Waters v. Williams

• Decision Date: 21 September 2001
• Citation: 821 So.2d 1000
• Parties: Brandy Rae WATERS v. Willie Shade WILLIAMS, Jr., and Betty G. Williams.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

821 So.2d 1000

Brandy Rae WATERS v. Willie Shade WILLIAMS, Jr., and Betty G. Williams.

2991228.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

September 21, 2001.

Certiorari Denied December 14, 2001.

Mark R. Ulmer and Andrew S. McDavid of Ulmer, Hillman, Ballard & Nikolakis, P.C., Mobile, for appellant.

Joseph C. McCorquodale III and Jacqualyn S. Bradley of McCorquodale & McCorquodale, Jackson; and John W. Thompson II of Thompson & Thompson, Butler, for appellees.

Alabama Supreme Court 1010094.

PER CURIAM.

Willie Shade Williams, Jr., and Betty G. Williams, on April 11, 1997, sued Gene Waters; Brandy Rae Waters, the minor daughter of Gene Waters; and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, seeking damages based on allegations of negligence and wantonness, negligent entrustment, and loss of consortium. All claims arose out of an automobile accident. The complaint also sought uninsured-motorist benefits.

Gene Waters moved for a summary judgment on June 18, 1999; the trial court granted the summary judgment on August 4, 1999. On September 29, 1999, State Farm moved the court to permit it to opt out of the trial proceedings, pursuant to Lowe v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 521 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1988). The court granted the motion on October 4, 1999.

The case proceeded to trial, and on April 5, 2000, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Williamses. The jury awarded Willie $250,000 on his claims and awarded Betty $50,000 on her loss-of-consortium claim. On April 12, 2000, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the Williamses on the jury verdict.

On April 19, 2000, Brandy Waters moved for a new trial, or, in the alternative, a postverdict judgment as a matter of law ("JML"), arguing (1) that the Williamses had exercised their peremptory jury strikes in a manner that violated her federal and state constitutional rights, by violating the principles of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala.1987), and (2) that the court had erred in failing to charge the jury on the sudden-emergency doctrine. Following a hearing on Brandy's postjudgment motion, the court, on July 3, 2000, entered an order denying it. Brandy appealed. This case was transferred to this court by the supreme court, pursuant to § 12-2-7, Ala.Code 1975.

On July 5, 1995, Willie was driving his automobile on Forest Avenue in Jackson. Brandy was also driving an automobile on Forest Avenue and was following Willie. When Willie brought his car to a stop on Forest Avenue, in order to turn onto Walnut Street and go home, he was struck in the rear by the automobile being driven by Brandy.

Brandy argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her Batson challenge to the Williamses' peremptory strikes. She specifically argues that the Williamses' counsel failed to engage the potential jurors in a meaningful voir dire and that that failure is evidence that the race-neutral reasons offered by the Williamses to explain the exercise of their peremptory strikes were a sham or a mere pretext for purposeful discrimination.

In Oblander v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 792 So.2d 1103 (Ala.Civ.App. 2000), this court enunciated the procedure and law applicable to a Batson challenge:

"The United States Constitution prohibits a prosecutor from exercising his peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609, 621 (Ala.1987) (interpreting Batson and Ex parte Jackson, 516 So.2d 768 (Ala.1986)). This prohibition applies to the parties in civil cases as well. Thomas v. Diversified Contractors, Inc., 551 So.2d 343 (Ala.1989); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991).

"`[T]he Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using the State's peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased persons from the petit jury solely by reason of their race, a practice that forecloses a significant opportunity to participate in civic life. An individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race.'

"Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991).

"Under Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609, the party alleging a discriminatory use of peremptory challenges has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Once a prima facie case has been established, it is presumed that the peremptory challenges were used to discriminate against black jurors. Id. at 623. The burden is then on the party against whom the prima facie case is established to `articulat[e] a clear, specific, and legitimate reason for the challenge which relates to the particular case to be tried, and which is nondiscriminatory.' Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d at 623, citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97,106 S.Ct. 1712 (emphasis omitted).

