Wates v. Fairfield Forest Products Co.

• Decision Date: 05 May 1947
• Docket Number: 15944.
• Parties: WATES et al. v. FAIRFIELD FOREST PRODUCTS CO., Inc.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

42 S.E.2d 529

210 S.C. 319

WATES et al. v. FAIRFIELD FOREST PRODUCTS CO., Inc.

No. 15944.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 5, 1947

B. E. Nicholson, of Edgefield, for appellant.

J R. Folk, of Edgefield, for respondents.

OXNER Justice.

This appeal involves the construction of the will of Mrs. Annie Wates who died in December, 1932. Her will, executed on November 15, 1932, consists of three paragraphs reading as follows:

'1st I will & bequeath to my beloved Husband D. B. Wates all my estate, real & personal, to wit 194 acres of land situate in Moss Township Edgefield Co., S. C., also all personal property now in our possession.

'2nd. I will that my beloved husband D. B. Wates shall enjoy possession & benefits of the said Estate during the remainder of his life.

'3rd I will that the residue of said Estate after the decease of my beloved husband D. B. Wates shall be equally divided between our children & their heirs.'

In addition to her husband named in the will, the testatrix was survived by six children, all of whom are now more than 21 years of age and are respondents in this action. D. B. Wates remarried in 1934 and thereafter died intestate on December 16, 1940, leaving as his sole heirs at law his widow and the respondents, his children.

On November 27, 1946, respondents contracted in writing to sell and appellant to buy the 194 acre tract of land mentioned in the above will. The price agreed upon was $2,716. Appellant refused to comply with the contract upon the ground that the respondents could not convey fee simple title to the premises. Thereafter respondents brought this action for specific performance. Appellant stated in its answer that it was ready and willing to comply with said contract provided it could obtain fee simple title, but alleged that under the first paragraph of said will, D. B. Wates acquired fee simple title to said tract of land and as he subsequently died intestate leaving a widow and respondents as his heirs at law, his widow inherited an interest in said tract which was not conveyed by the tendered deed. Appellant further maintained in its answer that even if the will be construed as devising only a life estate to D. B. Wates, the third paragraph of said will did not vest respondents with a fee simple title in remainder to said tract of land. The lower Court held that the deed tendered by respondents conveyed fee simple title to the premises and directed specific performance. This appeal followed.

The principal question to be determined is what estate was given to D. B. Wates under the will. Respondents contend that he only acquired a life estate while appellant contends that he acquired a fee simple estate. Appellant says that under the first paragraph of the will, D. B. Wates took an estate in fee simple and that the subsequent paragraphs are of doubtful import and therefore insufficient, under the applicable rules of construction, to qualify or cut down the absolute estate previously given.

There is no doubt of the soundness or wisdom of the rule that when a gift is made in one clause of a will in clear and unequivocal terms, the quality or quantity of the estate given should not be cut down or qualified by words of doubtful import found in a subsequent clause. To have that effect, the subsequent words should be at least as clear in expressing that intention as the words in which the interest is given. Among the more recent cases in which we have had occasion to review the authorities and apply this rule are Newnham et al. v. Forest Hills, Inc., 195 S.C. 431 12 S.E.2d 10, and Peecksen, v. Peecksen, 206 S.C. 497, 34 S.E.2d 787. But of equal importance is the rule that we must ascertain and give effect to the intention of the testator unless it conflicts with some well settled rule of law. 'Another cardinal rule is that, in ascertaining the intention, the will must be read as a whole, and force and effect must be given to all parts of it, every clause, phrase, and word, if it can be done by any reasonable method of construction, so as to...