appeal on December 8, 1995. Subsequently, she withdrew her post-judgment motion.

On April 22, 1996, the circuit court granted the Stevensons' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On May 10, 1996, the Whitings filed a notice of appeal from the judgment entered in favor of the Stevensons. In this Court, prior to the filing of briefs, Mary Waters filed a "motion for extraordinary relief" in which she observed the following:

This situation is now at cross-purposes: Mary G. Waters is appealing a verdict that has now been overturned, while the original plaintiffs are appealing the circuit court's action granting the judgment notwithstanding verdict.

Mary Waters requested that she be placed in the same posture as the other defendants in the case; specifically, she requested that we either dismiss the appeal without prejudice or remand the case to the circuit court with instructions to entertain a refiled motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 2-532 or a revisory motion under Rule 2- 535. This Court declined to grant the relief requested but, at the same time and on our own initiative, ordered that the parties address in their briefs the following question:

When, in a multi-party action, judgment is rendered on all claims against all parties and one or more, but fewer than all, parties files a timely motion under Rule 2-532, 2-533, or 2-534, is the time for filing an appeal by a party who has not filed such a motion stayed until the motion filed by the other part(ies) is withdrawn or ruled upon?

All parties involved in this tragedy lived in the same neighborhood in St. Mary's County. Donald Whiting was arrested on November 2, 1991 and charged with sexual offenses involving minor females, including a daughter of Mary Waters and a daughter of the Stevensons. Donald Whiting's trial began in December 1992, but it ended with a mistrial. Trial was rescheduled for March 10, 1993. On that date, Donald Whiting pled not guilty to an agreed statement of facts, and the circuit court found him guilty of sexual offenses with respect to three minor females, including the Stevenson and Waters minors.

The Stevensons filed a civil action seeking damages against Donald Whiting based on the sexual abuse of their daughter. A trial resulted in a jury verdict for the Stevensons. Mary Waters filed a similar civil action against Donald Whiting and that trial resulted in a verdict in his favor. Subsequently, Mary Waters initiated criminal complaints against the Whitings, alleging harassment. The Whitings were arrested, but the charges eventually were dismissed.

On May 29, 1993, and again on August 31, 1993, the Whitings hosted a V.O.C.A.L. ² gathering on their property. This incensed the other parties. Cheryl Stevenson and Mary Waters made various signs and posted them in the neighborhood, identifying Donald Whiting as a convicted child molester.

These events left all of the parties with resentment that continued to build over time. Several incidents occurred with respect to the Whitings' property that the Whitings attribute to the Stevensons and Mary Waters: signs disappeared, their mailbox repeatedly was stuffed with junk mail, a fire was started on their property in December 1992, they received phone calls but, upon answering, the caller would hang up, and they were unable to rent a second home that they owned as a rental property.

As mentioned previously, the Whitings filed suit in October, 1993 and the matter is now before this Court.

Issues

Mary Waters appeals and, in addition to the issue posed by this Court, raises the following issues, as condensed and rephrased by us:

1. Did the circuit court err in failing to grant a motion for judgment as to each claim because the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict?

2. Were the activities that formed the basis of the invasion of privacy claim protected by the First Amendment?

The Whitings appeal and, in addition to the issue posed by this Court, raise the following additional issues, as condensed and rephrased by us:

1. Did Cheryl Stevenson's failure to move for judgment at the close of the Whitings' case preclude her filing of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict?

2. Did the circuit court err in granting Cheryl Stevenson's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the claims for interference with prospective advantage and intentional infliction of emotional distress? ³

Discussion

With respect to the issue posed by this Court, all parties agree that the filing of post judgment motions by the Stevensons did not toll Mary Waters' time for noting an appeal and, consequently, Mary Waters had 30 days from the entry of the judgment on November 9, 1995, within which to note an appeal. The parties reason that the jury rendered separate verdicts for each defendant and that separate judgments were docketed. The parties lament, however, that the Maryland Rules give precious little guidance regarding this issue. We agree with the parties that the Maryland Rules do not specifically refer to the situation in which fewer than all defendants in a multi-defendant case file post trial motions. We read Rule 8-202 to provide that the timely filing of a post judgment motion pursuant to Rules 2-532, 2-533, or 2-534 by any single party in a multi-party case extends the time for noting an appeal for all parties.

Section 12-301 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, Md.Code Ann. (1995 Repl.Vol. & 1996 Supp.), provides in pertinent part that, except in certain instances not relevant here, a party may appeal only from a final judgment. This requirement is a jurisdictional requirement. Popham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 333 Md. 136, 142, 634 A.2d 28 (1994). We recently commented on the importance of the final judgment doctrine, noting that it is " 'based on the theory that piecemeal appeals are oppressive and costly, and that optimal appellate review is achieved by allowing appeals only after the entire action is resolved in the trial court....' " Jenkins v. Jenkins, 112 Md.App. 390, 409, 685 A.2d 817 (1996) (quoting 4 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 86 (1995 & Supp.1996)). See also Harris v. David S. Harris, P.A., 310 Md. 310, 314-15, 529 A.2d 356 (1987).

A judgment is considered final "if it decides or settles the 'very matter in controversy between the parties' and determines 'the question of right in issue in the cause.' " Planning Board v. Mortimer, 310 Md. 639, 644-45, 530 A.2d 1237 (1987) (quoting Nally v. Long, 56 Md. 567, 571 (1881)). "In addition to being intended as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy, ⁴ ... '[t]he judgment must settle the rights of the parties, thereby concluding the cause of action.' " Popham, 333 Md. at 142, 634 A.2d 28 (quoting Estep v. Georgetown Leather Design, 320 Md. 277, 282, 577 A.2d 78 (1990)). Further, the filing of post trial motions deprives an otherwise final judgment of its appealability until such motions have been resolved. Id. at 144, 634 A.2d 28; Unnamed Attorney v. Attorney Grievance Commission, 303 Md. 473, 494 A.2d 940 (1985).

Here, the parties contend that at the time the verdicts and judgment were entered on the docket, all of the issues in the case were finally determined and settled by the circuit court. They further contend that Mary Waters's failure to file timely a post judgment motion left the judgment against her final and appealable. While we agree that the judgments would have been final and appealable as of November 9, 1995 had no post judgment motions been filed by the Stevensons, the judgments lost their finality for purposes of appeal once the...