"In Smith v. Jackson, 770 So.2d 1068, 1072 (Ala.2000), the supreme court stated:

"`Under Alabama law, the trial judge must "evaluat[e] the evidence and explanations presented" and "determine whether the explanations are sufficient to overcome the presumption of bias." Branch, 526 So.2d at 624. "The trial judge cannot merely accept the specific reasons given ... at face value; the judge must consider whether the facially neutral explanations are contrived to avoid admitting the acts of group discrimination." Id.'

"An appellate court will not reverse the trial judge's ruling on whether the responding party presented race-neutral reasons unless it is clearly erroneous. Looney v. Davis, 721 So.2d 152, 164 (Ala.1998). Intuition or suspicion by the responding party is insufficient to rebut the presumption of discrimination. Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d at 623.

". . . .

"... [T]he `"removal of even one juror for a racially discriminatory reason is a violation of the equal protection rights of both the excluded juror and the party challenging the peremptory strike."' [Smith, 770 So.2d at 1074], quoting Looney, 721 So.2d at 163 (citing Ex parte Jackson, 640 So.2d 1050 (Ala. 1993), and Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d 676 (Ala.1991)).

". . . .

"... Although the trial court is not required to explain its ruling on a Batson motion, it does have to adequately consider whether the facially neutral reasons are contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination.

"`[T]he trial judge must make a sincere and reasonable effort to evaluate the evidence and explanations based on the circumstances as he knows them, his knowledge of trial techniques, and his observation of the manner in which the prosecutor examined the venire and the challenged jurors.'

". . . .

"`[T]he trial judge cannot merely accept the specific reasons given by the prosecutor at face value.'

"Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d at 624."

Oblander, 792 So.2d at 1108-12.

In this case, the jury venire consisted of 30 members—16 African-Americans and 14 Caucasians. Counsel for the Williamses used his peremptory strikes to strike one African-American female, three Caucasian females, and five Caucasian males. Counsel for Brandy used his peremptory strikes to strike three African-American females, three African-American males, one Caucasian female, and two Caucasian males. Counsel for Brandy made a "reverse" Batson motion,¹ alleging that the Williamses' peremptory strikes were exercised in a racially discriminatory manner, because eight of their nine strikes were exercised against Caucasians. The trial court determined that Brandy had established a prima facie case of discrimination and required the Williamses to present race-neutral reasons to justify the exercise of their strikes. Veniremember J.O. testified during the voir dire examination that his wife is employed as a real-estate agent at Pope Real Estate. After exercising a peremptory strike against J.O., counsel for the Williamses explained that he has sued Pope Real Estate three times, including one action that was pending at the time of trial, and that the Pope Real Estate firm does not "have good feelings toward [him.]" The record contains three complaints in which counsel for the Williamses had sued Pope Real Estate on behalf of other clients.

During the voir dire, the venire was asked by counsel for the Williamses whether they themselves or any member of their family had ever been sued or had ever been a defendant in a lawsuit. Veniremember J.H. stated that in her capacity as an employer she had been sued. She also stated that her husband had previously owned an automobile dealership and had been sued but that the lawsuit had been settled. Counsel for the Williamses used a peremptory strike against J.H. and counsel explained that he had previously represented a client that had sued J.H. The record contains a copy of the complaint in that case.

During the voir dire, counsel for the Williamses asked the veniremembers if anyone knew Gary Perkins, a local State Farm agent; veniremember J.J. responded by stating that they were friends. When the Williamses' counsel further questioned J.J. about his association with Perkins, J.J. said that their friendship had resulted from the fact that Perkins's wife was employed by the credit union of which J.J. was a member. Counsel for the Williamses used a peremptory strike to strike J.J. The Williamses' counsel stated that he struck J.J. because of his friendship with Perkins's wife, and he also explained that Perkins often assists State Farm's trial counsel with jury selection.

Veniremember C.P. informed the court during voir dire that she was a nurse. The Williamses' counsel used a peremptory strike to strike her and explained that he struck her because, after another nurse had been struck by opposing counsel, she was the only person left on the venire who had any medical knowledge.

Veniremember J.P. informed the court during voir dire that she knew Brandy's mother because their sons had played baseball together for three or four...